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Relatedness and Alienation in Interpersonal 
Understanding: A Phenomenological Account 
 
Amanda Taylor Aiken 
Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to provide a phenomenological exploration of relatedness and 
alienation in interpersonal understanding, which elucidates and supports recent 
interdisciplinary critiques of more traditional accounts of interpersonal 
understanding. Orthodox accounts of folk psychology, namely theory and 
simulation theories, have focused on the role of attributing mental states in 
understanding others. This focus has led to a neglect of how interaction and 
forms of relatedness contribute to the task of interpersonal understanding. 
Building on recent interdisciplinary research, my work aims to rectify this 
neglect through an exploration of how various forms of relations, particularly 
interactive relations between interlocutors, support interpersonal understanding. 
My account, therefore, emphasises understanding as a shared process, moving 
away from the spectatorial orientation of the orthodox accounts. My approach is 
distinctive in its use of Gadamerian hermeneutics to offer a novel and detailed 
account of the central role played by collaborative refinement of interpretative 
presuppositions. Examining face-to-face interaction, it becomes apparent that 
affective interactions often frame and underpin an ability to attribute mental 
states. I explore how, in conversational instances of interpersonal relatedness, 
understanding involves a continual collaborative refinement of interpretive 
presuppositions, resulting in a modification of understanding. From this my work 
broadens, taking into account how reciprocal embodied expression, space, and 
stance tacitly support an ability to relate to and understand others, in virtue of 
jointly inhabiting mutually meaningful social situations. To clarify the ways in 
which affective interaction and shared situation are partly constitutive of ability 
to understand others, I consider impaired forms of interpersonal understanding in 
the illnesses schizophrenia and depression. Examination of these instances 
highlights the central role held by an ability to dynamically engage and inhabit 
relations with others.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Understanding […] inherent to the investigation 
of human beings is not, at least in the first place, a 
grasp of mind.” (Schatzki 2000: 165) 
 
“The mechanism of the body cannot explain the 
spontaneity of the subject.” (Deleuze 1991: 89) 
 
“What they leave out of the world is precisely  
what binds us to it.” (Ratcliffe 2009: 291) 
 
 
This is a thesis about intersubjectivity: a philosophical and 
phenomenological investigation of how we find ourselves alongside and able to 
understand others. Intersubjectivity is, at present, a topic that is thriving in 
interdisciplinary academic thought. Questions of how we understand others, 
mechanisms that may be involved in enabling this ability, the role of a shared 
social world, and whether we might identify neural correlates of understanding, 
have all thrived in recent years. Situated against this rich interdisciplinary 
backdrop, the motivation for this thesis arose from the way in which many 
researchers began to use the term ‘relatedness’ to counter what they saw as an 
overly mechanised account of interpersonal understanding.1 Emerging 
predominantly from Hobson’s work, the importance of taking account of the role 
of ‘relatedness’ in understanding others became one of the trade-mark pleas of 
                                                      
1 Despite the term ‘relatedness’ entering the debate largely through Hobson’s work (1993, 2002, 
2007b, Hobson, Lee & Hobson 2007), we can trace the life of the concept of relatedness as active 
in many spheres. It holds importance for psychoanalytic theory, which situates and seeks a basis 
for therapy in the bond between analyst and patient. In psychoanalytic practice and theory, the 
dynamism of the relation shared between practitioner and patient is of primary, and therapeutic, 
importance. We can also find it present, peppered in writing from philosophy and psychology 
through Buber (2004 [1937]) and other writers such as Cole (2001), MacMurray (1999 [1961]), 
Ratcliffe (2007a, 2009), Scheler (1998 [1954]), Schutz (1967), Stanghellini & Ballerini (2007), 
Starwarska (2009), Stern (1984, 1993), Trevarthen (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978) and Urfer 
(2001). In calling attention to how this term, and related ones (such as ‘relations’), are used, I 
seek to make the role of relatedness more explicit by emphasising the term and subsequently 
exploring what supports a sense of relatedness to dynamically evolve through interaction. 
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those critical of what has become the orthodox account of interpersonal 
understanding: folk psychology. 
Throughout this thesis I use the term ‘folk psychology’ to refer to a 
philosophical position which seeks to describe our ‘commonsense’, everyday 
understanding of others.  In what follows, I shall develop a critical attitude in 
relation to this position, and maintain that it does not offer us the account of 
everyday intersubjective understanding that it seeks to provide.  
Broadly speaking, proponents of folk psychology argue that 
understanding others is primarily a matter of being able to attribute appropriate 
propositional attitudes, principally beliefs and desires, to them based on 
observation of their behaviour. Digging a little deeper, we find two main 
competing theories as to what enables us to understand others: theory theorists 
hold that ability to do so is enabled by possession of a theory of mind (Carruthers 
and Smith (eds.) 1996; Stich and Nichols 2003); whilst their rivals, the 
simulation theorists, deny the need for a theory, instead arguing that attribution 
of appropriate propositional attitudes is achieved through engaging in simulation 
routines (Gordon 1986; Goldman 2002, 2005, 2006; Heal 1986). Acknowledging 
that both accounts have some merit, hybrid theory states that successful 
understanding of others is born out of a fusion of both the possession of a theory 
of mind and an engagement in simulation routines: sometimes recourse to theory 
is needed whilst at other times simulation must be called upon. On other 
occasions both are used (Goldman 2006; Stich and Nichols 2003). 
Recently, these views have been criticised as relying on a conception of 
people that is overly individualistic and detached; as a consequence, they neglect 
the important role of certain ‘social’ aspects.2 More specifically, the ability to 
understand others, calling on the words of Clark and Chalmers, “ain’t [all] in the 
head” (1998: 8). Closely related to this criticism are the charges that folk 
psychology neglects to take account of the affective tonality of our exchanges 
with others, often referred to as ‘relatedness’, and to acknowledge the 
constructive role which relatedness plays. It is argued that this neglect leads 
advocates of folk psychology to mischaracterise the stance ordinarily occupied 
when understanding others, which in turn results in a failure to take into account 
                                                      
2 See Hutto and Ratcliffe (Eds.) 2007 for a selection of papers offering a critical reappraisal of 
folk psychology. 
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the interactive nature of understanding (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 
Gallagher 2001, Ratcliffe 2007a). These criticisms combine to present an 
alternative way in which intersubjective understanding may be understood; one 
that respects the ‘everyday phenomena’ of intersubjectivity more closely than 
folk psychology is able to.  
Despite the largely persuasive nature of these arguments, I noticed whilst 
trekking through these debates that a full and systematic exploration of what we 
have called ‘relatedness’ has largely been missing. This is not to say that there is 
no discussion at all. However, a lengthy treatment of the phenomenon of 
relatedness, and its role in shaping and sustaining engaged interaction is 
conspicuous primarily by its absence.  
Furthermore, such a project would be of use both to academic debates 
and those fields that practically apply the fruits of academic understanding to 
‘real-life’ contexts. First, an exploration of the phenomenon referred to as 
‘relatedness’3 will go some way towards honing and refining our understanding 
of ‘everyday’ intersubjectivity, and those elements which feed in to it. Secondly, 
it might also prove of use in the practical application of philosophy of 
intersubjectivity to therapeutic contexts. Detailed exploration of elements that 
underlie and support the development of ‘healthy’ intersubjectivity might add to 
an understanding of ways in which these are often absent or frustrated in varying 
forms of illness that involve a change in intersubjectivity. 
Given this, this thesis aims to provide an exploration of elements that 
support and shape a sense of relatedness between interlocutors. Furthermore, its 
findings elucidate existing theories of interpersonal understanding that deviate 
from folk psychology, such as interaction theory (Gallagher 2001, 2004a, 2008, 
2009) and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Di Paolo, 
Rohde and De Jaegher 2010). In doing so, it explores the manner in which 
reciprocal bodily engagement and shared spatiality are active within a sphere of 
dynamic, affective, and mutually engaged interaction.  
This thesis primarily uses the methods of phenomenological analysis and 
reflection in order to identify and examine certain elements that play a central 
role in structuring a sense of relatedness between people. Further, it seeks to 
                                                      
3 See footnote 1 for a list of sources that refer to ‘relatedness’. 
12 
 
describe the dynamic manner in which interlocutors’ relationships with these 
elements is modified through interpersonal interaction. 
A central part of this methodology is to clarify the ways in which 
affective interaction and shared situation are partly constitutive of the ability to 
understand others, by examining instances in which they break down. I consider 
impaired forms of interpersonal understanding, in particular cases in which 
intersubjective abilities are impaired in the psychiatric illnesses of schizophrenia 
and depression. Examination of these instances highlights the central role that a 
felt and dynamic sense of relatedness holds in supporting an ability to engage 
and interact with others.  
This thesis is comprised of three parts. The first, ‘Interpersonal 
Understanding: The Story so Far’ (Chapters 1 and 2), is largely expository, 
establishing the background to and current state of the debate. It provides a 
critical exploration of debates surrounding folk psychology: its mechanisms and 
role in understanding. It takes note of recent literature that combines cognitive 
science with phenomenology to stress the importance of accounting for relations 
in understanding.  
Chapter 1 provides a survey of ‘folk psychology’, detailing the 
emergence of folk psychology as a paradigm (1.1) before turning to examine 
arguments as to what constitutes an ability to successfully utilise folk 
psychology: theory theory, simulation theory, and hybrid theories (1.2). In this 
chapter, assumptions commonly held by proponents of theory theory, simulation 
theory and hybrid theory are brought to the attention of the reader. 
Taking up the elements which are common to theories underlying folk 
psychology, Chapter 2 provides an overview of recent critiques of folk 
psychology. This chapter is largely expository, examining critiques that argue for 
the importance of situation, recognition of personhood and relatedness, and 
interaction, for interpersonal understanding.  
The ground covered here is wide-ranging and interdisciplinary in nature. 
Whilst, in this chapter, I agree with the main thrust of already existing critiques, I 
argue that there is still much work to be done to provide an account of 
interpersonal understanding which moves beyond the purely cognitive 
mechanisms in recognising the social, personal, and dynamic aspects of our 
understanding of others. First, an account of how personhood and situation are 
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co-present and mutually informative in interaction is needed. Secondly, we must 
provide a detailed account of elements that contribute toward and shape 
interpersonal relatedness. 
Taking seriously the arguments which state that relatedness plays a 
central and important role in understanding others leaves us with the challenge of 
demonstrating how a sense of relatedness emerges and supports dynamic 
interaction. Part 2 (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) seeks to answer this challenge, 
providing a detailed phenomenological exploration of relatedness and ways in 
which it supports and affects interaction.  
Part 2 has two aims. First, it aims to explicate an understanding of the 
manner in which interaction develops and progresses which takes seriously the 
need to account for relatedness. Secondly, it identifies and provides a detailed 
account of: (i) factors which support, shape, and establish the mutual tonality of 
relatedness; and (ii) how these factors actively dynamically shape the sense of 
relatedness between interlocutors. On this account, relatedness is characterised as 
dynamic and active, rather than a static and unchanging sense of another as 
‘you’.  
Chapter 3 works toward answering the first of these challenges. Here, I 
draw on Gadamerian hermeneutics to offer a novel description of the dynamics 
of interaction. Under this description, I offer and argue for an account of the 
central role played by collaborative refinement of interpretative presuppositions. 
I also seek to show the manner in which situational and personal factors, 
identified as important in Chapter 2, work together and have bearing on each 
other in interpersonal understanding. To do this I demonstrate how understanding 
on the social (global) and personal (parochial) level mutually affect and revise 
each other through the interactive process. This provides a framework according 
to which we can posit how situational and personal elements combine to 
mobilise interpersonal understanding.  
Chapters 4 and 5 seek to address the second challenge laid out by Part 1 
by identifying two phenomena which are of key importance in supporting and 
shaping a sense of relatedness: intersubjective space (Chapter 4) and reciprocal 
embodiment (Chapter 5). 
 The issue of ‘lived’ spatiality, and how this supports a sense of 
relatedness is the topic of Chapter 4. This chapter develops an account of, first, 
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how an ‘everyday’ apprehension of space as lived shapes the way in which we 
engage with others; and secondly how others, through embodied interaction, 
shape our perception of space. In this way, my analysis seeks to establish an 
appreciation of intersubjective spaces. Further, it argues that these intersubjective 
spaces are dynamic, and that a shared sense of space, which moulds and forms a 
mutual sense of relatedness, evolves as interaction progresses whilst shaping the 
ways in which interaction will unfold.  
To explore this, I begin with Sartre’s well-known example of the park 
bench: the other’s presence is enough to change the manner in which space, for 
me, presents itself. Following from this, I explore several different examples of 
the dynamic relationship between space and interaction. Through these 
examples, I emphasise how a phenomenological, intersubjective sense of space 
acts as a foundation for interaction. Investigating this further, I argue that it 
contains certain normative, functional, and affective directives which guide 
interaction and form a platform which in turn shapes the way in which we relate 
to, and interact, with others. I argue that whilst phenomenological space 
encompasses elements of the normative, functional, and affective, it is not 
reducible to any of these. Rather, these elements jointly constitute a sense of 
space, and are an intrinsic part of what it is to inhabit a space in a non-
pathological way.   
 Complimenting the exploration of intersubjective spatiality and the 
manner in which this can be said to help establish a sense of relatedness, Chapter 
5 moves on to examine the role that reciprocal embodied interactions also play. 
This chapter establishes the central role which bodily responsiveness plays in 
constituting a sense of relatedness between interlocutors. First, I explore how 
affective bodily responsiveness contributes to interpersonal understanding; 
before characterising how this bodily responsiveness inputs into defining – and 
over-riding – particular types of intersubjective space in which interpersonal 
encounters take place. In outlining this, I show how consideration of embodiment 
is important for accounting for how we relate to and understand others. Chapter 5 
also emphasises how considerations of the role which embodiment plays are 
intimately connected and related to those of spatiality. Both intersubjective space 
and reciprocal bodily dialogue come to bear upon each other to give rise to and 
shape the affective sense of relatedness shared between interlocutors. Emerging 
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from Chapters 4 and 5 is an account of relatedness that identifies aspects that 
may be distinguished, yet are inextricable. 
Part 3 (Chapters 6 and 7) acts as a methodological counterpoint to the 
phenomenological explorations of Part 2. It examines instances in which a taken-
for-granted ability to be alongside and to understand others break down in certain 
forms of psychiatric illness. Just as Chapters 4 and 5 worked together to provide 
the roots of an integrative exploration of relatedness, Chapters 6 and 7 do the 
same to provide case studies of instances of pathological forms of alienation. 
Such explorations are based on the premise that characterisations of interpersonal 
understanding, in order to be effective and complete, ought to take into account 
instances in which interpersonal understanding breaks down, or is frustrated and 
fragmented. Doing so not only reveals those important elements of interpersonal 
understanding that are taken for granted by folk psychology and thus offers a 
chance to strengthen accounts of interpersonal understanding; it also offers a 
useful accompaniment to the phenomenological exploration of relatedness. If we 
can trace what has fragmented or become strained in pathological understanding, 
the original account of relatedness gains strength. 
In this final part, I provide two case studies through which I explore the 
fragmentation of intersubjectivity present in schizophrenia and depression. 
Focusing on extreme forms of alienation at the heart of schizophrenia and 
depression reveals what is normally taken for granted in our intersubjective 
exchanges with others: the ability to feel related to others, which lies at the heart 
of ‘unproblematic’ intersubjectivity. Part 3 responds to questions raised in Part 1 
by demonstrating the inadequacy of folk psychology to deal with experience that 
deviates from the ‘healthy’ norm. It also reveals to us the extent to which 
relatedness, and its structure, needs to be present in a full and accurate account of 
interpersonal understanding, and investigations into intersubjectivity. Such 
explorations also reveal a place for the hermeneutic account of understanding, 
championed in Part 2. Part 3, then, has a dual aim: first, to elucidate and support 
the account of relatedness given in Part 2 through examination of instances of 
interpersonal alienation. Second, to give an account of deviations in 
intersubjectivity undergone in schizophrenia and depression, in order to shed 
more light on the nature of these disorders. 
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 Chapter 6 takes intersubjectivity in schizophrenia as its focus. In 
particular, I examine the manner in which ‘lived’ spatiality undergoes a radical 
change in lived experience of schizophrenia. Drawing on autobiographical 
accounts, it is possible to argue that there is a geometricisation of space, often 
termed ‘geometric morbidity’.4 This both exacerbates and occurs alongside a de-
animation in things encountered in that space and also in other people. The 
ability to construe and encounter others as ‘people’ in the sense of the term 
highlighted in Chapter 2 often fragments.  
This has obvious ramifications for interpersonal understanding. Most 
fundamentally, the structures of relatedness though which others are presented as 
imbued with an affective sense of personhood can be seen to erode, as the 
affective sense of self and space is lessened and in some cases lost. Finding 
Sass’s notion of ‘un-worlding’ (1992a) helpful, I track, and make explicit, 
changes in the sense of affectivity and spatiality. I also draw on notions of 
‘distance’ to be found in both Minkowski (1970) and Blankenburg (2002), to 
give weight to my account of changes in lived spatiality in schizophrenia. I 
conclude this chapter by suggesting that changes in an affective apprehension of 
space as intersubjective and ‘lived’ affect a capacity for relatedness. This, in turn, 
shapes the way we understand others. What emerges from the discussion here is 
the similarity between strategies in which a person suffering schizophrenia might 
go about understanding others and those which are described in folk psychology 
as the ‘everyday’ way we go about understanding others. 
 The last chapter turns to take account of changes in intersubjectivity in 
depression. Chapter 7 argues that at the heart of the experience of depression are 
changes in relatedness, that is, in the ability to sustain interaffectivity. I begin by 
claiming that folk psychology does not have adequate resources with which to 
take into account the nature of intersubjectivity in depression. In examining 
accounts of depression, we find that changes in relatedness resound. In order to 
analyse these changes I draw on first-person accounts of depression which testify 
to changes in the lived body. Drawing on Fuchs’s notion of corporealisation 
(2005a), and Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) accounts of ‘horizons’, I argue 
that changes to bodily phenomenology undergone in depression impact on 
                                                      
4 See, for instance, Sass 1992a: 161. 
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perception of possibility: both in terms of possibilities for action and 
intersubjective interaction. I then move on to examine the way in which a 
lessening of dynamic bodily movement impacts on ability to initiate and sustain 
interaction. I turn to examine how this affects perception of – and participation 
within – intersubjective space, before turning once more to the hermeneutic 
account of interpersonal understanding. I argue that the hermeneutic account is 
better equipped to account for intersubjectivity, and the ways it breaks down, in 
depression. 
18 
 
PART 1 
 
Interpersonal 
Understanding: 
The Story So Far 
 
19 
 
CHAPTER 1  
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
“I guess all songs is folk songs. I never heard  
no horse sing 'em” (Big Bill Broonzy) 
 
 
1.1 What is Folk Psychology? 
 
 
Folk psychology sets out to describe a commonsensical, non-technical, 
non-specialist, and essentially widespread ability that most people possess to 
understand others.5 Possession of “folk psychological abilities” (Davies and 
Stone 1995a: 2) has been widely thought of as necessary for successful 
interpersonal understanding. It is important to delineate two ways in which the 
term ‘folk psychology’ is used: on the one hand, it is envisaged as an explanatory 
and predictive resource which furnishes us with an everyday ability to provide 
reasons for action and to predict the behaviour of others. Simultaneously, ‘folk 
psychology’ is used to name a philosophical position that seeks to describe our 
everyday understanding of others.6 This position involves commitment to the 
idea that understanding others is centrally and pervasively achieved through 
attributing reasons for action, most commonly in terms of propositional attitudes. 
The two uses of the term are interlinked; the philosophical position called ‘folk 
psychology’ holds that an everyday, explanatory resource is present to mediate 
our understanding of others. Throughout this thesis, when I refer to folk 
psychology I refer to the philosophical theory. In this chapter I explain and 
explore folk psychology before reviewing criticisms of this position in Chapter 2. 
                                                      
5 Excepting certain individuals, such as those in the autistic spectrum. Proponents of folk 
psychology have attempted to explain the perceived ‘deficits’ in social knowledge and interaction 
in autism spectrum disorder as ‘mind blindness’ – as stemming from a lack of possession of a 
folk psychology (Baron Cohen 1995, Leslie 1991). 
6 This philosophical position is also often referred to as ‘common-sense psychology’, ‘belief-
desire psychology’, and ‘mindreading’ at various points in the literature. All names refer to the 
central idea of understanding others being constituted by an ability to attribute mental states and 
propositional attitudes based on the behaviour of others.  
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Folk psychology states that understanding is enabled by so-called 
‘mindreading’, or ‘mentalising’ (Stich and Nichols 2003). That is, an attribution 
of propositional attitudes to others on the basis of their actions and behaviour. In 
this way, understanding others is constituted by an ability to attribute underlying 
reasons for actions. Such mentalising is always inferential in nature and posits 
underlying, unobservable mental states as causally linked to observable 
behaviour.   
In this way, we understand that Anne reaches for the pencil because she 
desires to write a shopping list and believes that doing so will help her remember 
everything she needs; Brenda slaps her forehead because she remembers the 
answer to the question at the pub quiz last night, and Carl kicks the car tyres 
because he is believes that his car won’t start and he desires to get to work on 
time. These three simple sketches are examples of what folk psychology holds to 
be a widespread, largely accurate tendency to provide reasons for actions in 
terms of propositional attitudes (principally taking the form of X believes, 
desires for p).7 It is argued that the ability to attribute mental states as reasons for 
action is central to our understanding of others.  
Following these examples, we can see that folk psychology is committed 
to the assumption that interpersonal understanding takes the form of explanation 
or prediction of the actions of others.8 It involves the claim that the way we 
achieve understanding of others is through attributing reasons for action, usually 
in the form of beliefs and desires. Understood this way, folk psychology 
furnishes us with a resource through which to provide reasons for action 
(Dennett 1991, Greenwood 1991a).  
But what is it that grounds competency in using folk psychology? There 
have been three standard answers that seek to provide an account of what 
successfully enables a use of folk psychology: 
(1) Understanding others requires deployment of a theory of mind 
(theory theory) (Baron-Cohen 1995; Stich and Nichols 1992). 
                                                      
7 Folk psychology focuses primarily on the propositional attitudes ‘belief’ and ‘desire’, though 
we may of course attribute others. For example ‘X remembers, loves, hates, hopes for p’. 
8 Chapter 2 takes a critical look at this commitment and explores whether it is appropriate to state 
that this is the basis for all instances of understanding others. 
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(2) Understanding others relies on generation of simulation routines 
(simulation theory) (Goldman 2006; Gordon 1986; Heal 1995a 
[1986]). 
(3) Understanding others is enabled by a combination both of theory 
and simulation routines (hybrid theory) (Goldman 2006; Stich and 
Nichols 2003). 
Each of these established answers preserves a commitment to folk psychology 
being widespread and pervasive in understanding others. Each theory also seeks 
to describe a mechanism or underlying strategy, possessed by human beings, that 
enables successful utilisation of folk psychology.  
In what follows, I provide a critical survey of the debate surrounding folk 
psychology. After covering early debates around how folk psychology is best 
understood,9 I move on to examine the claims that successful utilisation of folk 
psychology is grounded in theory (theory theory) and through engagement in 
simulation routines (simulation theory). I then move on to consider 
developmental evidence that is often cited in support of folk psychology. I close 
the chapter by considering whether folk psychology has to be mechanistic. Here I 
discuss Hutto’s ‘narrative practice hypothesis’ (2008a) before questioning 
whether folk psychology provides an accurate description of interpersonal 
understanding. 
 
(a) Early Debates 
 
Early debates surrounding the existence, use, and success of folk 
psychology tended to focus on the ontological status of folk psychology. The 
main question here was whether we have any reason to assert that there is 
anything in our neural architecture corresponding to the propositional attitudes 
posited as underlying behaviour. The ramifications of this question feed into how 
we conceive of folk psychology as a theory of interpersonal understanding.  
                                                      
9 The question which dominates these early debates is about folk psychology, its meaning and 
whether it will be supplanted and eliminated, as neuroscience progresses, by a better explanatory 
resource. These debates take folk psychology to be integral to folk practices of understanding 
others. In the following section I will also use the term ‘folk psychology’ in this way, but do not, 
myself, take it to be integral to the way in which we ordinarily understand others. 
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Wilfred Sellars (1997 [1956]) was among the first to state that our 
commonsense generalisations, often employed when understanding others, ought 
to be thought of in terms of a commonsense psychological, or folk, theory. Such 
a ‘theory’ was a body of law-like generalisations that link unobservable mental 
states to observable, intentional actions in order to make sense of them. For 
example, when people walk with a skip in their step (observable action) they are 
usually happy (unobservable mental state); if someone is shouting (observable 
action) it is usually because they are angry (unobservable mental state). Noticing, 
and then explicating, the interconnections between mental states and observable 
behaviour results in the founding of this commonsense, folk theory of 
understanding others. 
This commitment to folk psychology being a theory was taken and 
developed by David Lewis (1980 [1972]), who fleshed out the conception of the 
form and content such a folk theory might have. He explored how we should 
philosophically characterise such a theory. He writes: 
 
Think of commonsense psychology as a term-introducing scientific 
theory, though one invented long before there was any institution as 
professional science. Collect all the platitudes you can think of regarding 
the causal relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses 
… Include only platitudes which are common knowledge among us – 
everyone knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows them, 
and so on. For the meanings of our words are common knowledge, and I 
am going to claim that the names of mental states derive their meaning 
from these platitudes. (1980 [1972]: 212) 
 
Here Lewis emphasises that the terms of a commonsense theory are such 
that everyone assents to them (making it truly a theory of the ‘folk’). In 
conceiving of folk psychology as a theory comprised of “platitudes of common 
knowledge”, Lewis states that the constituting terms and ‘rules’ of the folk 
theory must be to some degree explicit.10 However, if folk psychology is to be 
understood as an explicit body of platitudes which are derived from ‘common 
                                                      
10 The theory is explicit in that it is readily available to retrospective or overt reason-giving as 
seen in the quote above (1980 [1972]: 212). 
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knowledge’, we run into a problem: why, on reflection, are we unable to 
articulate the terms and propositions which make up the theory? The answer 
given by Jerry Fodor is that folk psychology is a largely implicit theory: we 
utilise it without explicitly calling upon it. This theory, according to Fodor 
(1987), is active in all instances in which we understand others, running tacitly in 
the background to enable this understanding. The tacit and ongoing application 
of this theory gives rise to the platitudes which Sellars and Lewis take to make 
up the theory. However, Fodor’s claim also entails ambiguity. If such a theory is 
largely implicit, then how are we able to describe it as a folk theory? Fodor’s 
conception of folk psychology moves away from that of Sellars and Lewis to 
state that commonsense platitudes about behaviour are enabled by a complex, 
implicit theory of mind. Whilst Sellars and Lewis envisaged an explanatory 
resource which emerges from and is traceable to everyday practice, Fodor argues 
that this is enabled by psychological states which correspond to something 
localised in our neural architecture. Under Fodor’s description, people do not 
articulate this theory of mindedness.  
In elucidating how we ought to understand this folk theory, Fodor 
defends a realist claim about propositional attitudes; claiming that the beliefs and 
desires we attribute to others correspond to causally effective elements 
embedded within our neural architecture.11 We have already noted that, for 
Fodor, folk psychology is a largely implicit theory. Understanding others 
consists in the ability to attribute propositional attitudes (of the form X believes 
that p; Y desires q; Z loves r; and so on) to others, thus providing reasons for the 
particular action. He states that in order for us to understand actions of others, we 
must be able to entertain thoughts of the following structure: 
 
1. Jerry desires that we all be good representational theorists. In order to 
make this happen Jerry believes that he must write convincing papers 
arguing for such a position. 
 
Or a simpler example: 
                                                      
11 We see later that it is precisely this point that critics of the realist characterisation of folk 
psychology, notably Dennett and Churchland, take their departure from.  
 
24 
 
 
2. Molly desires to fulfil her hunger. She believes that by eating the 
apple, her hunger will be satisfied; therefore Molly will eat the apple. 
 
Or similarly: 
 
3. Molly ate the apple. Eating apples is usually a sign that someone 
believes they are hungry and desires to quell the hunger, coupled with 
the belief that eating an apple will result in this. 
 
In each of the three cases, there is something to be understood (Jerry’s continual 
writing of papers, Molly’s eating the apple) and that behaviour is understood by 
providing motivating reasons (the desire for us all to subscribe to mental 
representation theory, to satisfy hunger) for why the action (paper writing, apple 
eating) occurred. Fodor states that this ability to attribute or relate propositional 
attitudes to people also allows us to predict their behaviour. Arguing that – on the 
whole – most people do this accurately in everyday life, he concludes that our 
folk theory is, most likely, correct. If this is so, then the unobservable mental 
states that we attribute to each other as explanations for behaviour must 
somehow have causal efficacy. In this way, we can describe Fodor as a realist 
about propositional attitudes, in the sense that he argues for there being 
“contentful psychological states which ‘play a causal role in the generation of 
human behaviour’” (Greenwood 1991a: 7). 
 However, let us return to the three examples above. I will take example 3 
for simplicity’s sake. When we see Molly eating the apple, is the reasoning 
process as tight as has been supposed here? For one thing, folk psychology, if a 
theory, ought to fall foul of what Hutto has called “an embarrassment of riches” 
(2008a: 15). That is, far from highlighting one reason and taking that to be the 
case, surely folk psychology ought to provide us with a multitude of possible 
reasons for action. Consider, for example: 
 
Molly ate the apple because her mother told her to. 
Molly ate the apple because she was racked with guilt about children starving in 
Africa. 
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Molly ate the apple because she heard that doing so keeps the doctor away and 
she has an irrational fear of doctors. 
Molly ate the apple as a sign of respect and gratitude to the person who gave it to 
her. 
Molly ate the apple because it was about to go off, and she hates waste. 
 
These are just a few possible reasons as to why Molly might have eaten her 
apple. The question then becomes: how do we decide which is the right one? I 
return to this question in Chapter 2. Here I consider criticisms that state that 
resources for understanding cannot stop short at the type of reasoning that 
adherents of folk psychology describe. It is the context provided by social 
situations, norms, and expectations that make certain explanations salient rather 
than others. However, for now, it suffices to draw the point that sketching folk 
psychology as a theory does not show how and why we often arrive at the right 
reasons. 
Reacting against realist Fodorian conceptions of folk psychology and its 
commitment to a realist account of propositional attitudes, Paul Churchland 
(1988, 1991) argues that propositional attitudes do not correspond to anything in 
our neural architecture. This position leads him to be sceptical of the long-term 
success of talking in terms of propositional attitudes as explanatory-causal 
reasons for action. This position is eliminative materialism.  
Eliminative materialism considers folk psychology to be false. Whilst 
Churchland’s account of folk psychology begins from the same assumption as 
Fodor, that folk psychology is a theory, it suggests a very different use-value for 
folk psychology. As science matures, he argues, it will show folk psychology to 
be “false and radically misleading” (1988: 43). In offering a definition of folk 
psychology, he states: 
 
It is a framework of concepts, roughly adequate to the demands of 
everyday life, with which the humble adept comprehends, explains, 
predicts, and manipulates a certain domain of phenomena. It is, in short, a 
folk theory. (1991: 51) 
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For Churchland, folk psychology is theoretical in the sense that it is a body of 
“rough and ready general statements and laws” (1988: 59) which support an 
ability to explain and predict other people’s actions. Such generalisations are 
learned at an early age and represent the culmination of commonsensical 
wisdom, passed on through generations (1988: 59). As such, folk psychology is, 
for Churchland, an empirical causal-explanatory, non-specialist theory for 
understanding and predicting the behaviour of others. However, it is one which is 
ultimately misleading. Why is this? The clearest explanation is as follows: 
 
As the eliminative materialists sees it, the one-to-one match-ups [between 
mental states and brain states] will not be found, and our common-sense 
psychological framework will not enjoy an inter-theoretic reduction, 
because our common-sense psychological framework is a false and 
radically misleading conception of the causes of human behaviour and 
the nature of cognitive activity […] On this view, folk psychology is not 
just an incomplete representation of our inner natures; it is an outright 
misrepresentation of our internal states and activities. Consequently, we 
cannot expect a truly adequate neuroscientific account of our inner lives 
to provide theoretical categories that match up nicely with the categories 
of our common-sense framework. Accordingly, we must expect that the 
older framework will simply be eliminated, rather than be reduced, by a 
matured neuroscience. (Churchland 1988: 43) 
  
Contained within this, it is possible to distinguish two different but 
related notions: first, that folk psychology is empty as the beliefs, desires, and 
other mental states that we attribute to others as reasons for action do not 
correspond to any physical brain state or anything else in the world. In this way, 
the first eliminativist line is bound up with a commitment to physicalism: that is 
that the belief that what we posit as ‘real’ must necessitate, or supervene on, 
something physical.12 Following this line, the eliminativist response states there 
are no things that correspond to beliefs, desires, and other mental states in the 
physical world. Therefore, folk psychology must be false (see Feyerabend 1963).  
                                                      
12 For an exploration and defence of physicalism see Papineau 1996. 
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The second eliminativist line develops along a different presupposition. It 
states that folk psychology will be redundant in light of a more mature scientific, 
specifically neuroscientific, framework.13 Whilst we find folk psychology a 
useful explanatory device now, in the future, when neuroscience has progressed 
significantly, the concepts used in the theory constituting folk psychology will 
become outmoded and shown to be bankrupt. Instead, they will be replaced by a 
superior, neuroscientific framework that will eradicate the need for propositional 
attitude terms. Encompassed within this is the assumption that folk psychology 
as it stands now has explanatory value,14 but will be shown to be redundant in 
light of scientific progression.  
Whilst both eliminativist objections ultimately posit that folk psychology 
is false, Ramsey (2007) captures a subtle distinction between the two positions 
which we would do well to bear in mind. This difference consists in the 
following: whilst the first eliminativist position states folk psychology is false 
because there are no mental states, only brain states; the second states that folk 
psychology, as a supposedly utilisable theory, performs its tasks poorly. Even if 
it were to perform its task well, Churchland argues, a complete neuroscientific 
theory will perform it better (1988: 61). The first type of eliminativism states that 
sufficient progress in neuroscience will reveal that propositional attitude terms 
do not correspond to anything physical (and are therefore empty). This will 
(eventually) lead to an overturning of the language we use to express our 
understanding of others.  
 But why does Churchland state that ultimately as scientific knowledge 
progresses, folk psychology will turn out to be false? Churchland gives two 
reasons: first, what he labels the ‘explanatory poverty’ of folk psychology (1988: 
45); secondly, on analogy with theories from the history of ideas, we see how 
theories change or are supplanted as knowledge grows and becomes more in-
depth.  
Whilst Fodor defends both the reality and indispensability of folk 
psychology, Churchland questions both. The charge of explanatory poverty of 
                                                      
13 In focusing on the primacy of neuroscientific explanation, Churchland neglects to consider 
how folk psychology, whilst failing to be a scientific theory of the brain, could hold a place in 
social scientific explanations (see Kusch 1999; 2007: 176-177). 
14 That is, at least some explanatory value. Churchland stresses that folk psychology’s 
explanatory capacity is limited (1988: 45-46), and notes that the theory has failed evolve over 
time and make progress (1988: 46; 1991:51). 
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folk psychology relates to what Churchland identifies as an inability or failure to 
explain the explanandum. Whilst we may use folk psychology on a daily basis, 
its explanatory powers remain poor, with Churchland pinpointing “the 
widespread explanatory, predictive, and manipulative failures of folk 
psychology” (1988: 45). Whilst it provides basic platitudes on which we can 
understand the behaviour of others, it cannot tell us anything interesting about 
basic everyday phenomena such as sleep and dreams (45-46), how memory 
functions (46), and how intelligence is grounded (46). Furthermore it fails to tell 
us anything useful when faced with cognitive and psychological impairment 
arising from brain damage and psychiatric disorder (46).  
Churchland argues the theory which constitutes folk psychology itself has 
remained largely static and, consequently stagnant, since we began the project of 
understanding others. As other theories have been revised and have progressed, 
folk psychology remains the same. Developing this point, he states the subject 
matter which folk psychology seeks to explain is so complex that folk 
psychology has most likely ‘survived’ “because the phenomena addressed are so 
surpassingly difficult that any useful handle on them, no matter how feeble, is 
unlikely to be displaced in a hurry” (Churchland 1988: 46). However, the 
supposition that we ought to dispose of folk psychology’s terms and language on 
the grounds that we do not fully understand the terms we employ to make sense 
of certain issues is not necessarily sound. In fact, science and philosophy seem to 
be ripe with cases of this; and yet we have not abandoned the terms which we 
use.  
Greenwood (1991b) makes this point forcefully, citing many cases in 
which we employ specialist terminology to explain certain phenomena, without 
having a full understanding of the terms involved. He cites biology, in particular, 
as a field rife with examples of this. In particular, he uses Golgi bodies and 
myelin sheaths as examples (1991b): we know they are present in cells but have 
no full explanation of their functional and causal roles; that is, we don’t know 
fully how they ‘work’. This, he argues, does not, and should not, stop us from 
using the terms in biological science. However, this first example is poor since 
biological sciences know of their existence, and their existence in relation to the 
cell to which they belong, through observation.  
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Perhaps a better example would have been served by particle physics 
which posits the existence of particles such as: Higgs’ bosons, neutrinos, 
gravitons and quarks and so on, which are unobservable, yet are used to describe 
the fundamental make-up of the universe. The point is that there is nothing 
observable which corresponds to these posited particles, but they are integral to 
fundamental and phenomenological physics. Whilst Greenwood’s example from 
biology is poor, he furnishes the reader with a better example of cases of Plato’s 
bodily theory of emotion from his Timaeus, which Greenwood takes to be 
defunct. Such a theory involves emotions being rooted in the heart, liver, and 
other body organs. However, he states that though we now view the theory as 
defunct, we do not dispose of the terms ‘heart’ and ‘liver’, simply because they 
are misused and misattributed in a theory which turned out to be false. 
Greenwood’s point is to stress how the ineffectiveness of folk psychology (which 
even Churchland admits has limited merit) does not provide us with a strong 
enough reason to throw out terms used to express folk psychology such as 
‘belief’ and ‘desire’. Greenwood writes:  
 
It is … wrong to suppose that the semantics of our folk-psychological 
theoretical descriptions [are] fixed by reference to the causal-explanatory 
propositions in which they regularly figure. (1991b: 77) 
 
And surely Greenwood has a point. Churchland’s position, as it stands, is 
extreme: in jettisoning propositional terms from our explanatory vocabulary, it 
would seem that Churchland would be throwing the baby out with the bath 
water. Furthermore, if this is the standard which he sets for terminological use 
then many other terms, inherent within many of our scientific and philosophical 
theories, must also be disposed of.  
Developing this line of argument further, we must question the extent to 
which the explanatory and causal elements of folk psychology explanations must 
be treated as necessarily concomitant. In dealing with folk psychology theory, 
Churchland frequently describes such a theory of mind as ‘explanatory-causal’ in 
nature. In this way, the thing to be explained (explanandum) and explanation 
(explanans) are treated in a way that suggests they are inextricable. The 
explanans must causally give rise to the explanandum. The treatment of 
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explanatory and causal elements as inextricably bound leads specifically to an 
opening of the eliminative materialist criticism. Simply put, if we take a theory to 
be dually explanatory and causal, then if the causes the theory attributes are 
‘empty’, then the explanation, it follows, must also be bankrupt. In this way, 
Churchland’s notion of folk psychology as an explanatory-casual theory is 
problematic from the outset.  
However, it is perfectly possible to deny the causal nature of folk 
psychology (in its realist, Fodorian sense) whilst still asserting its explanatory 
value. Whilst this initially may seem to weaken the credibility of folk psychology 
further, this does not necessarily have to be the case. Consider the following 
example by Greenwood: 
 
In ascribing beliefs and motives to self and others we ascribe 
(intensional) contents directed upon (intentional) objects in natural and 
social psychological world. Thus, in attributing to myself the belief that 
the Empire State Building is the tallest building in the world, I mean that 
I represent the Empire State Building (intentional object) as the tallest 
building in the world (intensional content). In attributing shame to 
another, I mean that that person represents some action of his or hers 
(intentional object) as personally humiliating and degrading (intensional 
content). Such attributions are true if and only if agents represent 
particular aspects of reality in the particular ways attributed to them, 
irrespective of the adequacy of causal explanations referencing such 
psychological states. (1991b: 77) 
 
Emerging out of this example are questions as to how we ought to treat 
such classifications, particularly the extent to which we can describe folk 
psychology’s classifications as causal in nature. Greenwood’s examples illustrate 
how folk psychology may be not causal in nature, but still provide reasons to 
explain actions, which do not need to be jettisoned in light of the emergence of a 
highly developed neuroscientific language. In this way, a path between 
Churchland and Fodor’s positions is negotiated. Folk psychology is held to be 
explanatory but not causal; whilst the continued use of the language of folk 
psychology (even in the event of a neuroscientific vocabulary) is defended. Such 
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a path also remains true to the ‘folk’ nature of the theory. The point of folk 
psychology is that it is a non-specialist reason providing ability: shouting ‘Argh! 
My c-fibres are firing again!’ seems rather specialist, whilst ‘Argh! It really 
hurts’ remains true to the lay understanding of oneself and others which folk 
psychology attempts to describe.   
These considerations lead us nicely to examine what Daniel Dennett 
brings to the fray surrounding how we should think about folk psychology. The 
point of departure for both Dennett and Churchland is the same. Agreeing with 
Churchland, Dennett begins by critiquing the realist presupposition that the 
concepts, rules, and propositional attitudes used to describe the underpinnings of 
folk psychology correspond to something in our neural make up. However, 
instead of developing and drawing eliminativist conclusions, as Churchland does, 
Dennett takes a different tack. Folk psychology, for Dennett, is not a theory, nor 
is it embedded in neural architecture; instead it is a stance which is adopted for 
the direct reason of making sense of the actions of others, or predicting what they 
will do next (1987: 14-15). The particular stance taken towards people is one he 
labels the intentional stance (1987: 15).15 Dennett characterises the intentional 
stance as a perspective that one adopts in understanding others. As such, it does 
not claim to reveal internal states but instead focuses on particular patterns of 
behaviour: in such a stance, one assumes the other is a rational agent, and on that 
basis, ascribes beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes to others based 
on their behaviour or situation in order to predict or understand their actions. In 
Dennett’s own words: 
 
[F]irst you decide to treat the object whose behaviour is to be predicted as 
a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, 
given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what 
desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you 
predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its 
beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and 
desires will in many – but not all – instances yield a decision about what 
                                                      
15 This is contrasted with the physical and design stances (See Dennett 1987: 16-17). 
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the agent ought to do that is what you predict the agent will do. (1987: 
17) 
  
Such a position seems to avoid the theoretical confusion of Churchland’s 
eliminative position, as it does not view the roles of explanation and causation as 
interdependent. According to Dennett, folk psychology is simply a strategy 
which we adopt to make sense of others. In doing so, and in positing reasons for 
behaviour, we do not commit ourselves to the assumption that the reasons 
provided are essentially causal in nature. This is what makes it a ‘strategy’ rather 
than a theory. This leaves us with the question of how this can be the case: why 
posit reasons if the posited element ultimately does not correspond to something 
‘real’?   
The answer to this lies in the very nature of what folk psychology is for 
Dennett. Whilst Churchland states unequivocally that folk psychology is a 
theory, even if a bad one, and so, has an empirical basis and forms a body of 
wisdom that we call on and apply, for Dennett, folk psychology is something we 
‘step in to’. It is not so much a theory, as a strategy. In this way Dennett walks a 
middle ground between the realist position of Fodor and the eliminativist one of 
Churchland. Like Churchland, he argues that propositional attitudes do not 
correspond to anything in neurobiological architecture; however, this does not 
form a problem for Dennett. In conceiving of folk psychology as a stance which 
is adopted he makes a more modest claim: it simply becomes a strategy to 
explain behaviour in general terms, rather than a theory which posits the physical 
reality of propositional attitudes. Folk psychology, on Dennett’s view is still both 
useful and pervasive, but does not need to be revised.  
We can see the opposition between Dennett and Churchland more sharply 
in the way they view the centrality of the ‘folk’ in the term ‘folk psychology’. 
Whilst Churchland was regularly criticised for his conception of ‘theory’, which 
he viewed folk psychology to be; Dennett avoids these criticisms by bringing to 
the fore that folk psychology is a stance that the folk engage in, sometimes with 
success, other times not, emphasising that this stance is something which people 
can recognise and articulate as part of their practice. Dennett writes: 
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Do people actually use this strategy? Yes, all the time. There may 
someday be other strategies for attributing belief and desire and for 
predicting behaviour, but this is the only one we all know now, and when 
does it work? It works with people almost all the time. (1987: 21) 
 
Whilst Churchland struggles to answer the question of why, if folk 
psychology is a theory which the folk acquire and use, we cannot readily 
articulate the principles it operates by (as we can with folk physics etc); 
Dennett’s account holds onto and protects the use of folk psychology as an 
everyday resource for approaching and understanding others. But is it? We can 
identify several problems with Dennett’s account of folk psychology. 
First we must ask whether understanding others is a question of adopting 
a stance. Secondly, if we do adopt strategies and stances for understanding 
others, to what extent do we do this? Is it something we occasionally engage in, 
or does this form the entire bastion of our interpersonal understanding resources? 
Dennett, as is shown so clearly in the quote above, states that this is something 
we find ourselves doing in our day-to-day lives. It is, for him, something we do 
‘all the time’. However, it seems far from clear that this is the case.  
Take an example from Hutto.16 Asking us to imagine our partner, or 
family member walking into the kitchen with a new pint of milk, we do not need 
to step back, observe their behaviour and, adopting the intentional stance, 
attribute relevant motivational beliefs and desires. Doing so is not necessary, 
unless circumstances make it odd; that is, if the fridge is already packed with 
milk, or if all family members are allergic to milk. Only in the latter 
circumstances would the behaviour appear salient as needing explanation. In the 
former case, in which my partner brings in milk, other things carry the burden for 
explanation, and indeed, present us with the explanation. It might be countered 
that this does not create a problem for Dennett who at no stage claims that 
adopting the intentional stance requires effort. We could, it might be argued, 
adopt and inhabit the intentional stance without thinking about it. However, the 
question then remains that if we occupy this stance without thinking about it, in 
what sense are we in or adopting this stance? How much of our understanding of 
                                                      
16 Used in a paper entitled ‘The Narrative Practice Hypothesis’ delivered at Social Cognition and 
Social Narrative Summer Collegium (San Marino, 10th July 2008). 
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the situation is provided by folk psychology, and how much is down to 
socialisation, habit, and a navigation of the social world? As Ratcliffe puts it: 
“the world does the work” (2007a: Chapter 4) to an extent which may render 
adopting the intentional stance unnecessary. I examine such claims in Chapter 2, 
in which I re-examine the extent to which folk psychology ordinarily takes the 
flack in day-to-day life for providing us with understanding of others and their 
actions. 
In an attempt to escape the early controversy of the term ‘folk 
psychology’ and to remain “theoretically neutral” (Stich and Nichols 2003: 2), 
various authors, have more recently, used terms including ‘mind-reading’, 
‘mentalising’, ‘common-sense psychology’, and ‘belief-desire psychology’ to 
refer to the ability to attribute propositional attitudes to make sense of and predict 
other people’s behaviour. In what follows, I shall take and discuss these forms 
under the original name given to this collection of abilities: ‘folk psychology’, 
since this cluster of terms all refer to the “rich conceptual repertoire which [is] 
deploy[ed] to explain, predict and describe the actions of one another and, 
perhaps, members of closely related species also” (Davies and Stone 1995a: 2). 
However, this definition is wide to the point of not being very helpful. In what 
follows, when talking of folk psychology I appeal to a more specific definition, 
which also states that folk psychology is used to explain and predict the actions 
of others in propositional attitude terms.  
Recent debates about folk psychology have moved away from concerns 
bound up with whether folk psychology exists and, if so, in what form. Instead, 
recent debates focus on what constitutes and enables us to be users of folk 
psychology. In doing so, it is largely accepted amongst advocates of folk 
psychology that: first, folk psychology is a largely accurate and widely used 
resource for understanding others, whether theory, stance, simulation, or a 
combination of the above; and secondly, that it is this which enables us to 
understand others by providing reasons and motivations for action through an 
ability to attribute propositional attitudes.  
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(b) Recent Debates 
(i) Theory Theory 
Simply put, theory theorists argue that ability to successfully use folk 
psychology is enabled by possession of a theory of mind. Largely implicit, this 
theory is called upon whenever we provide reasons for actions and to enable 
prediction of behaviour. The ubiquity of the theory follows from this: in any 
instance involving attribution of mental states (taken to be the ‘unobservables’ 
within theory of mind), theory of mind is called upon. As Gallagher and Zahavi 
note, we ought to understand theory theory alongside its ubiquity claim, as not 
only mediating our understanding of others, but also being active in self-
understanding (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008: 173).17  
Debate as to how best to understand what is meant by ‘theory of mind’ is 
wide-ranging. Theory theory’s historical roots stretch back to the beginning of 
the folk psychology debate, where folk psychology was initially characterised as 
a theory (Sellars 1955; Lewis 1972), as we have already seen.18 Amongst 
proponents of theory theory, accounts range from the permissive conception of 
theory of mind as an “internally stored body of information” (Stich and Nichols 
1992: 46-47) to a stricter “systematic integration of knowledge” (Botterill 1996; 
Karmiloff-Smith 1992: 138).19 However, the consensus is that theory of mind is 
a largely implicit, domain specific mechanism for understanding other minds 
(Baron-Cohen 1995; Leslie 1991).  
Perhaps the clearest stated definition of theory of mind is that given by 
Botterill (1996), who states that our theory of mind is a systematic web of 
conceptual knowledge, employed to predict and explain behaviour according to a 
law like structure. Under his account, theory of mind is specific to the domain of 
interpersonal understanding and is systematically integrated.  
In exploring what constitutes a theory of mind, he identifies four main 
criteria, which must apply in conjunction with each other: 
                                                      
17 See Chapter 2 for an exploration of this point. 
18 This was the case until 1986, when Heal and Gordon published their papers outlining 
simulation theory as an alternative underpinning for folk psychology. 
19 Theory of mind “involves inferences based on unobservables (mental states, such as belief), a 
coherent set of explanations and causal links between mental states and behaviour which are 
predictive of future actions” (Karmiloff-Smith 1992: 138). 
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[1] It enables prediction and explanation of others’ behaviour 
[2] It must support counterfactual claims 
[3] It must posit causally efficacious unobservable principles 
[4] It contains an implicit definition of concepts 
 
 First, it must enable us to predict and explain others’ behaviour, 
specifically the “actions and reactions of others” (1996: 107). For Botterill, as for 
others in the folk psychology tradition, behaviour is the key to understanding 
others due to its public nature. Behaviour and actions are witnessed by others, 
and as such, it is supposed that this must be our starting point from which we 
may reliably come to attribute unobservable motivating reasons. The 
presupposition, that behaviour plus unobservable reasons (mental states) 
constitutes understanding has been heavily criticised, as we shall see in Chapter 
2. 
Secondly, for Botterill, theories must support counterfactual claims. 
These are claims of the sort of ‘if x had not been the case, then y’. For example: 
  
If Margot hadn’t believed that the finish line was 10m earlier than it was, 
then she would have won the race. 
 
Or 
 
 If John hadn’t forgotten about the roast, then it wouldn’t have burned. 
 
Encapsulated in these seemingly simple examples is an expression of 
how things normally are, and how things might go wrong. Contained within the 
above counterfactual claim about Margot and the race is a realisation that: 
 
(a) Margot wanted to win the race 
(b) Margot had the ability to win the race 
(c) Circumstances thwarted Margot unexpectedly, but if all things had 
been equal, then she would have won. 
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Botterill’s reasoning here is that if a theory supports counterfactual 
claims, then it must have principles that may be rendered in the form of law-like 
generalisations. Examining the case above shows how one may do this. 
However, the question remains as to whether these principles can, on their own, 
bear the sole burden for understanding. In stating that counterfactual claims form 
the spine of an ability to understand others, Botterill neglects wider phenomena 
which underpin an ability to make counterfactual claims.  
Returning to the example of Margot and the race, we find that an ability 
to state that ‘Margot would have won the race, had she not held a mistaken belief 
about where the finish line was’ requires an ability to understand what it means 
not just to race, but to engage in competitive activities. We might characterise 
this in terms of yet more propositional attitudes: 
 
Margot wanted to win because she desired the glory of winning the race. 
Margot wanted to win because she believed the prize money was generous and 
desired to write off her debt. 
Margot wanted to win because she desires to be liked and believes that everyone 
loves a winner. 
Margot wanted to win because she desired to make her Dad proud and she 
believed that winning a race would lead to this. 
Margot wanted to win because she desired to beat Laura, who she’s always 
disliked. 
 
However we must notice that contained within some of these propositional 
attitude statements are references to wider social platitudes (‘everyone loves a 
winner’) or to personal history (making her Dad proud, disliking Laura). Looked 
at in this way, it seems that we might view the counterfactual claim as an 
extrapolation of more general social and gaming norms, of personal history, and 
cultural expectation and valuation. It is within these larger meaning-bestowing 
structures which Margot’s actions, aims, and life choices make sense. If we are 
to see this counterfactual as upholding a nomological principle in the first place, 
then it must be one that relies on countless other nomological principles which, 
as we pursue them, seem to rest on others and becomes seemingly endless. Faced 
with this, we must wonder where we draw the line.  
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We are also left with the question of how to characterise the relationship 
between our general social knowledge, and the nomological generalisations 
which constitute folk psychology, something which Botterill does not consider. 
This is especially pertinent when we realise that Botterill wishes to distance 
knowledge contained in the theory of mind from experiential knowledge gained 
over generations in a folklore fashion. The question of how social knowledge and 
valuation, which change over time, relate to the principles of the theory is a 
difficult one. Is it the case that this provides an interpretative background? Or 
perhaps certain forms of social etiquette and ‘know how’ may form part of the 
nomological principles which drive theory of mind, and which are somehow 
revised as standards of behaviour and social understanding change? As we see in 
the example above, whilst we can extrapolate propositional attitude statements 
from our general social and cultural knowledge and value systems, these relate in 
turn to other areas such as personal and family history. Botterill has to at least 
address the question of the role of such areas, something which he does not do.  
Connected to this is Botterill’s third point that the theory must posit 
unobservables that play a causal role. In the case of folk psychology, these 
unobservables are “internal and causally active representational states” (1996: 
108). Working in the importance of postulation of unobservables which are 
systematically structured is important for Botterill, as it guards the status of folk 
psychology as a theory against those who claim it is a mere loose collection of 
commonsensical generalisations. Whilst the latter characterisation might be 
thought of in terms of folk-lore or know-how passed on through generations, in 
stating that theory of mind is constituted by the systematically integrated 
relations between unobservable, yet causally powerful elements, Botterill 
protects the legitimacy of the theory in that it describes natural elements which 
are directly responsible for the understanding of others. In casting theories thus, 
Botterill protects the status of a folk theory of mind as a theory, which must have 
systematic integration rather than merely being practically useful.  
Lastly, for Botterill, theory of mind involves an implicit definition of 
concepts (108). That is, we need not look outside the theory to define the 
elements and terms it deals with. Thus, for Botterill, propositional attitudes such 
as beliefs, desires, hopes, and so on, are best understood as theoretical concepts 
(108). However, these four elements alone are not enough to define theory of 
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mind: they must be systematically integrated. Only with systematic integration of 
principles, do they become a domain specific body of information (106).  
Stressing systematic integration20 emphasises the law-like structure of 
theory of mind and divorces its conception from commonsense generalisations, 
or lore-knowledge. Unlike lore-knowledge, elements of and principles within 
theories cannot be simple add-ons, in virtue of the fact that they have a functional 
role in relation to other principles. Each internal element or proposition is 
therefore situated in relation to others; taken together, they create an integrated 
whole which yields specific knowledge. This differs from folklore, which is a 
bundle of practical knowledge, amassed and added to as experience dictates. 
Whilst we might agree that a systematic integration of component principles is 
necessary for a body of information to specifically warrant the title ‘theory’, 
something more is needed here. That something is an account of the way in 
which the internal principles relate to each other. Unfortunately for Botterill and 
for us, this is not something he provides. 
 
(ii) Simulation Theory 
 
Prior to 1986 it was part and parcel of debates about folk psychology that 
attributing reasons for actions was enabled by possession of a theory of mind. 
However, in 1986 papers by Jane Heal and Robert Gordon challenged the view 
that understanding others was enabled by employing a theory of mind. Instead, 
they argued independently that mindreading is achieved through engaging in 
simulation routines (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986).  
Simulation theory offers a rival account of mental state attribution, which 
diverges from theory theory in stating that understanding others relies primarily 
on a practical use of one’s own cognitive and/or empathic resources to predict 
and explain behaviour of others. It states that understanding others is a matter of 
engaging in simulation routines. As Davies and Stone put it: 
 
                                                      
20 As opposed to contingent integration. For something to be a theory, the principles must sit in 
relation to each other in cohesive way that draws together its principles: in this way, each part of 
the theory is connected nomologically to other principles.  
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[T]he resources of our own minds … simulate the psychological 
aetiology of the actions of others. (1995b: 3) 
  
There are three alternatives within simulation theory as to how we ought 
to understand simulation: (i) explicit simulation, (ii) radical simulation (a variant 
type of explicit simulation), and (iii) implicit simulation. Each alternative 
provides a different answer as to how we ought to understand simulation 
routines. Uniting each differing approach to simulation is a wish to avoid 
recourse to a theory of mind in our accounts of how we understand others. 
Explicit simulation theory argues that we attribute mental states to others 
by consciously “putting ourselves in the other’s shoes” (Davies and Stone 1995a: 
21). Involved in this is feeding relevant information about the other’s situation 
into our own cognitive, empathic, and imaginative resources; we then make a 
judgement of their motivations, or a prediction of future behaviour, based on our 
own thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires which arise from this process. In 
short, explicit simulation theory states that I recognise the situation of the other 
person, and by empathetically imagining what I would do, think, or feel in their 
situation, I am able to infer mental states to them. 
Key to explicit simulation is an insistence on the primary role of pretence 
and introspection; and using both in a consciously controlled manner. In this 
way, simulation, according to the explicit model, is an imaginative exercise of 
putting myself in the ‘situational shoes’ of others. Doing so activates my own 
emotion, memory, and perceptual processes and evokes how I should think, feel 
and act if placed in their situation. As Heal states: 
 
[W]e take the contents of the beliefs and desires of the other as material 
for our own reasoning and reflective capacities. When this occurs the 
mind of the would-be predictor and the mind of the person to be predicted 
(if all goes well) proceed through parallel evolutions and arrive at similar 
end states; each of these persons develops thoughts from thoughts, using 
his or her capacities … The prediction is derived by a simulation process, 
not by calling on some theory about how minds work.  (1996: 46) 
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This form of simulation is one supported by the early writing of Goldman 
(2002, 2005). It has, however, attracted much criticism. Firstly, there are those 
who, noting the close relation of explicit simulation theory to the argument from 
analogy, resurrect criticisms originally levelled to the argument from analogy 
and direct them towards explicit simulation. Most prominently, there is the worry 
that in putting ourselves in another’s situational shoes and using my own 
conceptual apparatus to generate thoughts, feelings, and mental states, we can at 
best arrive at an understanding of what we ourselves would do in similar 
circumstances. This does not guarantee that the same holds for the person we are 
trying to understand (Scheler 1954; Zahavi 2007: 29; also see Zahavi 2001, 
2008). Zahavi argues that the same is the case for explicit simulation and we are 
left with the question of whether: 
 
[S]imulation ever allows for a true understanding of the other or will it 
merely let me attain an understanding of myself in a different situation? 
(Zahavi 2007: 27) 
 
A reliance on one’s own imaginative and empathic pretence does not 
seem to give us grounds for an understanding of others. At best, it gives us the 
grounds to have a good guess, or to surmise, ‘if it was me, then I would do x’.  
A further worry with explicit simulation addresses methodological 
concerns. Explicit simulation states that we take salient aspects of the other’s 
situation and by imaginatively putting ourselves in their situation and then 
introspectively examining our own beliefs, desires and other mental states; we 
arrive at the grounds for attributing these mental states to others. A central 
question is what enables us to decide what is salient within the other person’s 
situation in the first place. Another way of phrasing this is the question of how 
we decide what to feed into our simulation, and what to leave out.  
This concern is raised by Heal, who points out that when engaging in 
simulation we must make allowances both for our own and others’ moods, which 
may not be immediately obvious to us, but which affect our judgement and the 
way we act (1996: 52). This is also the case for wider phenomena such as 
personal history, current personal elements which affect the individual’s life, 
long term goals and hopes, pertinent memories, stress, and so on. For example on 
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witnessing a young man in silent tears in the waiting room of the dentist, how 
could I use explicit simulation to understand his actions? It will not be 
immediately obvious to me what it is in his situation that I might call upon to 
feed into a simulation. Perhaps he is terrified of the dentist, or maybe the music 
playing in the background holds particular sad memories for him. In this 
situation, I face the problem of how to decide what is salient and relevant about 
the young man’s situation; and also how to choose the ‘correct’ explanation. 
Apart from in seemingly obvious cases it seems that explicit simulation is 
rendered unnecessary if one knows something about the person in front of us, 
and their life and personality. However, this might not be a problem if we make a 
more modest claim about the scope and usefulness of explicit simulation: that it 
is useful in simple cases in which environmental factors are limited and obvious. 
However, this leaves us a long way from the characterisation of simulation 
theory as ubiquitous. Given these criticisms, explicit simulation provides, at best, 
rather sketchy grounds for understanding others.  
Following this line of thought, it seems that explicit simulation theory 
cannot shoulder the task of accounting for our understanding of others by itself.21 
There are those who argue that social competence, including an awareness of 
shared norms, cultural significance, and social roles, takes much of the burden 
for having to understand others. I explore this in Chapter 2. 
Gallagher voices a separate criticism in which he claims that the picture 
of interpersonal understanding painted by explicit simulation does not tally with 
our everyday experience (2007b: 65). He calls this his ‘simple phenomenological 
argument’ (2007b: 65). Explicit simulation theory claims that simulation routines 
are consciously engaged in when we understand others. Furthermore, Goldman 
argues, this is something we do all the time (Goldman 2002: 7-8). Gallagher’s 
rejoinder is that examination of our experience says otherwise. In day-to-day 
experience, whilst we may occasionally have recourse to something like explicit 
simulation, we do not normally have to explicitly make the effort to understand 
the actions of others. Understanding is instead given in part by context, or 
through an unfolding interaction, not in instances of explicit third person 
                                                      
21 Picking up on this, supporters of theory theory have stated that the ‘gaps’ could be filled in by 
a theory of mind; arguing that simulation must rest on a theory of mind. See Stich and Nichols 
1992, Stich 2009, and Goldman 2006 for the debate. 
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mentalising. Gallagher is keen to point out that this is not equivalent to stating 
that we never call upon imaginative projection into another’s situation. Instead, 
he makes the point that this is not pervasive.  
A more specific, slightly different form of explicit simulation is radical 
simulation. Unlike explicit simulation it denies that an appeal to introspective 
examination of our own mental states leads to an understanding of others. 
Instead, radical simulation holds that engaging in simulation involves a 
transformative shift away from concern with what I, myself, would do in the 
other person’s situation to what they, themselves, will do or believe in their own 
situation.  Under this description simulation is still explicitly engaged in, and it is 
still an imaginative enterprise; only, instead of imagining what I would do, I 
imaginatively reconstruct the other person in their situation and, in doing so, 
make judgments about what they will think, do or believe (see Gordon 1995, 
1996). 
Whilst radical simulation appears to overcome explicit simulation 
theory’s problem of never moving beyond what I would do,22 the remaining 
criticisms levelled against explicit simulation still hold for radical simulation. 
The first of these was Gallagher’s simple phenomenological argument that when 
we reflect on our general and everyday experience there is very little evidence to 
suggest that engaging in simulation routines happens very often. Whilst we 
imaginatively engage with the predicaments of other people occasionally, 
particularly when there is something odd or errant about their behaviour, the 
claim that this is pervasive or necessary remains one which is disqualified by 
appeal to our everyday experience.  
However, this is not necessarily a problem for implicit simulation. 
Avoiding the criticisms levelled at explicit forms of simulation, implicit 
simulation states that simulation is an ‘off-line’, sub-personal process, which we 
are not consciously aware of performing or utilising as a methodology. Implicit 
simulation holds that understanding of others occurs through implicit simulation 
routines which enable an attribution of beliefs and desires as causes of observed 
behaviour. But if simulation routines are not imaginative engagements and a 
                                                      
22 However, it is arguable that radical simulation still fails on these grounds, as it does not 
provide an account of how one adopts another’s perspective, or how transformation from my own 
mental states to those of others’ is achieved. 
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literal ‘putting oneself in another’s shoes’, then in what sense is simulation 
occurring?  
To answer this, implicit simulation appeals to evidence from 
neuroscience, in particular, to the working of mirror neurons and resonance 
systems more generally, to ground our ability to understand others (see 
Stamenov and Gallese (eds.) 2002; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Gallese, 2001, 
2007). Mirror neurons, a specific subtype of F5 visuomotor neurons, are neurons 
found in the pre-motor cortex of both humans and non-human primates which 
are closely linked to intentional behaviour. Canonical neurons are the other 
subtype found in this region (Fogassi and Gallese 2002). Canonical neurons 
discharge in the presence of objects which provide scope for intentional action 
and when the agent, itself, performs a particular motor action (Borg 2007: 5-6; 
Fogassi and Gallese 2002: 15). Unlike canonical neurons, mirror neurons 
activate when the monkey witnesses its conspecific performing an intentional 
action (Fogassi and Gallese 2002: 15) and when it performs intentional actions of 
that kind itself. As Fogassi and Gallese write, mirror neurons:  
 
[D]ischarge when the monkey [or human] observes an action made by 
another individual and when it executes the same or a similar action. 
(2002: 15) 
 
Mirror neurons are active in intentional, goal directed actions, rather than 
movement in general. Interestingly, mirror neurons in this area of the monkey’s 
brain discharge most strongly when it observes the other monkey using its hand 
to grasp, manipulate, or hold something; or perform some other goal directed 
activity. Whilst mirror neurons still discharge if the monkey witnesses its 
conspecific using a tool, the response is weaker (2002: 16; Gallese et al. 1996).  
 The discovery and subsequent exploration of the role of mirror neurons 
has been of great importance for debates addressing how we understand others. 
The findings have led some to surmise that the presence of neural mirroring of 
intentional action grounds an ability to understand and attribute reasons for 
action to others (Gallese and Goldman 1998; Gallese 2001). Mirror neurons 
provide good evidence of a subpersonal process which enables us to perceive 
goal directed behaviour. The discharge of mirror neurons has been subsequently 
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taken as what grounds an ability to perceive actions as intentional, and thereby, 
to understand them: 
 
To put the observed action into a motor semantic network is simply a 
necessity, if one has to understand what the observed action is really 
about. The activation of the parieto-premotor mirror circuit is 
fundamental to provide the observer with a real comprehension of the 
observed action. (Rizzolatti 2005: 419) 
 
 Supporters of implicit simulation theory draw on evidence and findings 
surrounding mirror neurons to suggest that the activation and workings of mirror 
neurons constitute an implicit simulation: when I observe the other performing 
an intentional action, the same neural pathways are activated as they would if I 
were to perform the same action. The resonance between observed intentional 
action and subpersonal activation of neurons is interpreted as simulation, albeit 
on the neural level. In this way, each time an intentional action is observed, the 
activation of mirror neurons simulates the neural working it would take to 
perform the action oneself. As Gallese writes:  
 
To spell it out in different words, action observation implies action 
simulation. (Gallese 2001: 37) 
 
 The evidence of mirror neurons and their functioning is strong. Given this, 
perhaps we stop reading and think the debate ends here. Not quite.  
Implicit simulation, in taking the discharge and function of mirror 
neurons to be simulation, raises some important issues which need to be 
addressed.  Whilst implicit simulation answers the simple phenomenological 
worry which presents problems for explicit and radical simulation, we find a 
concern resurfacing that was a problem for explicit simulation. Whilst we might 
say mirror neurons enact simulation by their very function, there is still the 
question of how one can attribute explanations that are the other’s and not simply 
one’s own. In relying on one’s own resonance system, once again we only have 
grounds for understand what I would do in that situation myself. More worrying 
is the question of to what extent can we call the subpersonal workings of mirror 
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neurons simulation, and still retain a sense of simulation as it was originally 
envisaged. Gallagher puts these problems forcefully when he writes: 
 
The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural 
resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be 
the kind of simulation required by Simulation Theory, because it fails to 
explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve 
instrumentality and pretence. Implicit Simulation Theory also fails to 
explain how I can attribute a mental state or emotional state that is 
different from my own to another person. (2007a: 353) 
 
In arguing that the action and functioning of mirror neurons and resonance 
systems constitute simulation, we must ask whether we have stretched the 
concept of simulation out of shape; instead of talking about perceptual processes, 
supporters of simulation theory adopt the language of simulation, which makes 
sense at a phenomenological level, and apply it to the subpersonal, where 
arguably such language is superfluous. Instead, it is arguable that mirror neurons 
provide grounding for a direct perception of others’ actions, without the need to 
recourse to a simulation. 
 Working along this vein, it has been suggested that a better interpretation 
of the function of resonance systems and mirror neurons in particular is as 
playing a part in the perceptual processes. 
 
Mirror activation, on this interpretation, is not the initiation of simulation, 
it is part of a direct intersubjective perception of what the other is doing. 
(Gallagher 2007a: 359) 
 
When we interpret the functioning of mirror neurons as part of the perceptual 
processes, we do not need to appeal to simulation: 
 
If … we look at those processes from a phenomenological level that 
suggests a direct perception of the other’s intentions, then we tend to read 
those processes as perceptual without simulation. Can the simulationist 
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offer any convincing evidence that the activation of resonance processes 
is in fact a simulation? (Gallagher 2007a: 359) 
 
It is not clear that they can. 
 
1.2 Acquisition of Folk Psychology: 
Developmental Evidence 
 
Given these problems, we are left facing the question of why we should 
posit that interpersonal understanding is enabled by theory, simulation or a 
hybrid of both. The answer to this lies with the identification of the emergence of 
an almost universal ability between 3-4 years of age, which can be distinguished 
from general intelligence (Baron-Cohen 1995: Chapter 4). This phenomenon is 
the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. Central to this is a capacity to 
recognise that others hold beliefs that differ from our own. Originally, 
developmental psychologists explained this ability in terms of a newly acquired 
theory of mind. The idea here is that possession of a theory of mind enables the 
infant to recognise that other people may hold different beliefs and information 
about the world than themselves. In others words, they explained this new ability 
in terms of the onset of mentalising, thanks to possession of a theory of mind.23 
Evidence of the false belief test is used to bolster the claim that around 
the age of four, an ability to represent the beliefs of others develops. Various 
developmental psychologists have argued that ability to do so is enabled by the 
child having a concept of belief alongside the ability to attribute beliefs to others, 
based on their behaviour and an appreciation of the context of their actions. 
Wimmer and Perner (1983), and other supporters of the theory theory (Baron-
Cohen 1995), put this ability down to a newly acquired theory of mind which 
enables this recognition that other people have access to knowledge beyond, or 
will have judgements differing from, my own. Possession of a theory of mind is 
thought to enable the child deploy their concept of belief in understanding others. 
                                                      
23 Simulation theorists also take the ability to attribute false beliefs to support simulation theory. 
There is a long and complicated literature which addresses this. For a good overview, see 
Goldman 2006: Chapter 8 (particularly 197ff). 
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Debates turned to consider how this related body of law-like 
generalisations is acquired. Two main accounts of theory acquisition are 
forwarded24 (i) scientific theory theory, or ‘child scientist’ approach (Gopnik and 
Wellman 1992, 1994; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997) in which the child learns and 
later internalises a body of rule based generalisations through experience of 
intersubjective encounters with others; and (ii) the modularity theory in which 
theory of mind is an innate and inherited module (mechanism) existing from 
birth in the mind which provides the potentiality of mindreading (Baron-Cohen 
1995; Fodor 1983; Leslie 1987, 1988, 1991, 1994).  
Scientific theory theory states that the child constructs her theory of mind 
much in the same way as a scientist constructs a theory. Central to this is 
entertaining hypotheses which are then tested. Scientific theory theory came to 
fall from favour for being unable to account for evidence suggesting that children 
acquire the ability to mind read at roughly the same age, between 3-4 years.25 In 
addition to this is the more serious charge that scientific theory theory is self-
undermining. The thrust of this charge is that children cannot entertain the sort of 
hypotheses which scientific theory theory requires (i.e. entertaining various 
beliefs) without first having the concept of belief (and false belief, in particular): 
one cannot build a theory about beliefs which other people hold, without first 
understanding what it is to hold a belief, correctly or incorrectly. In this way, it is 
argued that there is no appropriate grounding for scientific theory theory.  
In explicating modular theory theory, Baron Cohen outlines four domain-
specific mechanisms which he argues are evolutionarily advantageous, and 
which play a crucial role in the development of mindreading. These are: (i) an 
Intentionality Detector (ID) which enables the infant to recognise intentionality 
in object movement, specifically in terms of goals and desires (1995: 32); (ii) an 
Eye-Direction Detector (EDD), enabling a recognition of “eye-like stimuli” 
(1995: 35) and their direction;  (iii) a Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM) which 
is instrumental in allowing infant and carer to attend to something jointly; and 
(iv) a Theory of Mind Module (ToMM) which develops later than (i-iii). The 
                                                      
24 There are also accounts which argue that both innate structures and learning are necessary in 
order to develop a theory of mind. See, for instance, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) who argues that 
children have innate capacities, rooted in modules, which grow and develop through exposure to 
particular environmental and cultural factors. 
25 This is one reason amongst other reasons. See Goldman 2006: Chapter 4 and Ratcliffe 2007a: 
17 for an evaluation of this view. 
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ToMM works to synthesise the information gathered from ID, EDD, and SAM 
and attribute agency and reasons, in terms of mental states, to observed actions. 
For Baron-Cohen, as for Leslie, ToMM: 
 
[H]as the dual function of representing the set of epistemic mental states 
and turning all this mentalistic knowledge into a useful theory. (Leslie 
1994: 51) 
 
Under this description, competence in folk psychology (mentalising) is grounded 
in sub-personal, domain specific mechanisms (modules), and theory-of-mind is 
innate and tacit.26  
False belief tests usually take the form of a child being asked to witness a 
sequence of events. The one commonly used runs as follows: a mother and child 
(Maxi) enter a kitchen. Mother places some chocolate in the cupboard in the 
presence of Maxi, who witnesses the placing of the chocolate before going out to 
play. In Maxi’s absence, mother moves the chocolate from the cupboard to the 
drawer. The question asked to the participating child, is ‘Where will Maxi look 
for the chocolate?’ (Wimmer and Perner 1983) It has been found that children 
prior to the age of 3-4 years will struggle and not be able to correctly answer that 
Maxi will look in the cupboard. They are unable to see that Maxi will hold a 
false belief. However, between the ages of 3-4 years children begin to correctly 
answer that Maxi will look in the cupboard for the chocolate. Involved in this 
answer is an ability to correctly adopt Maxi’s perspective and realise that he 
holds mistaken beliefs, which will lead him to act in a specific way. 
There have been many other deviations to the set up of such experiments, 
involving for example a Smarties tube full of pencils instead of sweets (Perner, 
Frith, Leslie, and Leekam 1989), and the Sally-Anne test, in which Sally places a 
marble in a basket, which Anne moves in her absence (see Baron-Cohen 1995: 
70-72) but the core principles remain the same. Each variant of the false belief 
task reveals that around 3-4 years most children develop an ability to recognise 
that others may hold mistaken beliefs. Entailed in this might be an inability to 
                                                      
26 A challenge for such conceptions of theory of mind is to account for the translation of these 
sub-personal processes into a ‘theory’ that we explicitly call upon. However, I will not go into 
this further here. 
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realise that (a) other people hold beliefs differing from one’s own and (b) that 
people may hold mistaken and false beliefs which they will then act on.  
Wimmer and Perner originally explained this by reference to the child 
acquiring a theory of mind: the child understands that beliefs, when coupled with 
desires, are motivating forces. With the newly acquired theory of mind, the child 
may successfully predict that Maxi does not always have the same access to 
information than they do, and may therefore hold a mistaken belief. 
Psychologists including Chandler and Boyes (1982) Flavell (1988). Wellman 
(1990), and Wimmer and Perner (1983) all think this is explained by the 
“acquisition of new theoretical rules about the human mind” (Kern and Marbach 
2001:70). Fodor expresses this clearly when he writes: 
 
These data have been widely viewed as implying that the younger child’s 
theory of mind differs in quite radical ways from the one that older 
children share with adults; for example, that the young child either lacks 
the notion of belief entirely, or fails to realise that beliefs can 
misrepresent the world, and thus lacks a notion of false belief. If any of 
this is correct, then we are badly in need of an account of how, 
somewhere between the ages of three and four, maturational processes, or 
learning processes, or a combination of the two, could eventuate in what 
amounts to a conceptual revolution in the child's theory of mind. (Fodor 
1995: 109) 
 
This ‘conceptual revolution’ is largely interpreted in terms of the child acquiring 
her theory of mind. Sloars and MacDonald characterise this precisely: 
 
Taken together, the ideas that (1) discerning intentionality in the 
behaviour of others involves accessing their minds, (2) that this requires 
folk psychology understood as a theory and (3) that passing the false 
belief task is a hallmark of having acquired basic mastery of folk 
psychology, are the main features of the first player in the theories of 
mind debate, the classical Theory Theory (TT) of social cognition. (2008: 
154) 
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This evidence is further supported by examples from childhood 
pathology. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) adapted Wimmer and Perner’s 
original false belief test (1983) in order to test normal children alongside children 
with autism and Down’s syndrome. The results indicated that whilst the large 
majority of normal children and those with Down’s syndrome could successfully 
complete the task, those with autistism struggled. Of interest to Baron-Cohen et 
al. was that children on the autism spectrum performed poorly compared to those 
with Down’s syndrome despite the latter having lower general intelligence 
(Baron-Cohen 1995: Chapter 5). Given these results, they concluded that ability 
to understand others does not correlate with general intelligence; instead 
impairment in autism is specific to interpersonal understanding. Baron-Cohen 
uses this evidence to support modular theory theory and argues that children with 
autism lack a specific theory of mind module (see 1.1b) which precludes normal 
development of theory of mind (1995). 
Claims of those who champion the false belief test as the marker of the 
sudden emergence of new conceptual abilities have more recently been taken to 
task, both on their accuracy, and on their conclusions. Whilst critics do not deny 
that this ability emerges at this age, they do question the extent to which we see 
this as central to the infant’s ability to understand others. Given this, there is a 
question as to what the false belief test can be said to show, and in relation to 
this, what other, arguably more sophisticated abilities passing a false belief test 
requires in advance. Whilst the false belief test is taken as experimental evidence 
that around the age of 3-4 years a theory of mind matures and develops, if we 
recall our earlier exploration of theory theory, we saw there that most theory 
theorists characterise folk psychology as a tacit theory. However, Gallagher 
(2001) (also see Gallagher and Hutto 2008) has pointed out that evidence of the 
false belief test outstretches the conclusions drawn from it: the false belief test 
can at best be used as a measure of explicit theory of mind, not the implicit form 
which is favoured.  
Following on from this, Ratcliffe (2007a) has questioned assumptions 
that are taken for granted by this test. Far from being a simple test which 
examines only whether the child is able to recognise that others have different 
beliefs from themselves, successful completion of the test actually requires 
subtler skills than has been recognised. Criticisms of this test show that not only 
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does the test presuppose folk psychology27 (Ratcliffe 2007b: 229) but also that a 
successful engagement in the test requires a subtler understanding of situation 
and context than has been recognised. Even understanding what the test asks the 
child to do in the first place relies on subtle and complex skills which have been 
overlooked, including an ability to recognise that the puppets and props stand for 
people and furniture; an ability to engage with and follow the “lengthy narrative” 
(Ratcliffe 2007a: 53) of the test, as well as other feats of understanding, which 
are all presupposed by the terms of the test.28As Ratcliffe points out:  
 
Given the considerable social abilities that children must already have in 
order to comprehend the task, it is questionable how central a role the 
further ability to attribute false beliefs has in social life. (2007a: 53) 
 
He turns his attention to examine how sophisticated our understanding of 
social and personal know-how must be to even comprehend what the tasks 
requires us to do. For example, the infant must understand that the puppets 
represent people, that the set is their ‘world’ and so on.  The infant’s ability to 
make sense of what the experimenter asks, then, is complex, subtle and taken for 
granted by the false belief task experiments.29  
Inherent within these criticisms is the problem, stressed throughout this 
chapter, that theory theory and simulation theory take the remit of their 
explanation too narrowly. In focusing on the role of attributing mental states in 
understanding, theory theory misses out the more pervasive abilities which 
contribute to the activity of making sense of others in a specific context, whilst 
performing specific actions, without the initial need to make sense of these 
through inference.  
Having examined folk psychology, and drawn out its commitment to 
characterising understanding primarily as a process of attributing propositional 
attitudes and intentional states to others in order to explain behaviour, I now 
move on to examine whether folk psychology, and the accounts of what enables 
                                                      
27 In asking the question of when folk psychology appears, the experimenters assume a folk 
psychology interpretation of the results from the outset. See Ratcliffe 2007a: 53ff.  
28 See Ratcliffe 2007a (53) for a discussion of these presumptions. 
29 I cover the complexities of infant intersubjectivity in Chapter 2 in which I examine work that 
criticises folk psychology for neglecting intersubjective capacities which infants possess prior to 
the age of 3-years. 
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possession of folk psychology (theory theory, simulation theory), can ever fully 
provide a working account of interpersonal understanding. In what follows, I 
suggest not. Whilst folk psychology may legitimately describe a facet of 
interpersonal understanding, namely the attempt to understand others when a 
more fundamental type of understanding falters and breaks down, I suggest that 
more pervasive skills underlie the ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others, 
and further that reliance on these skills renders attribution of intentional states 
largely unnecessary, apart from in the few cases already mentioned. Thus in the 
next chapter I turn to look at the roles personhood, context and interaction all 
play in interpersonal understanding, and assess how they ought to form a part of 
any description of understanding.     
 
1.3 Must Folk Psychology be Mechanistic? 
 
Before moving on to consider criticisms of folk psychology more fully in 
the next chapter, I will first pause to consider a relatively recent and alternative 
account of folk psychological competence: the ‘narrative practice hypothesis’ 
(Hutto 2008a, 2008b, 2009). This account seeks to minimise the ubiquity claims 
of traditional advocates of folk psychology, emphasising that reliance on folk 
psychology is rare – only when actions appear as abnormal, errant or erratic do 
we seek to provide reasons which make sense of these action. Though the 
narrative practice hypothesis states that understanding others rarely references an 
ability to attribute reasons for actions, it protects the notion that competence to 
do so is a special skill, which we do occasionally make use of. It is, Hutto argues, 
worthy of philosophical attention in debates questioning how we understand 
others. 
  One major criticism is that orthodox accounts of folk psychology (theory 
and simulation theories) have assumed the wrong ‘start point’ for our 
understanding of others. Stating that a predominantly third-person stance is 
primary in our understanding of others, they do not take into account the ways in 
which others shape our competency at generating reasons, or more widely 
understanding what they say or do. We must, therefore, look at the work which 
being with others performs in learning and becoming adept at understanding 
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others (whether this is through reasons, direct perception or shared social 
context). Gillet expresses this concern precisely when he states:  
 
[A] grasp of the rules that govern the use of a concept (its application and 
its internal role in thought sequences) is shaped by modelling the actions 
of fellow human beings and responding to their corrective responses … 
The structure and coherence of one’s mental world therefore reflects, in 
part, the cumulative result of using skills developed in human forms of 
life, rather than the functioning of a set of mechanistic cognitive 
operations working (solipsistically) on the stimulations falling on 
receptor surfaces. (2004: 25) 
 
This is what the narrative practice hypothesis seeks to redress.  
Working against the presupposition that the ability to attribute reasons for 
intentional actions relies on a sub-personal, innate, and tacit mechanism,30 Hutto 
seeks to locate the ability to utilise folk psychology in a “decidedly socio-cultural 
basis” (Hutto 2008a: x). He also states that the principles of folk psychology are 
not the first port of call in understanding others; most of the time, understanding 
others is not a problem. According to Hutto, our understanding is scaffolded and 
supported by participation in a shared and public world; by the roles which we 
ourselves and others occupy; and across interaction with others.  
However, Hutto argues, there are cases in which an action sits on the 
boundaries of sense: it sticks out like a sore thumb and needs to be explicitly 
understood. It is in these cases, and only in these cases, which the narrative 
practice hypothesis comes into action. In such cases the narrative practice 
hypothesis claims that providing reasons for actions31 in terms of special reason-
giving narratives grounds our understanding of the situation. Hutto refers to these 
as “folk psychological narratives” (Hutto 2008b: 178; 2009: 11). But what is it 
that enables a development of the capacity for successful attribution of reasons 
though action? Hutto’s reply is as follows: 
 
                                                      
30 Whether theory of mind, simulation routines, or a hybrid of both. 
31 The narrative practice hypothesis states that these ‘reasons for actions’, whilst often relying on 
predicting or inferring a state of mind (mental states) which gives rise to the errant behaviour, do 
not have to be exclusively in terms of mental states and propositional attitudes. 
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[D]irect encounters with stories about persons who act for reasons – those 
supplied in interactive contexts by responsive caregivers – is the normal 
route through which children become familiar with both (1) the basic 
structure of folk psychology and (2) the norm-governed possibilities for 
wielding it in practice, thus learning both how and when to use it. (Hutto 
2008a: x) 
 
And this is where the ‘practice’ of the narrative practice hypothesis comes into 
play. According to the narrative practice hypothesis, competency in utilising folk 
psychology is not located in subpersonal, inaccessible, or individualistic 
frameworks. Instead it is developmental, and is learned through social 
interaction, most specifically through story-telling.32 The context of telling and 
sharing stories is one ideally suited to interactional learning and it is largely here 
that, Hutto argues, children learn the norms, expectations, and interpretative 
social anchors of society which commonly structure everyday understanding.  
 Though Hutto takes care to emphasise that recourse to folk psychology is 
something seldom used, some questions emerge. In particular is the question of 
the extent to which a reliance on concepts of ‘belief’, ‘desire’, and other 
intentional attitudes are actually helpful in understanding others (see Ratcliffe 
2008a). Ratcliffe argues that at best propositional attitude terms, such as ‘belief’ 
and ‘desire’, become generalised placeholders for a rich cluster of associated 
phenomena. When considering the concept of ‘belief’, Ratcliffe’s argument leads 
us to see that the ways in which we might ‘believe’ something are many and 
varied. Consider the following ways we can think of or hold belief: 
 
Conviction 
Religious belief 
Irrational belief 
Belief, which is more akin to hope, in which you want something to be the case, 
so believe it 
Assertive belief (‘I believe you’) 
Belief against the odds  
                                                      
32 Hutto quotes both fairy tales such as ‘Little Red Riding Hood’ and Shakespeare for adult 
competence in folk psychology. 
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The term ‘belief’, then, works as a placeholder for a diverse constellation of 
phenomena which when we pare down to the proposition ‘Paul did x because he 
believes y, and x-ing brings y about’ is not very informative. Consider how we 
might go about explaining Paul’s sudden falling to his knees: 
(1) Paul fell to his knees because he felt dizzy and believed that kneeling 
down would alleviate the dizziness. 
(2) Paul fell to his knees because he believed the kingdom of God was at 
hand and felt a sudden need to repent. 
(3) Paul fell to his knees because he believed he saw a rare 5 spotted ladybird 
and he gets excited about that sort of thing. 
In each of the three cases a belief ‘motivates’ Paul’s behaviour, and yet in each 
case the term ‘belief’ is very different; so different in fact that we arguably do 
not need to refer to ‘belief at all’. Consider: Paul dropped to his knees because he 
felt dizzy; Paul knelt to repent as he felt the Kingdom of God was near; Paul fell 
to his knees because he was excited by the ladybird and wanted a closer look. In 
each of these cases there is an affective dimension which appeal to the language 
of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ cannot capture (Ratcliffe 2008a:  446-447). We have to 
question and wonder what work an appeal to the core lexis of folk psychology is 
doing. The danger would lie in thinking that this, alone, constitutes interpersonal 
understanding, or an appreciation of why someone may have acted in the way 
they have. Morton makes a different but related point that is of relevance here:  
 
When we ascribe beliefs and desires and use them to explain and predict 
what people are doing the ascriptions are incomplete: we rely on 
conversational context and our knowledge of the particular person 
involved, and no doubt other factors, to fill in the full content of the 
ascription. (Morton 2007: 216) 
 
So, whilst ascription of propositional attitudes may give us a generalised idea of 
why something might be happening, much of the explanatory work, even in odd 
behaviour, is done by “conversational context” and knowledge of the person’s 
history and character (Morton 2007: 216). This serves to pin down what is meant 
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by ‘belief’ or ‘desire’ in a particular context. Though Hutto remains sensitive to 
this, the debate on the usefulness of describing interpersonal understanding in 
terms of folk psychology remains. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a survey of debates surrounding interpersonal 
understanding, which state that an understanding of others is enabled by 
utilisation of folk psychology. After some initial exploration of what folk 
psychology is, I turned to explicate two dominant claims as to what constitutes 
an ability to successfully utilise folk psychology. First, I examined the claims of 
theory theory that folk psychology, and therefore understanding others (as 
understood by this view), is enabled by utilisation of a theory of mind. After 
some discussion of this view, I turned to examine its main rival, simulation 
theory. As there is some argument as to how best to understand simulation 
theory, I outlined three main positions that state that simulation is to be 
understood as (i) explicit, (ii) radical, and (iii) implicit.  
Discussion which followed highlighted that each way of understanding 
simulation theory falls foul of criticisms which challenge the effectiveness of 
simulation theory as a pervasive and widespread methodology for understanding 
others and, in the instance of implicit simulation, the appropriateness of using the 
term ‘simulation’ to refer to neural processes involved in perception. Moving on 
from here, I turned to explore why skilful utilisation of folk psychology is taken 
to be important in debates surrounding how we understand others. Here I 
outlined the ‘false belief test’ and the reasons given by supporters of folk 
psychology, that it marks an important cognitive turning point which goes hand 
in hand with an ability to understand others.  
After this, I turned to examine the narrative practice hypothesis (Hutto 
2008a) which offers a more modest account of folk psychology. Moving away 
from the ubiquity claims of theory theory and simulation theory, the narrative 
practice hypothesis states folk psychology is only used when we are faced with 
puzzling or bizarre behaviour. Further, it claims that competence in using folk 
psychology is grounded in social narratives. The next chapter takes off from 
Hutto’s claims that folk psychology is not ubiquitous in instances of 
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interpersonal understanding and examines recent critiques of folk psychology. 
These criticisms accuse folk psychology of providing, at best, a narrow and 
overly mentalistic account of interpersonal understanding which neglects the role 
which shared social attunement and interaction play. After examining these 
criticisms, the next chapter turns to look at alternative accounts of interpersonal 
understanding, which seek to foster and take notice of subtle and socially shaped 
aspects of our ability to understand others. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SITUATION, PERSONHOOD AND  
THE WIDENING OF ‘UNDERSTANDING’ 
 
 
“In these relations of mutual 
understanding, there is produced a 
conscious mutual relation of persons 
and at the same time a unitary relation 
of them to a common surrounding 
world.” (Husserl 1989: 203) 
 
“There’s no art to find the mind’s 
construction in the face.” (Macbeth I.V 
l. 13-14) 
 
 
In the last chapter, we saw that folk psychology is a philosophical 
position that offers an account of how we ordinarily go about understanding 
others. Proponents of folk psychology argue that this is a matter of ‘mentalising’ 
or ‘mindreading’: explaining and predicting the actions of others by inferring and 
attributing mental states to them, usually in the form of propositional attitudes   
(Goldman 2006; Stich and Nichols 2003). Additionally, folk psychology claims 
that mindreading is primary and pervasive to successful interpersonal 
understanding (Currie and Sterelny 2000: 145; Goldman 2006: 3; Frith and 
Happé 1999: 2; Stich and Nichols 2003:1). 
Recently, many have taken a critical attitude toward the claims of folk 
psychology.33 They argue that in focusing almost exclusively on the role of 
mindreading, folk psychology neglects to account for richer phenomena that 
underlie and inform our understanding of others (Gallagher 2001; Starwarska 
2007, 2009; Zahavi 2001, 2007a). In particular it does not account for the ‘inter-’ 
                                                      
33 See Hutto and Ratcliffe (Eds.) 2007 for a collection of articles which critically explore folk 
psychology; and also the special issue of Philosophical Explorations 11.3 (2008) which examines 
theory of mind and narrative approaches to intersubjective understanding. 
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of intersubjectivity: the varying forms this takes, and the ways relations with 
other people shape our understanding of them (Hobson 2002, 2007a; Ratcliffe 
2007a: Chapter 6, Starwarska 2007, 2009). Additionally, folk psychology 
overlooks and fails to recognise the role that shared situation plays in rooting our 
encounters with others and informing the direction that understanding takes 
(Ratcliffe 2007a: Chapters 3 and 4; Zahavi 2007a, 2008).    
In what follows I turn to look at demands for this richer account of 
interpersonal understanding (Gallagher 2001, 2004a,b, 2005, 2008a,b, 2009; 
Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Hobson 2002, 2007a,b, 
2008; Hutto 2004, 2008, 2009; Ratcliffe 2006, 2007a,b, 2008b; Reddy 2008; 
Sloars and MacDonald 2008; Starwarska 2007, 2009; Zahavi 2001, 2007a,b, 
2008). I identify and survey underlying assumptions of folk psychology before 
moving on to call into question the assumed pervasiveness of folk psychology. 
Following the arguments of recent critics of folk psychology, I argue that folk 
psychology must be placed in context of the work done by social elements, such 
as norms, expectations, roles, and rules. Consideration of these other factors 
which support and frame our understanding reveals that the universality claim of 
proponents of folk psychology is questionable. This chapter has a primarily 
expository function. Examination of the material I cover here will serve as a 
springboard for my own views, which I develop in Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis.  
 
2.1 Folk Psychology:  
Underlying Assumptions 
 
Emerging from recent debates on what constitutes our ability to utilise 
folk psychology (theory of mind, simulation or both) is a presupposition and 
acceptance that all interpersonal understanding can be characterised in terms of 
folk psychology.34 A survey of the literature enables us to appreciate this 
perspective. Folk psychology for Stich and Nichols is:  
 
                                                      
34 Gallagher refers to this presupposition as the ‘universality principle’ and argues that it is false 
(‘Interaction Theory and the Science of Social Cognition’ delivered at Social Cognition and 
Social Narrative Summer Collegium (San Marino, 10th July 2008).) 
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[E]xtraordinary because it is so pervasive, powerful and important in real 
life that it is taken for granted. (2003: 1) 
 
The strong claim made by Stich and Nichols is that all instances of understanding 
others involve this ‘pervasive’ and ‘powerful’ ability. It is not only Stich and 
Nichols who are impressed by the centrality of folk psychology in understanding 
others. Currie and Sterelny agree with claims for the fundamentality of mind 
reading when they write: 
 
[O]ur basic grip on the social world depends on our being able to see our 
fellows as motivated by beliefs and desires we sometimes share and 
sometimes do not. (2000: 145) 
 
For Frith and Happé, mindreading “appears to be a prerequisite for normal social 
interaction: in everyday life we make sense of each other’s behaviour by appeal 
to a belief-desire psychology” (1999: 2); and for Goldman, “mentalising anchors 
the fabric of social life” (2006: 3). Baron-Cohen asserts the centrality of positing 
unobservables (mental states) when understanding and predicting the actions of 
others, writing: 
 
[M]indreading is a wonderful thing for us to have: Attributing mental 
states to a complex system (such as a human being) is by far the easiest 
way of understanding it. (1995: 21) 
 
Fodor goes one step further, remarking that, if we are mistaken about the 
prevalence and existence of folk psychology, it would be “the greatest 
intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species” (Fodor 1987, xii). These 
few examples are indicative of the common consensus amongst supporters of 
folk psychology that an ability to use folk psychology is indispensable to making 
sense of our encounters with others.   
But is this the primary, or indeed, only way in which we understand 
others? Looking more closely at instances from our own social lives, it seems 
that our understanding and engagement with others might not be as clear-cut as 
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proponents of folk psychology make out. Consider the following ways in which 
understanding comes into play: 
 
Understanding the off-side rule 
Understanding how to pay for food at the till 
Understanding that Molly is upset 
Understanding what hand-holding means 
Understanding what my work demands from me 
Understanding that whilst it is socially acceptable to hug friends, it is not alright 
to do the same to your boss 
 
Consideration of these examples (and there are many more) leads us to 
realise that the category of ‘understanding’ is by no means narrow or simply 
definable, and is not constituted by an individual ability to attribute reasons for 
action alone. Thus understanding that Molly is upset is different, and often prior 
to understanding why Molly is upset. Whilst we might explain and attribute 
reasons for Molly’s being upset in order to understand it, we first apprehend that 
Molly is upset through how she comports and expresses herself. If we know her 
well, our ability to recognise that she is upset might also take place within the 
context of her personality and history, and the way in which I perceive her 
interactions with others. Recognition of the role which social and personal 
elements play has led to criticism of the view that inference is the primary way 
we understand others. The ubiquity of mental states attribution to others in 
interpersonal understanding has been challenged further by arguments stating 
that direct perception, rather than inference, is the primary way in which we 
understand others (see 2.2d). 
When we turn to examine folk psychology’s commitment to mindreading 
being ubiquitous in understanding others, we find it rests on and entails a further 
group of presuppositions about the nature and character of interpersonal 
understanding. Recently, it has been argued that these presuppositions are not 
representative of non-problematic, everyday interpersonal understanding as folk 
psychology has claimed (Gallagher 2001, 2004a,b, 2005, 2008a, 2009; Gallagher 
and Hutto 2008; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Hobson 2007a, 2008; Hutto 2004; 
Ratcliffe 2007a, b; Starwarska 2007, 2009; Zahavi 2001, 2007, 2008a,b). We can 
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list these presuppositions as follows: 
1. Observing the behaviour of others is the key to having knowledge of 
their mind, which is otherwise inaccessible (Gallagher 2009: 291; 
Herschbach 2008: 223; Sloars and MacDonald 2008: 154). 
2. The standpoint ordinarily occupied when we relate to each other is 
that of the third-person: we observe behaviour from which we may 
mindread to predict and explain the behaviour of others (Gallagher 
2009: 291; Hobson 2007a; Hutto 2004, 2007, 2008; Starwarska 2007, 
Zahavi 2007a).  
3. Inference, rather than direct perception is the mechanism through 
which we understand others (Gallagher 2005). 
4. Understanding is primarily a matter of mindreading, that is, of 
attributing propositional attitudes, usually beliefs and desires, to 
others (Gallagher 2005: 209, 2009: 291; Ratcliffe 2007a, 2007b, 
2008). 
Taken together, these four interrelated claims offer a picture of everyday 
interpersonal understanding that is mentalistic, predominantly individualistic, 
and largely spectatorial in nature (Gallagher 2001: 90-1, 2005: 209ff; Gallagher 
and Hutto 2008: 27; Zahavi 2008b: 526). The overarching assumption that binds 
the four points above together is that the other’s mind is private and inaccessible; 
that it is unknowable. Given this, in ordinary day-to-day life people present 
themselves as needing to be understood. We perceive them behaving in a certain 
way, but something extra is required in order to make sense of our perception. I 
now move on to examine each of the presuppositions listed above, offering an 
overview of ways in which people have criticised them. This overview leads us 
to question the extent to which folk psychology is used in our day to day 
encounters with others.  
 
2.2 Challenges to the Ubiquity of Folk Psychology 
(a) Infant Intersubjectivity 
 
In Chapter 1, we saw that the false belief task (Wimmer and Perner 1983) 
64 
 
has widely been taken to show that at around the age of 3-4 years a landmark 
cognitive ability develops. Around this age children become able to entertain 
beliefs about other people’s beliefs. In particular they can correctly attribute and 
recognise that others may hold mistaken or ‘false beliefs’. Entailed in this is the 
ability for children to be able to distinguish their beliefs from those which others 
have, which in turn enables them to successfully predict the actions of others. We 
saw in Chapter 1.2 that supporters of the theory theory take this development to 
be evidence that the child gains a theory of mind which they are able to deploy to 
understand other people. This development is taken to herald a crowning social 
achievement: the child is able to understand others, through correctly attributing 
mental states, in the form of beliefs, to other people. 
However, we have already seen that in focusing specifically on a child’s 
capacity to attribute beliefs to others (Leslie 1991, 1995),35 theory theorists and 
folk psychology more widely neglect a host of social abilities that infants 
develop much earlier than the age of 4 years. These abilities arguably support 
and shape the child’s ability to attribute beliefs to others that differ from their 
own (Hobson 2002, 2007a; Ratcliffe 2007a,b; Reddy and Morris 2004).  
For example, understanding, let alone passing, the false belief task relies 
on a basic ability to navigate shared social situations. It also demands that the 
participants are able to understand the context that the task sets up,36 and to be 
able to make judgments about a situation in which they are not directly involved 
(Reddy and Morris 2004). Children must also be able to understand the terms of 
the narrative in which the task is couched. In false belief task scenarios children 
have their capacity to attribute false beliefs tested, and it is on this conceptual 
basis that they are judged to have the tools (or not) for interpersonal 
understanding. The task fails to recognise and appreciate the skill with which 
infants below the age of 4 years enter into embodied and expressive relational 
exchanges with others. This constitutes a form of communication that precedes 
an ability to attribute beliefs to others. The attention focused to the skills of 
mindreading comes at the expense of neglecting and failing to recognise the 
                                                      
35 That is, beliefs about other people’s beliefs. This requires one to realise that other people think 
differently from myself and may have a more restricted access to information that I possess, but 
that they do not (and vice versa). 
36 These are often, though not always, imaginary contexts which require the child to follow a 
particular narrative. 
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sophisticated grasp of embodied communicative relations young infants have, 
and develop from an early age, and the central role which this plays in 
interactional understanding (Trevarthen 1979, 1993; Trevarthen and Hubley 
1978). In this way, using the false belief task as evidence for ability to 
understand others gives us a narrow understanding of what it is to understand 
others. Once we move away from thinking of understanding exclusively in terms 
of mentalising, we are able to discern a variety of early emerging abilities that 
hold significance for communication with, and understanding of, others. 
Acknowledgement of these leads to a reassessment of the way we think of our 
capacity for intersubjective relations in early infancy and childhood.  
In what follows, I look briefly at imitation in neonates and in early 
infancy which we might see as a precursor to and enabler of social interaction 
(Gallagher 2005: 74); and also a basic form of communication between infant 
and their parents (Kugiumutzakis et al. 2004). According to this interpretation, 
imitation is an early way of “making contact” with others (Reddy 2008: 45). 
Following this I turn to examine primary and secondary intersubjectivity 
(Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen and Hubley 1978); before posing the question of 
what this developmental evidence reveals about a capacity for intersubjectivity in 
early infancy. 
Meltzoff and Moore’s now famous experiments tested the ability of a 
large number of neonates to imitate simple actions such as mouth opening, 
tongue protrusion, and lip protrusion (Meltzoff and Moore 1977, 1983, 1994). 
These experiments found that a significant number of infants were indeed able to 
imitate the particular gesture shown to them. The studies claim that neonates are 
attuned to the actions of others from birth.37 This might not seem so impressive, 
until we take into consideration that within minutes of birth neonates are 
responsive to people, to the point of being able to imitate them, in a way they do 
not attempt with objects. There is something specific about the human person 
that solicits this response in these neonates, in a way which inanimate objects do 
not. This lead Gallagher, along with Meltzoff to conclude that: 
                                                      
37 Whilst Meltzoff and Moore have argued that their experiments show this ability is widespread, 
it is still contentious: other studies show that whilst some children initially show this ability, they 
cease to continue imitation, whilst others show no response to the demands of the experiment at 
all (see Reddy 2008: Chapter 4 for an overview of the debate). 
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Infants are able to distinguish between human faces and human bodies, 
that is, in a way that they do not respond to other objects. (Gallagher 
2005: 225) 
 
What is it that distinguishes the human face so that the neonate and infant 
imitate its gestures and movements? The answer to this is far from clear.38 
However, consideration of the controversial evidence for neonatal and early 
infant imitation suggests that, from very early on, infants are able to recognise 
and respond to something about the personhood of another. This is hugely 
significant for debates surrounding interpersonal understanding and folk 
psychology, since the presence of imitative ability in neonates trumps the idea 
that in order to connect to others, there must be some “intellectual bridge” 
(Reddy 2008: 48) existing between self and others. Imitation constitutes and 
indicates a type of connectedness that exists between infant and another at a very 
early age. In Reddy’s words: 
 
The first of the key beliefs challenged by a neonatal imitation in recent 
psychology is the belief in the need for some sort of intellectual bridge (a 
third-person stance) to connect people. (Reddy 2008: 48) […] If there 
was indeed such a gap between self and others as philosophers and 
psychologists have postulated and struggled with, a gap which required 
extensive experience and observation of similarities to bridge, we would 
either not have neonatal imitation at all, or if we did, this imitation would 
first involve those ‘visible’ features of the body (such as hands or legs) in 
which the self-other visual comparisons are more apparent. (Reddy 2008: 
55) 
 
The danger in calling this phenomena ‘imitation’ is the implication that it 
is one sided. However more recently developmental psychologists have been 
keen to recognise these early imitative abilities as a type of affective exchange 
                                                      
38 I will not rehearse the various arguments and debates here. Instead, see Reddy 2008: Chapter 4 
for a discussion and evaluation of the differing theories as how to understand neonate imitation 
and theories as to what underlies and enables their ability to replicate simple facial expressions. 
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between infant and care giver: 
 
When interacting with people newborn infants don’t just imitate, they 
respond. They respond with interest or disinterest, with attention or 
avoidance, and at least within weeks, with reciprocal rather than imitative 
emotional actions. It has been argued that even imitative interactions are 
not merely imitative and that the actions themselves are never identical to 
those observed. They often involve (even in neonates …) varying degrees 
of approximation and varying degrees of hesitation and change: responses 
to, rather than mimicking of, another person. (Reddy 2008: 59) 
 
Trevarthen (1998), Kugiumutzakis (1993, et al. 2004), and Gallagher (2005) take 
the neonate evidence to show that there is an innate capacity for intersubjectivity. 
However, the results of the infant imitation studies remain controversial. Not 
only is it difficult to achieve the state of ‘alert calmness’ needed to carry out the 
task (as opposed to the infants showing disinterest or thrashing); but once these 
infants react in a manner to give us results, there is great debate as to how they 
ought to be interpreted.  
Despite the evidence remaining controversial and having raised much 
debate, it appears that this is a remarkable achievement, and one that deserves 
special attention. Too often, focus has been lavished on the part of the imitator; 
but this opens the question of what is the effect on the party being imitated? We 
must ask what it is that we are doing, or what it is that is happening when we 
imitate and are imitated. Reddy makes the point that imitation is often the most 
basic form of an attempt to communicate, often coming at the point when we 
have no shared frame of reference or common language (2008: 60-65). She uses 
the example of explorers on the voyage of the Beagle, who in meeting a tribe 
described the way tribe members would imitate the sailors. Interestingly, she 
notes that this is an occurrence which resulted in great excitement and gladness. 
Why should this be?  
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In electing to imitate their actions39 there is an invitation to share and 
attend to each other.40 An action will be performed (yawning, tongue and lip 
protrusions, vocalisations) and the child imitates. But what effect does this have 
on the person who is imitated? The imitated person might be proud, delighted, or 
excited. At the very least, they might be encouraged to continue, trying out a 
different action to see how it will be received. Essentially, there is a rudimentary 
form of engagement between the imitator and the imitated; the imitator responds 
to the gesture of the imitated. In the case of infant imitation, the occurrence of 
imitation is one which is affectively laden (Kugiumutzakis et al. 2004). As 
Reddy notes: 
 
Smiles are often seen in both infant and adult just before, during, and 
after the imitative acts […] Not only does imitation appear to produce 
pleasure, but pleasure seems to facilitate the occurrence of imitation […] 
Imitation as an emotional activity seems to be essentially mutual. (2004: 
63) 
 
When we focus on the exchange within which acts of imitation occur, rather than 
simply upon the acts of imitation, then we can see that from a very early age, a 
form of affective dialoguing is occurring between infant and parents, which 
seems to be a mutual source of delight (though not always, if the child is in the 
‘thrashing’ mood, or just does not want to be bothered). When both infant and 
parent are mutually engaged in the activity of modelling and imitating, there is 
an affective bond; at least it is easy to say that the occurrence and context of the 
imitation will not be strictly neutral. 
Building on early imitative abilities, young infants are, from the age of 2 
months able to engage in “patterns of relatedness” (Hobson 2002: 35) in which 
they initiate, respond to, and solicit responses from the people they are engaged 
with. In other words, they show a steadily developing ability to interact, and to 
show sensitivity in this interaction, with others. This is described as a two-stage 
process involving primary intersubjectivity at 2-9 months and secondary 
                                                      
39 Though there is the question of whether young infants elect to imitate, or whether the imitation 
is merely a reflex response to certain stimuli.  
40 There are, of course, other reasons we might elect to imitate others. We might do so to tease or 
to make fun of others. However, this the case for adult, rather than early infant imitation.  
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intersubjectivity from 9-14 months (Trevarthen 1979; Reddy 2008).  
Primary intersubjectivity is a “dynamic interpersonal awareness that 
allows mutual regulation of feelings and motives”. This stage of the child’s 
social development is marked by the emerging ability to engage in ‘proto-
conversations’ (Bateson 1979). Within proto-conversations, infant and parent 
engage with each other through “delicate expressions and sensitive responses” 
which form “rhythmic patterns of engagement that could be represented as 
‘musical’ or ‘dance-like’” (Malloch and Trevarthen 2008: 1). Proto-
conversations include a dynamic exchange of affective and expressive 
interaction. In them, parent and child mirror and respond to the affective 
gesturing of each other in a structured way, taking turns to respond to and 
encourage each other throughout the interaction. Typical markers of the style of 
engagement include the parent adopting ‘motherese’ or ‘baby talk’: a highly 
expressive and intoned voice, imitating the sounds their child makes, or talking 
very musically and in a softened manner. This vocal tone is often accompanied 
by highly expressive facial movements, widened eyes and raised eyebrows to 
mirror the intonations and musicality of the vocalisation (Stern 1984: 140-142).  
What makes these proto-conversations ‘conversations’ is the way in 
which the directions the exchanges take are mutually determined. The infant is 
able to initiate, respond to, and sustain these pre-reflective affective and 
embodied relations with their parents. In these proto-conversations, at a pause in 
the parent’s stream of vocalisation and bodily movement the child reacts, often 
by giggling, smiling, waving the hands about in an excited manner, or moving 
their face toward their parent. As the child grows older, they may vocalise back 
to the parent, cooing, or burbling to match the sounds of their parent. At this 
particular stage in the child’s social development, these proto-conversations 
appear to be enjoyed by parent and child alike and already they are structured 
and marked by turn-taking between infant and parent. The child gestures and 
responds to the affective communication of their parent once the parent’s 
expression has reached its cadence, whilst sensitive parents will resume their 
‘chat’ once the child’s response has subsided. It is important to note the 
fundamentally affective and expressive nature which marks the interaction 
between parents and child. 
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Primary intersubjectivity is concerned with the way in which infant and 
parent relate to each other, without reference to anything else (objects, 
environment). Within primary intersubjectivity, the infant specifically responds 
to and recognises the human person. In particular infants respond to the face and 
body of another as that with which they may react and relate to, in a way which 
they do not attempt with inanimate objects (Johnson 2000, Johnson et al. 1998, 
Legerstee 1991, Meltzoff 1995). Interaction, at this stage, is focused primarily on 
imitative and playful enterprises within the parent-infant relation. Infant and 
parent maintain eye contact and, taking turns, will imitate each other’s facial 
expressions or vocalisations. At this stage, there is also some cross-modal 
matching;41 the parent may vocalise the unfolding expression on the child’s face 
(Stern 1984: 141-143). The interactions, therefore, are face to face and will be 
formed by mirroring, or imitating each other’s facial expressions and 
vocalisations. It is important to recognise that this is an affective relation 
between infant and parent, which is expressed through bodily orientation, posture 
and gesture, as well as specific vocalising. The bodily relatedness as parent 
imitates the child, leading the child to respond (or vice versa), is central to this 
stage. Hobson states that this early stage is marked by “patterns of relatedness” 
(2002: 35):  
 
At least from 2 months of age, then, infants seek and register mutually 
co-ordinated relations with others. This is a motivational business, both in 
the ways infants seek and sustain such contact, and in their reactions to 
perturbations in the mutual exchanges. It is also affectively patterned, as 
the observable feelings of the infant and the manifest feelings of the 
adults attest. In some sense, it is also cognitive, at least insofar as the 
infants draw a distinction between humans or human-like forms on the 
one hand, and non-human creatures or things on the other, in what infants 
anticipate each class of ‘object’ to afford. (Hobson 2007b: 270) 
 
There are those who are skeptical of attributing an ability to engage in 
                                                      
41 Cross-modal matching describes instances of expression incorporating different sense 
modalities. For example, in excitement the infant may widen her eyes (visual, kinesthetic) and 
vocalise in a sharp, high-pitched tone (hearing).  
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affective interactions (‘protoconversations’) to infants who are 2 months old. 
Instead of characterising them as mutual and coherent ‘patterns of relatedness’ 
between parent and child, as Hobson does (2002: 35), this might be better 
described as ‘pseudo-dialogue’. Here, the parent interprets the phenomena as an 
exchange whereas, the infant reacts as they normally would regardless of what 
their parent does.42  However, in response to this, Tronick devised a test to 
discern the extent to which the driving force of the proto-conversation between 
infant and parent is mutual and coherent.43 Called the ‘still face experiment’, 
Tronick invited participants to strike up a normal engagement with their child, 
gaining the child’s interest and allowing them to react.4445 2-3 minutes into the 
interaction, the experimenter would give a signal, at which time the mother was 
to assume an impassive, ‘still’ or poker face, ideally for another 2 minutes. The 
driving idea behind this test was to see what the child’s reaction would be. If 
there were in fact no affective interaction between child and parent46 then the 
child would be unlikely to have any response. After a period of keeping a still 
face, the parent is given another signal at which time they were to resume 
‘normal’ expressive engagement with their child.  
The results were impressive. Far from the infants remaining impassive 
and unaffected, the result was dramatic, with the infants (2-9 months) showing 
signs of confusion and perturbation, with some efforts to reengage the parent in 
‘normal’ interaction. When their attempts to reengage their parent fail, the child 
becomes visibly confused and distressed. Reddy describes this quite graphically 
when she tries the still face experiment with her young child and records her 
experience as follows: 
 
During a period of good ‘chatty’ interaction, with Shamini [her child] 
lying on the bed and me leaning over her, I held my face still, continuing 
to look at her with a pleasant expression, but totally unmoving. Her 
reaction was text book typical, but quite shattering to experience. She 
                                                      
42 See Reddy 2008: 73 for a critical exploration of this. 
43 Rather than a series of reactions on the part of the infant to their parent (See Hobson 2002: 34ff 
for further discussion of this.) 
44 This experiment is conducted using infants who are 2-9 months old. 
45 See Hobson 2002 (36ff) and Reddy 2008 (73ff) for explorations of the ‘still face’ experiments.  
46 This would be the case if the parent is merely interpreting their face-to-face exchange as 
conversation, in which the child is not really affectively engaged. 
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continued to look at me, smiled and vocalized  a bit, then sobered at not 
getting any response, looked away briefly, then back to me again, smiled 
and vocalised again, sobered, looked away and back a few times. It must 
have lasted all of 30 seconds but felt much longer. I couldn’t stand not 
responding anymore and broke into a smile, spoke to her and leaned 
forward to hug her in apology. At this her face crumpled and she began to 
cry. I was shocked, dismayed, and immensely touched … This incident 
jolted me out of my self-consciousness and made me take her dialogues 
with me seriously. (2008: 74) 
 
Here we see that the sudden ceasing and absence of expressive 
engagement with the child is not just upsetting for the infant, but is terribly 
difficult for the parent to carry out and keep on with. The retreat of the parent 
from the affective expressive engagement deeply affects the child. In this way, 
we see that at the very young age of 2 months old, the infant is already involved 
and engaged with others and somewhat adept at being directing and responding 
to patterns of relatedness with other people.  
The findings of the still face experiments were corroborated by those of a 
second study, in which Tronick used the method of perturbment once again to 
examine its impact on infant-parent interaction.47 This time, he sought to 
examine the effects of inappropriate, specifically mistimed, interaction on the 
infant. In the still face experiments, all interaction and responsiveness is removed 
from the infant-parent encounter. In the second experiment, Tronick set up 
television monitors through which parent and infant interacted in real time 
through the monitors. Once infant and parent had settled into normal interactive 
patterns, the experimenter introduces a time delay in the interactions. Rewinding 
the recorded interaction, the experimenter replays the video to the infant. Instead 
of the ‘live’ interaction, the infant is presented with the parent’s interaction from 
30 or more seconds earlier, whilst the parent continues to view the infant’s ‘live’ 
reaction. Again the results are impressive. Despite the parent’s reactions not 
being stressful, hostile, or unpleasant (as they were in the still face experiment) 
they become detuned to those of the infant. This causes visible confusion and 
                                                      
47 This experiment was also conducted separately by Murray in 1975 (See Murray and Trevarthen 
1985). They used infants who were 2-3 months old in this experiment. 
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distress. Infants regularly turn away from the screen on which their parent is 
shown, with a few quick backward glances, as though to check (Hobson 2002: 
39, Reddy 2008: 75). Smiling decreases, closed mouthed expressions increase, 
and from time to time the infant attempts to restart interaction (Reddy 2008: 75). 
The infant reacts clearly to the disturbance in the interaction and displays 
disconcertment at the out-of-kilter responses of their parent. As Hobson 
concludes: 
 
[I]t was not simply that the infant felt unattended to or even unresponded 
to – it was that the interactions were not in tune, and disturbingly so. 
(2002: 39) 
 
Through these experiments, we see that far from being merely imitative, 
the exchange between infant and parent is a dynamic, mutual, and affective 
relation. The developing patterns of relatedness between parent and child are 
fundamental; the child displays distress when he or she discerns a change in the 
feeling and presence of relatedness between her and her parent. We see in 
Tronick’s experiments that this is conveyed through the parent’s bodily 
expression and orientation to the infant. When this is inappropriate or removed 
entirely, the infant becomes distressed. What these experiments show is that 
already, at 2 months, there is a sense of relatedness between infant and parents in 
which infant and parents orient themselves to each other through dynamic, 
affective engagement. Their interaction is initiated, shaped, and sustained 
through this. This is significant for studies of interpersonal understanding, and 
particularly for the question of the ubiquity of folk psychology, because the gap 
between self and other, assumed by folk psychology, does not arise as a problem 
for the 2 month old (until interactions are perturbed).  
Though the social abilities of a 2 month old are very limited, these 
experiments show that infants can, in a rudimentary way, engage with others in a 
dynamic and affective way. There is not a need for them to overcome the 
supposed gap between self and other. This leads us to question whether folk 
psychology provides an accurate description of interpersonal understanding. 
Though we cannot appeal to infant intersubjectivity to gain a full picture of 
everyday intersubjectivity, it does remind us of abilities which prefigure and 
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predate the ability to attribute reasons for actions and which continue to be 
important once this ability is gained. This leads us to question the centrality of 
attributing beliefs and desires to others in interpersonal understanding. 
Considering infant intersubjectivity provides a window into abilities and 
intersubjective competency which develops long before the ability to attribute 
mental states. Furthermore, this early competency does not disappear or become 
supplanted by the ability to attribute mental states to others. It plays an important 
part in adult intersubjectivity (Gallagher 2001, Gallagher and Hutto 2008). From 
this, we can argue that far from attributing mental states to others being the 
central ability that it is claimed to be, a pre-reflective sense of relatedness and 
attunement to others underpins our interactions with others (as it does in the case 
of primary intersubjectivity). It also can be seen to underlie a later developing 
ability to attribute propositional attitudes to them. 
At around 9 months old, there is a marked shift in the way in which 
infants interact with their parents. Instead of the direct, exclusive relation 
between child and parent (present in primary intersubjectivity) the child begins to 
refer to and share objects of attention which feature in the shared environment in 
which exchanges with their parent take place (Trevarthen 1979). Primary 
intersubjectivity widens into secondary intersubjectivity (9-14 months old) as the 
child and parent jointly attend to things outside their direct relation (Seeman 
2010: 162; Tomasello 1993: 174).  
This marks a very important development in how the child relates to their 
parent: their relation becomes in reference to the world and things that are around 
them. In this way, the child, interacting and sharing eye contact with their parent, 
might break off their shared eye contact, shifting their gaze toward something 
nearby. By doing so, the infant ‘points’ something out to their parent by directing 
their attention to it. The child may then turn back to the parent, before issuing an 
invitation to turn their gaze to the object they themselves have just looked at. 
This is a kind of visual pointing and referencing, which may also be 
accompanied by vocalisation and facial animation which convey something to 
the parent about the child’s affective response to the thing singled out. In this 
way, the quality of the relatedness between child and parent gains an additional 
dimension: the relation exists between child and parent, but this is now situated 
within a common space or frame. The attention may be triangulated, between 
75 
 
parent and infant and the world (Hobson 2002). In this way, the manner in which 
infants relate to things and their sense of relatedness to other human beings is no 
longer as separate as it has been until around the age of 9 months old; the child 
can sustain the sense of interpersonal relatedness, and bring inanimate objects 
within the scope of this relation (Hobson 2004: 40). 
What marks this as important for studies on intersubjectivity and 
interpersonal understanding? For the most part, the developmental evidence 
states that from an early age we are endowed with the ability to recognise and 
respond to the expressive behaviour of others, without the need to represent it in 
terms of beliefs and desires to understand it before we may react. Instead, we see 
that in the very early infancy, patterns of relatedness, sustained through an 
embodied and affective responsiveness to others marks and shapes a form of 
intersubjectivity with them. This capacity to engage in and sustain relatedness 
through interaction is not only important for the social development for young 
children; it is something which marks our mature relations with others too 
(Gallagher 2001). Given this, there is a question of whether folk psychology has 
over-emphasised the importance of attributing mental states for adult life.  
 
(b) Relatedness and Stance 
 
 Examination of early social phenomena in neonates and infants reveals 
that there is much going on to orient and anchor infants in social participation, 
long before they acquire and master the concept of belief around 3-4 years.48 
This section builds on the previous section by examining the second 
presupposition of folk psychology: that the third-person observational stance is 
the one we ordinarily occupy in understanding others.  
 We saw in the last section that from birth, human neonates and infants 
respond to (and arguably participate with) other human beings (imitation). In the 
first few years, the infant develops and comes to interact with others, particularly 
their parents, in a direct relation of intersubjectivity (primary intersubjectivity).  
Later the scope of interactions widens and the infant is able to interact with 
                                                      
48 There is some debate about the age at which children gain this ability. Original studies 
suggested the ability emerges at about 4 years (Wimmer and Perner 1983), though more recently, 
it is thought this ability might develop earlier (see Reddy and Morris 2004). 
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parents whilst referring to and sharing objects from their shared environment 
(secondary intersubjectivity). Primary and secondary intersubjectivity are ways 
in which the infant affectively relates and responds to their parent. This has led 
developmental psychologists to state that relatedness is of huge importance in 
developing intersubjectivity (Hobson 2007a,b, 2008; Stern 1984). In this section 
I examine the importance of relatedness and second-personal relations for 
intersubjective understanding. 
  This examination involves two closely related issues which need to be 
distinguished and separated. First, there is a difference between understanding 
someone as a ‘you’ (second-person understanding) and understanding them as a 
‘he’ or ‘she’ (third-person understanding). Second, and closely related to this, is 
the standpoint we take in relation to others in understanding them, whether this is 
detached and observational or dynamic and interactive.49 Folk psychology has 
tended to characterise everyday instances of understanding others as third-
personal and observational. In doing so, proponents of folk psychology have 
neglected cases in which we relate to others as ‘you’ and/or interact with them.   
This is significant for debates seeking to account for the way in which we 
ordinarily understand others. As we have seen, folk psychology describes 
everyday interpersonal understanding as predominantly a third-personal and 
observational enterprise: I observe the other’s behaviour and, using theory, 
simulation, or a hybrid of both, I attribute mental states to them and thus 
understand their actions. The act and process of understanding described here is 
largely individualistic, and ‘action-based’. Observing the behaviour of others is 
central to understanding them.  
However, when we engage in simple phenomenological reflection of our 
daily encounters with others, we must ask to what extent this picture of 
understanding matches and reflects our ordinary experience. Gallagher (2001, 
2004a,b, 2007b), Ratcliffe (2007a), Starwarska (2007), and Zahavi (2001, 2008a, 
b) argue that it does not. They argue that ordinarily the relation we take to others 
is that of the second-person; and that interaction, rather than observation, is the 
primary way in which we understand them. Furthermore, they emphasise that 
understanding, being rooted in interaction, is usually a process of mutual 
                                                      
49 Thanks go to Matthew Ratcliffe for pointing out the importance of this distinction. Also see 
Ratcliffe 2007a: 152. 
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engagement. Whilst approaches rooted in folk psychology do not deny this, at no 
point do they acknowledge it. In this way, rather than this argument being a 
‘knock down’ stating that we never use folk psychology, it is one which raises 
two main concerns. First, it questions folk psychology’s accuracy as a 
description of everyday interpersonal understanding.50 And secondly, it 
highlights folk psychology’s neglect of phenomena central to everyday 
understanding of others.  
In doing so, this offers a marked difference from the third-person 
mentalising approach offered by folk psychology. The other person does not 
usually appear as someone we have to make sense of.51 Instead we usually find 
ourselves in contexts of interaction and meaning, understanding and sense 
emerge through the process of interaction (Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009; 
Gallagher 2001; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; De Jaegher 2009; De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007; Ratcliffe 2007a).   
 To understand why many argue that the second-, rather than the third-
person relation is primary in our relations with others it is helpful to turn to 
Martin Buber’s exploration of the “primary words” (2004 [1937]: 11), of which 
he identifies two: the ‘I-Thou’ and the ‘I-It’ (2004 [1937]: 11). These relational 
words are coined to describe firstly my relation with and orientation toward other 
human beings (‘I-Thou’); and secondly, my relation with the physical world (‘I-
It’). The achievement of Buber, in coining and labelling these ‘primary words’, is 
                                                      
50 That is, the way in which we pre-reflectively ordinarily go about understanding others in day-
to-day life when the other person’s behaviour or situation does not strike us as problematic, in 
that it is not odd or puzzling. 
51 Folk psychology does not clearly distinguish the third-person (approaching others as ‘he’ or 
‘she’) from impersonal understanding (approaching others as ‘it’) (See Ratcliffe 2007a: 78-84 for 
an exploration of this point). Both second- and third-person understanding of others are personal 
approaches in which recognise, and do not question, the personhood of others. This must be 
distinguished from understanding someone from an impersonal stance; here, one retains a 
distance from the sense of the other as a person, and instead views them as a complex object (it). 
In failing to distinguish the third-personal from the impersonal stance, folk psychology often 
assumes that understanding others is a matter of interpreting them as a complicated ‘it’ that we 
need to make sense of by attributing mental states which motivate behaviour (for example see 
Dennett’s conception of the intentional stance (1987; also see Ratcliffe 2007a: 82 for a criticism 
of this)). In what follows I continue to refer to the stance which folk psychology describes as 
primary and ‘third-person’ in order to mirror the language which folk psychology uses to 
describe interpersonal understanding. However, I do so with the proviso that firstly, folk 
psychology often runs third-person and impersonal stances together in its description; and 
secondly, that if we tease these apart properly, then we find that in everyday life the third-person 
stance is sometimes used when the person is not present, or when we do not engage in direct 
interaction with others. However, the question as to whether the third-person stance is primary in 
everyday interpersonal understanding still remains.  
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to prioritise the relational experience over the individual experience. In this way, 
it is a mistake to read the primary word ‘I-Thou’ as merely a composite of you 
and me; rather the relation as a whole is more than the sum of its parts. Buber 
places the relation first.  
 This moves us away from the individualism that usually characterises our 
descriptions of interpersonal understanding (‘I’ understand ‘You’ from an 
observational distance) by stating that primarily we are inextricably in relation to 
others. Understanding is much more an emergent phenomena taking place 
between us. What is more, in this relation we are directly faced with a sense of 
the personhood of the other: 
 
If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to 
him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things. Thus 
human being is not He or She, bounded from every other He and She, a 
specific point in space and time within the net of the world; nor is he a 
nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of names […] 
I do not meet with him at some time and place or other. I can set him in a 
particular time and place; I must continually do it: but I set only a He or 
She … no longer my Thou. (Buber 2004 [1937]: 15) 
 
 Buber states that the I-Thou relation is the primary way in which we 
encounter others, and ourselves; thinking and naming a person as ‘He’ or ‘She’ 
(third-person relation) is an extrication from the more primary experience of 
them as ‘Thou’. In this way, for Buber, we are primarily always in relation to 
others. Ordinarily, we do not have to reach out and construct a bridge between 
self and other; instead I am oriented within a relation with others that is different 
from the way I relate and am oriented to nature and things.  
 Buber’s descriptions have been influential amongst those seeking to 
characterise our everyday understanding and affective experience of others 
(Hobson 2007a, 2008; Ratcliffe 2007a; Reddy 2004; Starwarska 2006, 2007, 
2009). We have already seen that in characterising interpersonal understanding 
as an exercise of mindreading, folk psychology assumes that ordinarily we 
observe people and bridge a gap of understanding by inferring their mental 
states: ‘I’ observe, reflect and attribute mental states to ‘him’ or ‘her’ (third-
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person relation). What is missed is an appreciation of the way in which we are 
oriented in a special way towards other human beings. This is what Buber’s 
exploration of our encounters with others seeks to emphasise and prioritise; it 
seeks to reinstate a sense of relatedness that marks our encounters with other 
human beings. This is the sense that they are someone (rather than a something) 
capable of receiving and reciprocating interaction. We already saw in the 
previous section that this affective relation marks the earliest of our 
intersubjective encounters with others, that patterns of relations can serve to 
strengthen this bond and that parents and infants find pleasure in relating and 
interacting with each other from an early age. This sense of ‘relatedness’, then, 
marks out other human beings as ‘special’; it is a recognition that our relations 
and interactions with them hold different possibilities than our interactions with 
objects, or the natural world. In I and Thou, Buber states that appreciation, or 
recognition, of another’s personhood, through the capacity for relatedness, is 
manifest in the way we primarily relate to them as I-Thou. 
 This leaves us with the question of whether this is an accurate description 
of the way we usually relate to, and find ourselves amongst, others. In 
considering this, Schutz draws a helpful distinction between “social observation” 
and “social relationship” (1967: 151-159). Social observation is a mode of social 
engagement which shares some elements in common with the third-person 
observational stance as discussed above: it describes a way of understanding 
others through the mode of non-engagement, that is through observing their 
actions and reaching a judgment as to what they are doing; social observation is 
“the objective comprehension of [other people] and their experiences that takes 
place in the social sciences” (Schutz 1967: 151).  
 Social relationship, on the other hand, he describes as “the subjective 
comprehension of other people that takes place in everyday life” (1967: 151).  
Schutz argues that whilst the former is integral to the type of understanding 
described by and aimed for within the social sciences (1967: 140-141); this type 
of understanding is not an appropriate description of the kind of understanding 
that we have of others in our everyday lives; it misses out the way we are 
oriented directly to people, and the way in which others affect us (1967: 151). 
Schutz expresses this as an “Other-orientation” and “affecting-the-Other” (1967: 
151). He is clear to state that when with others, our ‘Other-orientation’ is not 
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always reciprocated, and that it is possible to have a situation in which others do 
not allow themselves to be affected by their interlocutor; in this way, there are 
many ways of finding ourselves within an ‘Other-orientation’ in which our 
interlocutor may exist on a sliding scale of entirely responsive and open, to 
closed and unwilling to respond. Schutz is right to emphasise this and assert that 
though we primarily relate to others as people, this does not mean our 
interactions with them are always easy and non-problematic. We may easily 
imagine cases in which our interactions with people may start favourably, but 
deteriorate on listening to and engaging with their views; or as they refuse to 
listen and engage with our actions, viewpoints, or gestures. However, engaging 
with others in this way as people who may reciprocate our interaction and affect 
us (social relationship), is rooted in what Schutz terms the “Thou-orientation” 
(Schutz 1967: 153).  
 In speaking of the “Thou-orientation”, Schutz elaborates and argues for 
the phenomenon that Buber simply describes. The Thou-orientation is a pre-
reflective relatedness through which I ordinarily approach, understand and make 
sense of others in a non-inferential way. It is constituted by an openness to, and 
reciprocity of, bodily mutual relations which reveal others as “fields of 
expression” (1967: 100) which we directly respond to, without recourse to a 
theoretically removed stance (observation), or by seeing the other ‘at a distance’ 
in order to make sense of their actions (third-person relation). Instead, I am 
“influencing them and [am] influenced by them in turn – in doing … these things 
we understand the behaviour of others and assume that they understand ours.” 
(1967: 9). 
 Schutz argues that the kind of understanding which social science prizes 
is rooted within the more direct understanding of others and self in pre-
theoretical daily life (140-141). This is based on the relatedness which 
constitutes the ‘Thou-orientation’ (163): 
 
For in a certain sense I am a social scientist in everyday life whenever I 
reflect upon my fellow men and their behaviour instead of merely 
experiencing them. I live with them as a man among men, I encounter 
them continually in direct experience. My awareness of their presence 
and of their personal characteristics is immediate … I not only 
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consciously experience you, but I live with you and grow old with you … 
In the living intentionality of this experience, I ‘understand’ you without 
necessarily paying any attention to the acts of understanding themselves. 
This is because I live in the same world as you, I live in the acts of 
understanding you … while I am directly experiencing you and talking 
with you, the whole complicated substructure of my own interpretation of 
you escapes my attention. (1967: 140) 
 
 In this way, Schutz draws a distinction between reflective and pre-
reflective ‘understanding’, which folk psychology seems to merge. We might 
elaborate this point with an analogy to the difference between playing sport (pre-
reflective understanding) and commentating on sport (reflective-understanding). 
In the case of playing sport, we unthinking engage in the game. When we are 
adept at a particular team sport we do not explicitly call upon and think of the 
rules which govern what we can and cannot do. Instead we are caught up in the 
flow of events, responding to the moves of our team mates with unthinkingly, 
without hesitancy. We seamlessly work with our teammates to the same shared 
end: to get the ball in the back of the net or fend off the opposition. We are 
caught up in the immediacy of the game with our team mates: there is a sense in 
which we know the position of those around us and can anticipate their 
movements without having to explicitly think about it. Often it is the case that 
when we think about our next move too hard and explicitly, we disrupt our 
natural reactions and rhythms, and ‘fluff’ the shot or pass. Our relation to each 
other is given through – and develops through the flow of – the game.52  
 This is very different from offering a sports commentary (reflective 
understanding). In this case, the sports commentator watches from outside of the 
game, seeking to describe and understand it from without the confines of play. 
The sports commentator is the observer par excellence; they use their knowledge 
and experience to analyse, explain, and offer insight into the play which they are 
                                                      
52 In this way, we might relate to each other in terms of our positions. Taking football as our 
example, we will not expect to find our goalkeeper playing up front, and we rely on her to patrol 
and direct the defence. This is akin to understanding someone, in part, through social role. 
However, sticking with the football example, players may come to play ‘out of position’ as the 
game dictates. A team who are losing might pull players back to strengthen and help the defence. 
In this way, the progression of the game tacitly directs the way in which we play and the way we 
relate to each other. 
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watching (or have watched). They observe others in the flow of play and use 
their knowledge or their own experience to interpret, understand, and critique (or 
praise) the skills and abilities of the players in front of them. This is akin to 
reflective understanding, through which we observe an action and then make 
sense of it (whether by theorising or drawing on one’s own experience and 
resources).  
 It is worth emphasising the difference in the way in which one relates to 
others in playing sport, or interacting with them (pre-reflective understanding) 
and in commentating on sport, or observing them (reflective understanding). In 
the former, other people are one’s team mates (or the opposition). They are those 
to whom one responds directly and pre-reflectively. One is caught up with them 
in the activity at hand, in which we are engaged together. In the latter case, 
others are players of a game that one is not part of, but that one, instead, 
observes. In this instance, one is removed from the immediacy of the ‘play’, and 
one is able to observe and understand the players apart from oneself. 
 In failing to distinguish observational and interactional understanding, 
folk psychology’s characterisation of interpersonal understanding fails to fully 
take into consideration the ‘inter-’ of interpersonal understanding, and the 
richness and complexity of the forms this takes within both second and third-
personal stances. Whilst we might indeed provide reasons for actions, especially 
when faced with inexplicable or odd behaviour, this is the exception to the rule. 
In neglecting to consider this, folk psychology misses out on the richness of 
interpersonal experience and understanding. 
 Emerging from this is an appreciation of the ways in which we interact 
with people, and the richness of the variety of relations we share with them, each 
of which affects our understanding of them in subtle ways. For example, I can 
interact with someone as: 
 
A sibling,  
parent,  
boss,  
teacher,  
spouse,  
best friend,  
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acquaintance,  
colleague,  
assistant,  
confidante,  
leader 
and so on. 
 
Each of these forms of interrelatedness carries a precedent for understanding, 
which the other person is ordinarily at liberty to transcend through our 
interaction. In assuming that interpersonal understanding is predominantly 
observational in structure and third-personal in nature, folk psychology fails to 
account for the second-person stance. Furthermore, it neglects the predominant 
role of direct and/or indirect interaction. 
 
(c) Shared Situation and Context 
 
 We saw in 2.2a that, in prioritising and describing interpersonal 
understanding as an observational, predominantly third-personal venture, folk 
psychology runs the risk of neglecting to account for the richness of our social 
relations and interactions with others. Section 2.2b then explored the varying 
stances through which we relate to others during interpersonal engagement. This 
section picks up on and explores the role that shared situation plays in 
interpersonal understanding. By ‘shared situation’ I refer to the contexts and 
spaces that we interact with others in. Be it a beach, a school, the pub, or at 
home; when we are with others, we are with them in a certain place. Our 
situation often frames and shapes our understanding in virtue of the social signs, 
symbols, and social roles which it encompasses. Situation does not refer solely to 
spaces and places, but also includes transactions or activities, such as paying for 
my shopping, or teaching a class. In these examples, the context of action will 
often determine my understanding of the other people involved (as a till assistant, 
or my student perhaps).  
 The importance of shared situation has already been raised during 
discussion of secondary intersubjectivity, in which interactants triangulate their 
attention in an interactive dialogue that encompasses each participant and the 
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environment they find themselves within. Our discussion of Schutz also touched 
on the central role which finding ourselves with others in a social and public 
environment, which we are both adept at navigating, plays in ultimately 
understanding them. 
 In this section, I explore phenomenological argumentation that recognises 
the importance of being situated in a public and meaningful world for 
interpersonal understanding. I draw on Ratcliffe (2007a) who argues that 
understanding other people usually requires us to be able to take our situation for 
granted; before moving onto consider how embedded expectation of social roles 
scaffolds understanding of others (Gurwitsch 1979). Both state that we usually 
encounter others doing things within a context of action which provides a frame 
of reference within which the actions fit. In such instances, there is no need to 
make sense of other people’s behaviour as the context performs the work. 
 To begin, let us consider an example. For instance, on undergraduate 
results day within the college in which I work and live, I will encounter a variety 
of emotions, unusual behaviour, high-pitched squeaking, and excitement. I might 
smile as I see a huddle of students jumping up and down with each other as they 
congratulate each other on their marks; I might notice the subdued student who is 
oddly detached from the rest of the vibrant scene; I will be surrounded by 
laughter, a general air of excitement and a party atmosphere. The proponent of 
folk psychology could argue, at this point, that this context helps us to infer 
mental states, allowing us to be more successful in our attribution of mental 
states. However, this misses the point of what it means to be in a shared situation 
with others: I have no need to attribute mental states to the people around me. 
My interactions with the others are rooted within our shared context which 
informs my understanding of them. When I see the group of students, hugging 
and jumping up and down, it does not occur to me to provide reasons for their 
actions. Their actions flow from and into the situation which they are in: results 
day. The context of the scene before me legitimates and provides me with 
understanding which I do not have to reach out and infer. Their actions form part 
of that context, as does my response as I wave, congratulate, or console. In these 
circumstances, it would never occur to me for it to be necessary to infer the 
context as the reason for action. As Zahavi writes: 
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Ordinarily, we do not encounter others primarily as thematic objects of 
cognition. Rather we encounter them in the world in which our daily life 
occurs, or to be more precise, we encounter others in a worldly situation 
and our way of being together and understanding each other is co-
determined in its meaning by the situation at hand. (Zahavi 2007a: 37; 
2008: 165) 
  
 As Ratcliffe writes, “[i]nterpersonal understanding does not take place in 
a social vacuum” (2007a). The situation in which actions occur provides a 
context which suggests meaning for, and make appropriate, the actions of others. 
For example, picture a person kneeling down with a straight, upright back; their 
hands are brought up to their breastbone, palms pressed together and elbows 
tucked into their sides. Their eyes are closed and their lips seem to be moving 
slightly, though without making any sound. The expression on their face is 
earnest, perhaps peaceful. Decontextualised, their action and position seem 
intriguing or strange. What is it that they are doing? As soon as we mention the 
context of church, temple, or mosque, thoughts of ‘prayer’ arrive. Usually, if we 
encounter someone in this position we will never have to ask the question of just 
what it is they are doing (unless we are a young child who has never encountered 
such behaviour, or the situation is alien). Once we place this public action in the 
context it usually or may appropriately take place in, the individual ‘evidences’ 
of the person’s stance, bearing and activity are read and understood directly 
through the background without the need for inference.   
 In this way, we see that the situations we share with others provide sense 
and a background to certain actions. Going back to the person kneeling in prayer; 
we might be more unsure, or curious as to what the person was doing if we were 
to walk past them in the middle of a pavement in a busy street, or if we are 
unfamiliar with religious contexts. However, when we encounter the person in a 
church, mosque, temple, or at religious gathering, there is no need to notice the 
‘behaviour’ as something in need of explanation; it forms part of the activity and 
the background in which it takes place. In the same way, when we are in a 
lecture or talk, the person pacing, gesturing and talking, usually at the front of the 
room, does not present themselves as someone performing certain gestures or 
behaviour which demand to be understood. The situation and context carries the 
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behaviour, and endows it with meaning: it forms part of our shared situation. 
 This is what Zahavi is getting at in the quote above. Ordinarily, we 
encounter, rather than observe, other people through a shared, public, and 
normative medium that, as Zahavi puts it, “co-determines” the meaning we will 
find in the situation at hand. The terminology here conveys a legitimate 
difference which needs to be drawn out: we encounter people when we share a 
situation or are directly addressed by them; observation implies that one is 
removed from the other person through a spatial or conceptual distance; as a 
consequence, we do not share a direct relation with the other.  The question we 
are now left with is how do we understand the way situation scaffolds and 
constrains our understanding of others? To answer that I turn to two 
phenomenological accounts of shared situation: (i) Heidegger’s explication of 
how we ordinarily find ourselves within the world (Welt); and (ii) Gurwitsch’s 
emphasis on social roles. First let us consider Heidegger. 
Heidegger begins his investigation of our everyday relationship with the 
world by reversing the start-point of the inquiry, which he sees as traditional in 
mainstream philosophy (1962: 21ff). Traditionally, philosophy has, he states, 
relied too heavily on the distinction between subject and object. Doing so masks 
the way we pre-reflectively find ourselves in the world. That is, whilst the 
subject-object distinction seems reasonable in a detached, philosophical inquiry, 
it does not adequately characterise the way we relate to the world in a pre-
reflective, everyday manner. Closely related to this, Heidegger diagnoses an 
overemphasis on beings, rather than Being, in mainstream philosophy. In other 
words, philosophers have tended to focus on making sense of the objects and 
things we find in the world (beings) rather than the structures which allow these 
things to be apprehended coherently and in ways that make sense to us (Being). 
This predilection in focusing on beings, in a detached and reflective way, feeds 
into and reinforces the subject-object standpoint of mainstream philosophy. For 
Heidegger, Being is a condition for the possibility of experience and is that 
through which the world makes sense. What is more, if we wish to understand 
our relationship to the world, as human beings, we must explore the structures 
which root us into the world in a pre-reflective and everyday manner. Heidegger 
calls this ‘Being-in-the-world’.  
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In order to characterise Being-in-the-world, Heidegger outlines ways in 
which ‘world’ may be characterised as: 
(i) All the things which are in the world. 
(ii) The way in which all these things relate to each other to form a 
coherent whole. 
(iii) As that in which we, as human beings, live within in a pre-theoretical 
manner (“Welt” (Heidegger 1962: 93)).53 
 
The investigation of characterisation (iii) is what Heidegger labels as our ‘Being-
in-the-world’. (i) and (ii) are characteristic of a traditional ontological framework 
through which we focus on the things in the world, and the way they interrelate. 
What is missing here is an investigation of how these things appear to us as pre-
reflectively, outside the activity of ontological investigation. This is precisely 
what (iii) seeks to investigate.  
Heidegger is careful to emphasise that Being-in-the-world is a “unitary 
phenomenon” (1962: 78) in which a person and world are primordially related. 
In emphasising Being-in-the-world as unitary, Heidegger distances his 
conception from those rooted in the subject-object distinction discussed above. 
To shed some light on this relation, Heidegger clarifies the way in which we 
should understand the ‘in’ of ‘Being-in-the-world’.54 We might think of this as 
signifying a person’s particular position in space: they are ‘in’ the world much in 
the same way as my pen is in my pencil case, or the cat is in the kitchen. 
However, this is not what Heidegger means. Such interpretations follow from 
understanding of ‘world’ encapsulated by (i) and (ii) above. Instead, Heidegger 
uses the term to signify an existential “state of Dasein’s Being” (1962: 79)55 as 
“resid[ing]” or “dwell[ing]” in the world (1962: 80). It is that within which we 
                                                      
53 See Heidegger 1962: 93 
54 “Being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and 
without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that man ‘is’ and then 
has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the ‘world’ – a world with which he 
provides himself occasionally.” (Heidegger 1962: 84) 
55 “Dasein” is Heidegger’s special terminology which he uses to refer to a person. He uses it to 
escape the connotations which “individual” and “subject” hold with the ‘subject-object’ 
viewpoint, of which he is so critical. Using ‘Dasein’ allows Heidegger to emphasise the way in 
which we are immersed in the world in a practical and pre-reflective world (Being-in-the-world) 
which we share with others (Mitwelt). 
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feel at home and in which we are immersed in a pre-reflective and taken for 
granted manner.  
What is more, this manner of Being-in-the-world structures the way in 
which we apprehend things and the way we carry out our activities. An integral 
part of Being-in-the-world is that people are usually “absorbed” (1962: 80) in the 
world in virtue of their practical activities. When we pre-reflectively go about 
our business objects appear not as entities, but as ‘equipment’. That is, things 
appear not as isolated objects, but as useful tools to be picked up, grasped, used, 
or discarded, as our activities require. In this way, when I sit at my desk, my 
computer, coffee mug, felt tip pen, pile of books, and diary are grouped around 
me and are apprehended through the context of work. I do not first perceive each 
object individually, but rather they appear to me pre-reflectively according to my 
activity (Heidegger 1962: 96). ‘Equipment’ sums up the way in which things are 
pre-reflectively apprehend, flowing from our activities, as “in order to” (1962: 
97). Heidegger demonstrates this through the oft-quoted hammer example, 
through which he describes relation between person and equipment through its 
usability.  
When I grab my hammer to construct the extra bookshelf I have been 
promising myself, at first its weight in my hand may seem conspicuous. But as I 
become progressively more absorbed and engrossed in the activity of hammering 
each tack into the wood, and as my activities gain a rhythm, my awareness and 
apprehension of the hammer changes. It becomes transparent as I become geared 
into the activity at hand. Heidegger describes how the boundaries between the 
hammer and myself blur in the context of my action: engrossed in constructing 
my bookshelf, the hammer becomes an integral part of the context of my activity. 
I do not notice it as a ‘thing’ itself; instead it is a tool which allows me to get 
something done. It becomes, according to Heidegger’s description, an extension 
of myself as I become absorbed and caught up in the flow of my activity 
(Heidegger 1962: 98). However, this is not to say we always encounter things in 
the world in this way. I may become too enthusiastic in my activity and hammer 
my thumb instead of the nail.  
The shock and pain of the occurrence jolt me out of the flowing activity 
and the hammer, far from retreating out of explicit awareness, becomes 
conspicuous as something which has caused me pain. The way I relate to the 
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hammer changes. It is no longer perceived in the context of my activity (as 
“ready-to-hand” in Heidegger’s terminology) but I might stare at it, 
comprehending and rationalising what has happened. In this instance, and in 
instances in which equipment ‘breaks down’, Heidegger says I perceive the 
hammer first as “un-ready-to-hand” – as something that once served my purpose 
and yet, now, has disrupted my project – and then, perhaps, as fully “present-at-
hand”; that is, in a reflective, theoretical manner as divorced from myself and my 
projects. This is contrasted with “ready-to-hand” in which entities appear as 
equipment and in terms of their practical value for my current activity. 
Apprehending equipment as “un-ready-to-hand” forms a half way house between 
the “ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand”.  
Another integral dimension to Being-in-the-world is that it is a world 
which is fundamentally shaped by others. It is a “with-world” (Mitwelt). 
Heidegger, once again, begins by stating that accounts of others rooted in the 
subject-object stance mischaracterise our everyday experience of others. 
Beginning with the subject leads to a “misunderstanding”:  
 
[I]n this characterisation does one not start by marking out and isolating 
the ‘I’ so that one must then seek some way of getting over to the Others 
from this isolated subject? (Heidegger 1962: 154)  
 
Heidegger states that this is a mischaracterisation of how we usually find 
ourselves in the world. Far from experiencing ourselves as isolated subjects, 
others are encountered and implicated in our activities, projects, and “dealings” 
within the world (Heidegger 1962: 155-156). On one level, equipment rarely 
appears to us exclusively as ‘mine’; instead it appears as that which others can 
use, or which others have made. 
 The point to be extracted here is that, far from the traditional picture of 
beginning with oneself and then bridging meaning and sense from that, the way 
we find ourselves in the world is at once and primarily in a public way. The way 
in which we understand not only ourselves, but the projects we undertake, the 
equipment we use, the world we move about in is one which, from the beginning, 
references others. The hammer that lies on the table, the pavement on which I 
walk, the table from which I eat, even the cardigan that I wear is not solely for or 
90 
 
about me. Others are implicated in their design, manufacture, and possibility of 
use. Others, for Heidegger, are referenced by Equipment. They are those whom 
we share the world with.  
 Ratcliffe (2007a) makes the point that we can widen this insight to 
broader things in our world, which carry direct and social meanings and which 
help us to navigate a world which is shared: the traffic lights regulate our 
journeying, embodying social norms and laws which ensure a minimum of havoc 
and accidents on the road. We tuck in to the right when using escalators on the 
London underground so as to let those who are in a rush pass straight by. The 
ring I wear on the third finger of my left hand expresses a personal commitment, 
signifying something of my marital status. All of these different examples are 
public signs embedded within, and expressive of, a public meaning. Of course, 
this depends on belonging to the main culture of the situations we find ourselves 
within; but even when we find ourselves in an alien situation, we are often aware 
that there is a code of practice governing and structuring the activities of the 
people we find around us, who are seamlessly navigating their way through the 
situation. In these unfamiliar circumstances, in which a taken for granted sharing 
of public and social codes and symbols breaks down, we can find ourselves 
hopelessly lost.  
 However, it is worth noticing that even in these situations, the actions of 
those around us do not appear as completely bizarre or as defying explanation: 
we recognise that it is us who are missing the trick – there is a code, we just do 
not understand it yet. For example, when in Japan we might be offended for a 
long time until we realise that the gesture for ‘that smells’, in western contexts 
(waving a hand in front of our nose) means ‘no thanks’; or that swiveling an 
index finger into the cheek is a gesture of praise (meaning ‘that tastes good’) in 
Italian culture. Usually, in observing these gestures we might be baffled by them, 
but perceive them as holding a social meaning, only it is one we do not yet know. 
My point here is that even in cases in which we find ourselves outside of our 
cultural, situational and social cues we do not, in many cases, perceive that 
action to be completely baffling or defiant of any sense or meaning – instead, we 
realise it is a gesture which seeks to convey something, and one which has a 
publicly established meaning; it appears to us, then, to ask what it means.  
 Whilst this is going on, we still operate within a broadly second-personal 
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stance: we do not need to retreat from the situation to theorise or simulate what I 
might do or be thinking on performing such a gesture or action – I interact with 
my interlocutor and usually ask what is going on. In this way, the shared 
situations we find ourselves within perform much of the work in understanding 
others. Their meaning is embedded within and made appropriate by the situation 
that we share with others.  
 It is also the case that the way in which we will relate to and understand 
others within certain contexts will be understood in virtue of the social role 
which they occupy. In observing rows and rows of small children curtseying, 
bowing and handing over posies of flowers to an elderly woman with a hat on; 
we might wonder ‘why such deference and fuss’ if we did not know that the old 
woman is the Queen, and handing over flowers and curtseying is what one does 
when in the presence of the Queen.  
 In this way, we do not encounter others in daily life as agents we need to 
‘figure out’; we often encounter them (for better or worse) in terms of their social 
role: the library assistant, the till girl, the policeman, my teacher, my students. 
Each role carries a normative dimension about how one ought to behave or treat 
the other (again for better or worse), or what we might come to expect of them. 
In this way, I might expect a hug and a sympathetic ear from my husband at the 
end of a day spent writing my thesis; it is not right that I expect the same from 
my students or from the assistant at the till.  
 Clearly there is a potentially negative and damaging aspect which comes 
with viewing others only in terms of their social role. This involves a denial or 
overlooking of the personhood of the other with which we meet them through the 
‘Thou-orientation’. However, social roles do play a large part in shaping the way 
we might initially understand another (on first entering into interaction – this 
may change through the interaction process) or understanding the actions and 
behaviour which they are engaged in and perform. Gurwitsch relates this through 
the following excerpt: 
 
How we comport ourselves, in which concrete sense we are partners, is, 
to be sure, determined by the situation of our being together. (1979: 107) 
 
And following on from this: 
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[T]he partners encounter each other in their partnership-situations in these 
roles constituted by the relationship to one another; they encounter each 
as the ones who are what they are in the particular common situations 
e.g., as fellow workers, as buyers and sellers, as employees and 
employers, as masters and servants, and, more particularly, in just the 
roles which they have in the concrete case – as the coachman who carries 
the passengers on a journey, etc.  […] Hence I do not encounter an 
individual in this dimension with his individual properties accruing 
specifically to him that constitute him as this determinate individual. 
(108) 
 
Gurwitsch points out the way in which social roles perform a central task in 
shaping how we encounter and approach people in shared social situations: in 
witnessing the actions of a police officer patrolling the skirt of a crowd of 
demonstrators, their behaviour, or manner of dress does not stand out as 
something odd which needs to be explained. The burden of understanding is met 
and fulfilled in virtue of the role and social job they perform; only if they become 
violent or abusive might I start to wonder just what they are thinking or doing 
since the action is out of line with what we expect of an officer of the law.  
We encounter the person, then, within the context of the demonstration, 
and in virtue of their social markers which signal to us the job they are 
performing and the capacity in which they are present in the circumstances. Of 
course, there are many instances in which we do not understand people in virtue 
of their social roles, in the case of close family and friends. However, consider 
the manner and attitude we might adopt with our mother (the things we will or 
will not say; the topic of conversation) and compare it to your interactions with 
your best friend or spouse. Even in the case of individuals close to us, and with 
whom we share a long and rich personal history and bond, our relation and the 
understanding of them and what we expect of them, is in part demarcated by the 
relationship we share with them (mother, father, daughter, son, spouse, best 
friend, acquaintance). 
In this way, actions that appear within a meaningful shared situation or 
context do not usually appear as in need of explanation. What is more, we are 
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often with others in social situations within which we are immersed. It is, then, 
not the case that we usually (certainly not as default) need to extract ourselves 
from this immersion to make sense of a particular action. Instead that action or 
behaviour flows from and is situated in a certain shared context of meaning. In 
cases in which understanding is not directly given by this situation, observation 
is not usually necessary. Instead, if we are inculcated and active within a 
situation, we react with others within the situation and understanding emerges 
from the dialectic between self, other and our shared situation. 
 
(d) Direct Perception 
 
Following from our exploration of the importance of relatedness and 
context, I now come to explore ‘direct perception’. Both Gallagher (2008a,b) and 
De Jaegher (2009; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007) argue that in ordinary and 
non-problematic interactions with others, attributing mental states is not 
necessary for understanding. Instead, they argue, we directly perceive the affects, 
dispositions and intentions of others through their situationally embedded, 
embodied interactions: there is no need to infer intentions, feelings, beliefs, and 
dispositions of others as an ‘add on’ to perception (Gallagher 2008b, de Jaegher 
2009, Ratcliffe 2007a). In stating that ordinarily we perceive something first and 
then infer what that thing is, Gallagher (2008b) argues that folk psychology 
underestimates the complexity and richness of ordinary perception. To make the 
point a distinction is drawn between “dumb” and “smart” perception (Gallagher 
2008b: 536).  
‘Dumb’ perception is that which folk psychology presumes to be 
typical:56 folk psychology holds the view that, whatever we do perceive does not 
include mental states. In this way, we perceive behaviour, and in order to 
understand this we run a simulation or utilise a theory from which we are able to 
infer and ascribe mental states. Dumb perception, then, works from the following 
model: perception + inference = understanding. Dumb perception assumes, as De 
Jaegher puts it, “that perception and cognition are separate things that need 
gluing together” (2009: 537). It is this which Gallagher questions, asking the 
                                                      
56 It is worth noting here that folk psychology does not spend time developing a theory of 
perception. 
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extent to which this is indeed the case, arguing that ordinarily we do not need the 
‘add on’. Instead, we directly perceive the action, or object.57  
Gallagher, in making his case for direct perception, is careful to note that 
direct perception in intersubjective understanding is cradled by and emerges 
from second-person interaction (Gallagher 2009).58 In this way, we should not 
think of interpersonal understanding as beginning with a perception, but instead 
see our perception of others as directly embedded within and constantly revised 
by interactive relations with them, within a process of understanding (2009). 
Considering an example, at this point, may clarify things. Imagine seeing a 
woman reaching out for and then squeezing a man’s hand.   
When we notice the woman reaching out to give the man a squeeze of the 
hand, we do not discretely observe this action as something that needs to be 
made sense of. It occurs within a certain situation. As the last section stated, this 
situation performs a certain amount of work in framing and shaping our 
understanding of the action: it immediately conveys sense and meaning which 
makes inference unnecessary. Already, as we notice this intimate and friendly 
gesture being given and received, we understand the people as a couple. We do 
not need to infer this, based on evidence we see before us; rather we perceive it 
through their embodied exchange, and the way they comport themselves with 
each other. This perception is informed and suggested by knowledge of the social 
roles and understanding of what it is to be a friend, partner or spouse. Only in the 
context of the people being viewed as a couple would the gesture make sense: 
one does not go around squeezing the hands of passing strangers. However, if the 
man were to react in a shocked manner, or look alarmed or bemused, it would 
occur to us to wonder about the couple’s relation to each other, his reaction 
                                                      
57 Gallagher’s example here is that of perceiving his car (2008b: 536); there is no need to grasp 
for the concept of ‘car’ in order to synthesise visual data. Instead of being presented with a 
certain extension of a certain colour that to which we have to attribute the concept ‘car’; the car is 
given to us within perception. De Jaegher (2009) criticises Gallagher for use of an example 
including an inanimate object, claiming that direct perception is constituted and shaped by and 
through interactive and intersubjective contexts and processes (537ff). Whilst De Jaegher is right 
to highlight that direct perception in interpersonal understanding is not static, and develops and is 
revised through interaction, Gallagher’s point predominantly remains that whether in static 
instances of observation, or within social interaction, we do not need to yoke behaviour under a 
concept in order to make sense of it. Instead the concept is integral to the perception. 
58 Also see de Jaegher 2009, who stresses the potential problems in talking about perception as 
before understanding, instead emphasising the way in which perception and interactive 
understanding are bound up within each other. She issues this as a warning in response to 
Gallagher’s 2008b paper in which she considers Gallagher guilty of conceiving of perception as 
prior to, rather than embedded within, interactive understanding. 
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signalling her initial hand squeeze as inappropriate and shocking. If this were the 
case, his reaction would mark out her actions as a candidate for making a special 
effort to understand. In this way, the manner in which the gesture is received by 
the co-dialoguer presents it either as natural or unproblematic (it makes sense), or 
as bizarre and unwelcomed, as something puzzling which needs explanation. 
Only if something out of the ordinary occurs does the gesture appear as the latter. 
In this way, direct perception must be, and is, sensitive to the work which 
context, social knowledge and social roles play.  
In order to appreciate the manner in which situation frames direct 
perception, we might generate reasons as to the woman’s gesture, without being 
told the context, and cook up a host of explanations. However, conceiving of 
them in the terms of folk psychology seems contrived and odd. Consider: 
 
(1) The woman reached out to squeeze the man’s hand because she 
believed that doing so is a nice thing to do and she desired to be nice to 
him.  
 
And now consider: 
 
(a) They were sat on an uncomfortable looking bench outside the oak 
office door. The man squirmed a little. She absent-mindedly reached out 
to squeeze her husband’s hand. It had been a hard day for them both and 
the gesture escaped her without her noticing. 
(b) The woman bounced, turning to grasp his hand in an excited 
squeeze. He returned the gesture, grinning and gathered her in close. 
(c) He looked ahead dejected and blank. What else could she do but 
gently take his hand and with a slight pressure reassure him that she was 
there? 
 
Looking at these examples we can see that there is a sense in which (1) is 
trivially true and could apply as a description of (a), (b), or (c). However, it 
seems to betray a certain lack of what we might think of as a rich and nuanced 
understanding, which is given directly in (a), (b), and (c) in the context, and 
embodied interaction between the couple. In paring the situation down to be 
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expressible in terms of beliefs and desires, and in isolating the behaviour of the 
woman alone as the key to understanding, (1) misses the rich understanding in 
failing to appreciate the contextual nuances of the situation, within which an 
appropriate ‘understanding’ is made salient and enriched, as is the case in (a). At 
the same time, (1) fails to capture the complexity of the affective tonality, 
directly constituted and given through the embodied interplay between the 
couple, in (b) and (c). Both (b) and (c) involve an unfolding interactive 
awareness between two individuals which an observer would be directly 
presented with, and perhaps affected by.59 
Not only does the above example put across the point of direct perception 
being the more common way in which we understand others, it also echoes the 
criticisms of both Ratcliffe (2008a) and Morton (2007), already noted in Chapter 
1.3 (p.55-56). Here we saw that they questioned the extent to which folk 
psychology, with its emphasis on mindreading and understanding as primarily 
expressible in terms of propositional attitudes, can be useful for understanding 
others; and further whether we use it in this sense at all. Picking up the point that 
when we ascribe beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes to others, the 
context frames how we understand the unfolding behaviour, Morton writes: 
  
[A]rticulate folk psychological description operates courtesy of a 
background of possibility-eliminating factors of potentially unlimited 
variety. (2007: 215) 
 
The above examples also throw into light the simple point that understanding 
others is not usually an individualistic enterprise. I have already noted the role 
context plays here, but let us now turn to think about the other person in the 
example. The actions of the woman are directed toward the man, and to 
understand the significance of her actions properly will require a nuanced social 
orientation, which encompasses an understanding of social roles and appropriate 
behaviour, but will also take into account his own embodied orientation and the 
                                                      
59 One might feel a little sad for the tired looking couple of (c), or find oneself smiling 
involuntarily at (b). 
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way in which he receives or calls for her gesture.60  
Whilst the above example is framed from a third-person perspective, we 
must also consider the difference it makes to understand others from inside the 
relation, that is to say, to understand the woman as the man or the man as the 
woman. Within the example, there are subtle tokens of the recognition of 
understanding that take place within a second-person relation to each other. The 
members of the couple do not take a third-personal stance toward each other. 
They are engaged with each other, and this engagement is shaped by the situation 
they are embedded in. They do not observe each other and then infer what the 
other is thinking or feeling, rather they interact. As Gallagher puts it: 
 
[I]n ordinary instances of interaction with others, I am not in the observer 
position; I am not off to the side thinking or trying to figure out what they 
are doing. Rather, I am responding to them in an embodied way. What we 
call social cognition is often nothing more than that social interaction. 
(2008b: 540) 
 
Given this, let us return to the question of the extent to which we use folk 
psychology in everyday contexts. When we take seriously positions from 
developmental psychology and phenomenology which draw on direct perception, 
it is argued that recourse to inference in not necessary:    
 
It is a corollary of this that the other person has - like ourselves - a sphere 
of absolute personal privacy, which can never be given to us. But that 
‘experiences’ occur there is given for us in expressive phenomena - again, 
not by inference, but directly, as a sort of primary ‘perception’. It is in the 
blush that we perceive shame, in the laughter joy. To say that ‘our only 
initial datum is the body’ is completely erroneous. This is only true for 
the doctor or scientist. (Scheler 2008 [1958]: 10) 
 
Instead:  
 
                                                      
60 By this, I mean the way how, in interaction, the bodily orientation or comportment of another 
can solicit an embodied response from us. I investigate this in Chapter 5. 
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[T]he understanding of others is not an inference of mental states, but a 
pre-cognitive, intuitive experience, a direct perception of the others’ 
emotional life. (Stanghellini 2004: 14)61  
 
Gallagher’s arguments undermine the idea that understanding others is about 
overcoming the problem of ‘hidden minds’ which folk psychology tells us, need 
to be deciphered to overcome the explanatory gap between observable actions 
and unobservable states of mind. Instead, direct perception argues that there is 
rarely a gap that needs to be overcome in the first place. In stating that people’s 
intentions, affects, dispositions, and so on are perceived through their embodied 
comportment, which is situated in a particular shared context, Gallagher removes 
the need to have recourse here to alternative ways of ‘bridging the gap’, as he 
reveals, ordinarily, there is no gap. 
 
2.3 Alternative approaches to Interpersonal Understanding: 
Interaction Theory and Participatory Sense-Making 
 
If everyday interpersonal understanding is not about ‘getting into another 
person’s mind’ and inferring mental states from behaviour, then how do we 
understand others? The main alternatives to folk psychology, including 
interaction theory (Gallagher 2001, 2004a,b, 2005, 2007a, 2008, 2009; Gallagher 
and Hutto 2008) and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 
2010) offer alterative accounts of interpersonal understanding based on a 
challenge to the following principles they see as key commitments of folk 
psychology: 
 
(1) ‘Other minds’ are hidden.  
(2) Third-person observation and inference of mental states forms the 
basis for understanding others. 
(3) Mindreading is both the pervasive and dominant way in which we 
                                                      
61 Stanghellini argues that those suffering from schizophrenia often lack the ability to directly 
perceive emotions of others, writing: “What is missing is a pre-conceptual link between this 
person and the other persons, a pre-cognitive, intuitive experience and direct perception of others' 
emotional life” (2007: 133). 
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understand others. 
 
Instead, Interaction Theory seeks to argue that: 
 
(1.a) We directly perceive the intentions, emotions and dispositions of 
others through bodily comportment (Gallagher 2008b, 2009: 292). 
(2.a) Second-person interaction is more primary in our understanding of 
others than third-person observation is (Gallagher 2009: 292).  
(3.a) Far from being pervasive in understanding, mindreading is a “rare 
and specialised ability” (Gallagher 2009: 292) which is seldom utilised. 
Furthermore, development of mindreading abilities is dependent on more 
primary social embodiment (Gallagher 2009: 292). 
 
To support these claims, Gallagher turns toward developmental psychology, in 
particular to the social abilities of infants from birth to around 3 years. As we 
saw in 2.2a, findings here suggest that before children are able to master and 
utilise a concept of belief, they are adept in a host of other, more primary 
intersubjective and communicative abilities.  
Combining the evidence of an infant’s early intersubjective life with 
criticisms that state that folk psychology has missed the importance of situation 
and the second-personal stance, Gallagher forwards interaction theory, as a 
model for ‘everyday’ interpersonal understanding (2001, 2004a,b, 2008a, 2009; 
Gallagher and Hutto 2008). He states that understanding other people is 
“primarily neither theoretical not based on an internal simulation. It is a form of 
embodied practice” (2005: 208). Whilst Gallagher accepts that there is a leap in 
conceptual abilities in understanding others around the age of four (see Chapter 
1.2) he states that this advancement is couched in “a wider framework of 
interpersonal pragmatics” (2005: 224).  
Such interpersonal pragmatics have been neglected by the narrow focus 
of folk psychology and are, Gallagher suggests, embodied (‘sensory-motor’ 
2005: 224), affective, perceptual, pre-reflective (‘non-conceptual’ 2005: 204), 
and fundamentally: “second-personal embodied interactions with other persons 
perceived as others” (2005: 224). Citing the developmental evidence from 2.2a, 
and developing an emphasis on the roles which relatedness and situation play, 
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leads Gallagher to argue that folk psychology is not our primary way of 
understanding others:  
 
Theory theory and simulation theory at best explain a very narrow and 
specialised set of cognitive processes that we sometimes use to relate to 
others […] But neither theoretical nor simulation strategies constitute the 
primary way in which we relate to and interact with or understand others. 
Furthermore, in these cases where we do use theoretical and simulation 
strategies, these strategies are already shaped by a more primary 
embodied practice. (Gallagher 2005: 208) 
 
The widening is achieved by taking interpersonal understanding out of the 
exclusive scope of the ability to attribute intentional and propositional states to 
others, and emphasising the pre-reflective skills and abilities which support 
interpersonal understanding. In order to flesh out his claim, Gallagher draws on 
evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathology, focusing in 
particular on the emergence and progression of types of shared intersubjectivity.  
Gallagher argues that both primary intersubjectivity (shared person-to-
person attention), and secondary intersubjectivity (in which child and caregiver 
begin to share situations and contexts) prefigure and underlie the conceptual 
abilities which accounts rooted in folk psychology emphasise as central to 
interpersonal understanding. The inescapable element in both of these forms of 
intersubjectivity is the way infants respond directly to others as people, in an 
embodied manner. Early intersubjective abilities are up, running, and enabling 
interactions with others to take place before the advent of conceptual knowledge. 
This leads us to question whether folk psychology can provide us with the whole 
story. Whilst these forms of sharing intersubjectivity develop in very early 
infancy, they feature and scaffold adult intersubjectivity:62  
 
[P]rimary intersubjectivity is not something that we leave behind as we 
mature. We continue to rely on our perceptual access to the other’s 
affective expressions, the intonation of her voice, the posture and style of 
                                                      
62 For example, see Currie 2007 for an explanation of the importance of shared attention for adult 
interpersonal understanding. 
101 
 
movement involved in her action, her gestures and so on, to pick up 
information about what the other is feeling and what she intends. 
(Gallagher 2009: 293) 
 
Right from the beginning second-person interaction with others marks 
and enables both a fundamental ability to share and be with others, and supports 
an emerging and developing sense of self.63 Secondary intersubjectivity develops 
from around the age of nine-months and underpins more general intersubjective 
capacities.  
Gallagher emphasises the pre-theoretical capacities for intersubjectivity 
which are present in children before the age of 3 years, and which are embedded 
in a second-person relation, which is vital for sustaining these types of sharing 
oneself with another, and my world with another. However the fundamentality of 
primary and secondary intersubjectivity does not wane after the ‘cognitive 
revolution’ at 4 years. Far from it. Instead, Gallagher argues that primary and 
secondary forms of intersubjective sharing go on to enable adult as well as 
developing intersubjectivity. At the heart of both forms of subjectivity is a 
recognition and a direct perception of another as a person with whom I may 
interact (Gustafson 1993: 280), and with whom one does interact, in a primarily 
second-personal way. 
 Participatory sense-making is strongly influenced by Gallagher’s 
interaction theory. Recognising that “explanation and prediction may not be at 
the centre of our everyday social practice”, De Jaegher and Di Paolo also seek to 
offer an alternative account of social understanding which is more respectful to 
“everyday social practice” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007: 486). In this way, De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo consciously follow the move away from viewing an 
inference of mental states to be at the heart of our understanding of others, to 
prioritise interactive understanding (Gallagher 2001, Hutto 2004, Ratcliffe 
2007a).  
 Motivating participatory sense making is the challenge to “work out what 
the interaction process does for social cognition” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007: 
486). Whilst De Jaegher and Di Paolo agree with Gallagher’s general interactive 
                                                      
63 See the edited volume by Neisser (1993) for a variety of papers to argue for such a view. 
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approach, they state that those concerned with interaction have as yet failed to 
give a clear “articulation of a theoretical and methodological framework” (2007: 
494) by which we may understand the process of interaction. Participatory sense-
making aims to provide this by drawing on the enactive concept of sense-
making, and dynamical systems theory (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Fuchs 
and De Jaegher 2009). It states that – and seeks to explain how – meaning arises 
between interacting individuals. 
 With this in mind, De Jaegher and Di Paolo seek to put forward an 
enactive account of the mechanics of interaction, which characterises it as an 
autonomous process, involving each interactant co-ordinating (or not) with the 
other (2007: 491-496). In doing so, like Gallagher, they emphasise interaction as 
an embodied and socially embedded process, but seek to add flesh to the bones 
of how we understand the way in which we come to consensual understanding 
with each other; how, in social interaction (by which they take to mean direct 
face-to-face interaction or conversation) we make meaning together:  
 
[M]eaning is created and transformed through patterns of coordination 
and break-downs. The phases of action and perception typically used to 
describe individual sense-making now acquire collective aspects and 
sense is created through the stabilisation of patterns of joint activity … In 
this kind of activity the interactors engage in the highest degree of 
participation. (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007: 500) 
 
 De Jaegher and Di Paolo are right to emphasise the “dynamics of co-
ordination” (2007: 499). They form a complex phenomenon, but one which adds 
much to our understanding of the way in which we mutually affect each other to 
arrive at some mutual understanding. I agree with De Jaegher and Di Paolo when 
they seek to emphasise the dynamics which give rise to a mutual and consensual 
form of interpersonal understanding, and investigate how meaning arises from 
interaction. This is certainly something which needs to be addressed and is of 
potential value for accounts of interpersonal understanding. However, the 
concept of ‘co-ordination’ between participants still asks for more detail.  
 In appealing to the resource of sense-making, Gallagher questions 
whether participatory sense-making addresses the same problematic as 
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interaction theory. Responding to the criticisms laid at his door by participatory 
sense-making, Gallagher seeks to distinguish the problem of intersubjective 
understanding from the broader question of social cognition. In doing so, he 
locates interaction theory as addressing the former: the question being, how do 
we understand others? Answer: through interactive processes; whilst 
participatory sense-making contributes to the latter question: how are we able to 
navigate and share a social world? Answer: through participatory sense-making: 
 
[T]hey [De Jaegher and Di Paolo] understand it to address the issue of 
how intersubjectivity enters into meaning constitution and most generally 
the co-constitution of the world. The question that PSM addresses is: 
How do we, together, in a social process, constitute the meaning of the 
world? In contrast, the problem of social cognition is centered on the 
following question: How do we understand another person? Now I 
believe these two problems are closely related. For example, one might 
think that the problem of PSM is the more general problem which 
includes social cognition since if we are trying to make sense out of the 
world, certainly we find other persons in the world. (Gallagher 2009: 
297) 
 
 Gallagher does have a point here, which he uses to diffuse some of the 
criticisms laid at his door by De Jaegher and Di Paolo. However, I agree with the 
latter when they state that debates surrounding interpersonal understanding 
would indeed benefit from a more in-depth engagement with the question of how 
understanding is arrived at between people. Often this is through a process in 
which interlocutors affect each other and in doing so arrive at mutual 
enlightenment and understanding. Whilst ‘understanding’ and ‘making meaning’ 
are different phenomena, they are at the same time, highly related64 and 
intertwined, especially if we take interaction to be the primary way in which we 
ordinarily understand others. Understanding reached through interaction relies on 
a mutual engagement in which we perpetually react to and clarify the 
                                                      
64 As Gallagher acknowledges (see Gallagher 2009: 298). 
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presuppositions we have of each other.65 In a sense, this is related to a coming 
together of people who create meaning with, and understanding of, each other. 
Whilst the two problems are separate, debates surrounding how we understand 
others benefit from bringing them to bear on each other. 
 Whilst I do not disagree with the aims or content of their discussion of 
participatory sense-making, I believe (as they themselves do (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo 2007: 503)) there is much more work to be done on how we envisage the 
way in which ‘co-ordination’ gives rise to shared meaning. It is not simply the 
case that I, on the one hand, begin to sync with you in an embodied, gestural 
manner. Whilst this is an important, indeed central part of the process of 
interaction, we must still question what enables and shapes this shared relation to 
continue unfolding.  
  
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 Underlying the call to account for ‘relatedness’ and context is a 
commitment to anti-individualism in understanding others, that is, the kind of 
individualism in which we ourselves are the sole arbiter of understanding, 
whether in virtue of theory or simulation routines. Both theory and simulation 
theories neglect the more primitive, pre-reflective ways in which we ordinarily 
find ourselves operating alongside others. Having examined the themes of 
situation and relatedness, we are now in a position to ask how they come together 
to mutually aid understanding. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
However, before ending this chapter, I wish to turn briefly back to ‘relatedness’ 
in order to pause and ask what precisely is meant by the term. 
 As we have seen, the value of relatedness for interpersonal understanding 
has been widely discussed and argued for, by philosophers, cognitive scientists, 
and developmental psychologists alike. By it, they mean the sense we have of 
being connected to others in a primitive and pre-reflective way. It is that which 
calls us to interact differently with people than we do with objects. But whilst the 
term has been used quite heavily, there has been little discussion of what 
constitutes, enables, and shapes this sense of relatedness. In the remainder of this 
                                                      
65 See Chapter 3. 
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thesis, I will attempt to unpack this notion of relatedness a little more carefully. 
To do so, I identify two main elements (space and reciprocal bodily expressivity) 
and explore the roles they play in supporting and transforming this sense of 
relatedness. After having laid out the hermeneutic account of interaction 
(Chapter 3), we will be able to see how the identified elements of space and 
embodiment work together to enable an understanding of other people. This way, 
we can fully see why we ought not to mistake interpersonal understanding with, 
as Hutto writes of the folk psychology approach, a “spectator sport” (2008: 12); 
and have an appreciation of some of the elements that combine to make normal 
interpersonal understanding achievable. 
 The next chapter builds on the critiques of folk psychology explored in 
this chapter, and also on the grounds of interaction theory and participatory 
sense-making. It aims to draw the strands of situatedness, relatedness, and 
interaction together to suggest how these elements, which support 
intersubjectivity, combine, and mutually affect each other during processes of 
interpersonal understanding. To do this I draw on the hermeneutics of Gadamer 
(2004) to offer a model of how interpersonal understanding rests on, is facilitated 
by, and progresses according to the mutual regulation of these elements. 
Gadamerian hermeneutics offers a wealthy resource through which we 
can account for the way in which individual situations, personal history, cultural 
contexts, and intersubjective spaces feed into the interaction process. From 
examination and an application of this resource, we appreciate how we need to 
account not only for interaction between interactional participants, but how the 
interactional relation between participants leads to a dynamic re-orientation of 
the interactants to their wider social background and space. To do this, I draw on 
Gadamer’s notion of the fusion of horizons in order to show how interactive 
processes do not just occur between interlocutors, but encompass the broader 
dimension of changes in attitude and understanding to the situation we share. In 
this way, interaction inseparably occurs not just between myself and another, but 
between ourselves and our social context. Understanding others and making 
meaning with them, often involves a re-understanding of our wider situatedness 
which engagement with others subtly refines.  
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PART 2 
 
Relatedness: 
A Phenomenological and 
Hermeneutic Exploration 
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    Part 1 provided an overview of the main contenders for accounts of 
interpersonal understanding (Chapter 1) and several of the responses to these 
positions (Chapter 2). Emerging from the discussion was a need to provide an 
account of interpersonal understanding that moves beyond the preoccupation 
with attributing propositional attitudes, and recognises the social, personal, and 
dynamic aspects of our apprehension of others. Providing a comprehensive 
account of relatedness will be integral to this: an exploration of how it is enabled, 
facilitated, and sustained both prior to and through our interactions with others. 
As we have seen, an emphasis on relatedness and the ways in which it impacts 
on our interactions with others holds a key place in many descriptions of the 
developmental trajectory of our ability to understand others. Though it has been 
argued that a sense of relatedness underlies our ability to engage with others, 
there has not been much explicit attention given to what relatedness is, nor to 
what contributes to and shapes the development of successful interpersonal 
relating. 
Thus we are left with a double gauntlet, thrown down from Part 1. First, 
there is a need to supplement interaction theory by providing an account of how 
interpersonal understanding emerges from and is shaped by interaction with 
others.66 Secondly, we must offer an exploration of the elements that support, 
shape, and facilitate a basic sense of relatedness with others.   
Part 2 attempts to take up these challenges. In response to the first 
challenge, I draw on Gadamerian hermeneutics to offer a description of the 
dynamics of interaction (Chapter 3). In addition to this, the account brings 
together understanding on both a social (global) and personal (parochial) level, 
demonstrating how understanding on each level mutually affects and revises the 
other through the interactive process. Interpersonal understanding successfully 
occurs from a negotiation between both levels. It is this insight that is missed by 
the accounts of theory and simulation theories, and to a lesser extent, in 
interaction theory, by not providing a framework outlining how situational and 
                                                      
66 As we saw in Chapter 2, Gallagher argues that interaction needs to be central to an account of 
interpersonal understanding, but has not yet illustrated how understanding emerges from 
interaction. Participatory sense-making is also sensitive to this, yet acknowledges there is still 
work to be done in providing an account of how co-ordination between interactants gives rise to 
shared meaning. This thesis is a continuation from, and a widening of, the implications of 
interaction theory. 
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personal elements combine to support understanding through an interactional 
process. 
 From here, Part 2 widens to consider possible solutions to the second 
problem. As mentioned previously, despite a prominent focus on the role that 
relations with others play in supporting and enabling interpersonal 
understanding, there has not been much consideration of what constitutes or 
enables these mutual relations to occur. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a 
phenomenological investigation of two elements that I identify as integral to an 
ability to enter into, whilst supporting and shaping, a sense of relatedness: 
phenomenological, intersubjective space (Chapter 4) and reciprocal bodily 
relations (Chapter 5). Accounting both for the ways that understanding emerges 
from interaction and the elements underpinning and shaping an ability to relate to 
others will give us a firmer basis on which to lay a more accurate account of 
interpersonal understanding. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
A HERMENEUTIC ACCOUNT  
OF INTERPERSONAL UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
“To understand is to participate immediately 
 in life” (Gadamer 2004: 208) 
 
 
Chapter 2 argued that third-person observational accounts of interpersonal 
understanding (folk psychology) cannot characterise interpersonal understanding 
in its full bodied and everyday way. Attributing mental states based on 
observation of others’ behaviour constitutes a skill that we call upon when faced 
with behaviour that is bizarre, out of character, or in some sense puzzling. 
However, it is not the primary and pervasive way in which we understand others: 
at best it forms “a narrow and specialised set of cognitive processes” which is 
sometimes active in intersubjective understanding (Gallagher 2001: 84; 2005: 
208).  
In focusing almost exclusively on attributing mental states to others, theory 
and simulation theories have neglected the work which shared situation and 
interaction perform. Both underpin and shape the progression of our 
understanding of others. Appreciation of the role of shared situation and 
interaction requires a shift away from conceptualising understanding primarily as 
an individual (and observational) enterprise. Instead, it requires an account of 
how others actively shape the understanding we have of them through 
interaction. Providing an account of this will supplement and build on the 
groundwork of interaction theory. 
This chapter introduces and outlines a hermeneutic account of interpersonal 
understanding. Gadamerian hermeneutics provides a wealthy resource, not only 
to account for situational and personal elements, but also to show how they 
dynamically come together in interaction to enable and facilitate an ongoing 
understanding of others. As such it supplements and builds on the groundwork 
which interaction theory has laid out, to account for how understanding emerges 
through interaction.  
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In what follows, I neither deny that there is an internal element to 
interpersonal understanding, nor claim that understanding must always be a 
completely shared activity. Some authority and autonomy does remain with the 
individual (in terms of level of engagement, and the decision to begin or end 
interaction). However, I offer an account which demonstrates that situation and 
personal engagement are more integrated and mutually informing than many 
have supposed: both are inextricably related in interpersonal understanding.67 In 
arguing this, I examine three interrelated key areas, which I claim have a bearing 
on understanding others. They are: situation, pre-judgements, and a dynamic 
relation between self and other. To begin, I shall outline the structure of this 
hermeneutic account of interpersonal understanding, showing how the elements 
involved in understanding the other, as Clark and Chalmers insist, ‘ain’t (all) in 
the head’ (1998: 8). 
 
3.1 Hermeneutic Structure 
 
As we have seen, we understand others according to their situation, 
actions, goals, roles, according to social norms, ideals, and so on. I can 
understand Mick as an excellent carpenter, a good person, a good husband and 
father, a safe driver and so on. But what is it that allows us to make non-
inferential acts of understanding about others? Doing so relies on an ability to 
understand the other against a ‘global’ backdrop which encompasses the present 
situation, past situations, knowledge of personal history, and so on. This 
knowledge is brought to bear on new situations in which we relate to the other 
through a personal stance.  
Given that interaction theory and participatory sense-making already 
emphasise the importance of being affected by others and our shared 
environment during interpersonal understanding, why do we need to draw on 
hermeneutics? Hermeneutics provides us with a resource through which to 
understand the active role which context plays in shaping interpersonal 
understanding, while giving us a framework that can account for how 
                                                      
67 For example, Gurwitsch frequently states that situational understanding is prior to ‘personal’ 
(1979: 113), whilst Gallagher (2001) and Hobson (2002), among others, stress the primary role of 
‘personal’ understanding. 
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understanding emerges through and from interaction.68 Furthermore, a 
hermeneutic account of interpersonal understanding not only explores the way in 
which interaction supports understanding between individuals; it also accounts 
for how interpersonal understanding is constituted through interaction between 
individuals. At the same time it explicates how interaction with others affects the 
understanding we have of the contexts in which our interactions are conducted.  
In proposing to think of interpersonal understanding in terms of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics it is important to note that I do not use the term 
‘hermeneutic’ in its traditional literary and theological sense. As discussed 
above, I use it to evoke a concept of understanding as a shared venture. This 
means the control of an understanding process that does not ultimately reside 
with, and only with, the individual. Instead it usually resides between 
interlocutors. In this way, use of ‘hermeneutic’ emphasises the Gadamerian 
hermeneutic ideal of understanding as a dynamic, mutual, and co-constituted 
process.  
In this way, hermeneutics can shed more light on interaction theory to 
provide an account of how we can view intersubjective understanding (and 
misunderstanding) as emerging from interaction taking place within a shared 
context. Simultaneously, it enables us to account for how our interactions cause 
revisions to how we understand our context. Furthermore, drawing on Gadamer’s 
insights on the value of play and risk in understanding emphasises the retreat 
from the presupposition held by both theory and simulation theory that 
understanding others is a predominantly third-person and spectatorial enterprise. 
As Gadamer writes: 
 
The task of hermeneutics is to clarify this miracle of understanding, which 
is not a mysterious communion of souls, but sharing in a common 
meaning. (2004: 292) 
 
Gadamer likens the phenomenon of understanding to finding oneself 
within progressive dialogue with others. In doing so he appeals to the hallmarks 
of genuine conversation, in which participants are fully open to what their 
                                                      
68In what follows I focus on themes specifically from Gadamerian hermeneutics.  
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interlocutor has to say, and through which interlocutors go beyond the 
presuppositions and positions which they begin the conversation with. This 
forms a contrast to conversation in which one partner dominates or browbeats the 
other into accepting their point of view. Instead, the subject matter leads the way, 
and through dialogue with one’s interlocutor, we come to revise, abandon, and 
transcend our original position in coming to a consensus with the other. Once 
again, this is not a case of abandoning one’s own point of view in favour of that 
of the other. Instead, through the momentum of dialogue we each bring our 
presuppositions to the dialogue, and in engaging with the other, they are laid 
bare. It might be that my interlocutor challenges a particular point that I had 
taken to be the case or that in seeing the other’s tacitly held convictions I become 
aware of my own.  
In genuine conversation, these presuppositions are ‘put at risk’: that is, in 
laying them bare we are prepared that they might be insufficient, misguided, or 
just plain wrong. Gadamer refers to coming to a consensus as “the fusion of 
horizons” (2004: 300-304) through which we “integrate differing perspectives in 
a deeper understanding of the matters in question” (Warnke 1988: 169). The 
quality of ‘openness’ to perspectives, objections, and experiences which differ 
from one’s own preconceptions is integral to hermeneutic understanding as 
Gadamer characterises it. As long as one remains open and willing to risk one’s 
presuppositions, the conversation, and understanding, remains ongoing. 
In characterising understanding as dialogical, Gadamer challenges the 
way in which we think of the structure of understanding. This is particularly 
relevant to characterisations of interpersonal understanding. As we have seen, 
theory theory and simulation theory have tended to describe our understanding of 
others as being a matter of attributing propositional attitudes to others on the 
basis of observed behaviour. Chapter 2 explored how this is usually framed as an 
observational and predominantly third-person enterprise.69 In this case, I observe 
some action by X, and apply a theory of mind or run a simulation, which allows 
me to attribute mental states to them. This model of understanding is linear in 
nature: there is something to be understood (someone’s behaviour), I apply my 
                                                      
69 I noted in Chapter 2 that proponents of theory theory and simulation theory would probably not 
wish to deny that understanding can be second-personal, however, they make the claim that folk 
psychology is pervasive and predominant in understanding others, and they neglect to explore the 
interactional and second-person nature of everyday understanding.  
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internal resources (theory, simulation, or both), and this yields understanding of 
their action. Here the responsibility (control, decision to understand) and 
resources (theory, simulation) for understanding rest with the individual. The 
other person is apprehended as a model to simulate or apply a theory to. In 
characterising understanding thus, theory and simulation theories neglect to 
account for the way in which understanding others is often a mutual and co-
constituted venture.  
As we see above, Gadamer characterises understanding, when it is 
genuine, as a shared and co-constituted activity. It is achieved through the fusion 
of horizons. This leads Gadamer to characterise the structure of understanding, 
not as linear, but as a circular:70 the person, who is always situated within their 
tradition,71 brings certain presuppositions (tacit or otherwise) to their encounter 
with another person. On engagement with their interlocutor, these come to be 
revised or abandoned, causing a shift in the presuppositions that are held. 
Gadamer likens the back and forth of understanding to ‘play’ (Gadamer 2004: 
104, 105, 483-484). Taking the form of ‘to-ing and fro-ing’ between 
interlocutors, play describes the dialogical and ongoing, engaged interaction 
which drives the fusion of horizons and the circular structure of understanding. 
Gadamer uses the term to emphasise the ordinary way in which we usually find 
ourselves “caught up” in the flow and process of understanding others (Coltman 
1998: 52), which gathers its own momentum. In doing so, neither of the 
interlocutors control the direction the conversation takes, but yield to the 
                                                      
70 Gadamer was by no means the first to do this; the concept of the hermeneutic circle has long 
been established. Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Heidegger all referred to the hermeneutic circle in 
characterising understanding. See Warnke 1983: 82ff for an overview of its history. The 
hermeneutic circle was predominantly used to refer to understanding a part of the text in 
reference to the whole. Heidegger widened this to encompass the relationship between self 
understanding and one’s understanding of the world. This includes, for Gadamer, historical 
situation, culture, and tradition at large. It is the latter, wider conception which is useful when 
applying insights from hermeneutics to interpersonal understanding. 
71 Tradition for Gadamer includes the cultural and historical background within which we are 
rooted. For Gadamer, tradition shapes and forms the pre-judgements which we bring to 
understanding. See Gadamer 2004: 268ff. In what follows, I will not refer to ‘tradition’ or take it 
to be as central as Gadamer does. Instead, I view ‘tradition’ as part of a rich conception of 
‘situation’. In what follows, I will refer to ‘situation’ in a rich sense which includes not only 
historical situatedness, but also the list of phenomena above (see p. 115-116). I also note here that 
Gadamer was criticised for his emphasis on the necessity of understanding others from inside 
one’s tradition, most famously, by Habermas. Habermas raised the concern that Gadamer does 
not allow the possibility for individuals to ever transcend their ‘tradition’. There is a long debate 
on whether Gadamer does indeed fall foul of this charge. However, this is beyond the scope of 
the present thesis. Instead see, for instance, Gadamer 1979: 108.  
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movement of the conversation. The subject matter, rather than the individual, 
steers the course of the conversation. In this way, understanding is dynamic and 
co-constituted; it emerges and is shaped between interlocutors. 
The structure of play shapes progressive understanding between people, 
enabling and structuring a revision of our understanding of the contexts and 
presuppositions which we bring to our engagement with others. These then will 
feed back into the way we understand our interlocutor. Understanding is a 
transformative process which entails a relinquishing of power and control of the 
direction it takes: 
 [I]n order for the play of conversation to take over, the speakers must be 
willing to yield to its movement. In Gadamerian terms, they must be 
genuinely interested in coming to agreement … and this means that for 
either of them to learn anything or for any degree of truth to emerge from 
the dialogue both partners must be able to put their own preconceptions at 
risk; they must remain open to the possibility of being wrong. (Coltman 
1998: 53) 
 
 As with the hermeneutic circle, understanding interlocutors in the ‘rich’ 
sense outlined in Chapter 2 requires one to enter into a relation with them. One 
engages with the other in a way which is ultimately informed by background and 
cultural expectations. As Gadamer (2004) writes: 
 
The circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor 
objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of 
tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning 
that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but 
proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. (293) 
 
Although Gadamer is talking of understanding between a reader and text, this 
process is applicable to understanding between interlocutors. Understanding is 
not an enterprise which endeavours to “read the author’s mind” (Orange 1993: 
252); it is instead a relational and culturally instantiated project, which is neither 
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entirely subjective, nor removed from the perspectives of the interlocutors.72 
Instead, as we have seen, it is a fusion of horizons; interlocutors come to 
understand each other through a revision of what they have understood in the 
past in the light of what they are presently confronted with.  
We have already gone some way toward accounting for the dynamics of 
understanding as it takes place between interlocutors. However, in order to 
provide a rich account of interpersonal understanding, we need to account for 
how understanding between interlocutors is shaped by their situation; and, in 
turn, how interaction between interlocutors transforms the understanding which 
they have of their situation. These are inextricable aspects of the overall dynamic 
of the interaction process. As such, rather than examining the role which 
interaction plays, and then doing the same for situation, we need to account for 
how they work together dynamically throughout the interaction process. In order 
to emphasise this inextricability of interactional and situational understanding, 
and provide an account of the overall dynamic process of interpersonal 
understanding, I use the language of ‘spheres’. Doing so emphasises that 
interaction between interlocutors and situation are two sides of the same coin of 
the interaction process. In what follows, I identify two spheres at play in 
understanding others, which I refer to as the ‘global’ and ‘parochial’ spheres.  
 
(a) Global and Parochial Spheres of Understanding 
 
 As we see from Gadamer’s description of the structure of understanding, 
we can delineate two forms of understanding which are at play. Both are brought 
to bear on each other to enable the process of understanding. The first is broadly 
situational. One of the prominent points of hermeneutics is that we always 
understand others from our situation.73 Our situation forms a grounding from 
which understanding begins. It encompasses not only awareness and knowledge 
of the things in our environment, but also wider social phenomena including 
norms, social roles, social signs and symbols, cultural practices or rites, and so 
                                                      
72 See Athos and Gabarro: “The ability to prevent and anticipate misunderstandings, or problems 
of communication is directly related to the capacity to understand another person and what is 
important in that person’s world” (1978: 133). 
73 For ‘others’ we can read ‘text’ or ‘artwork’ as well as ‘person’. However, given the topic of 
this thesis, I focus on the case of applying hermeneutics to understanding other people. 
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on. In what follows, in order to emphasise the richness of this concept, I move 
away from the label ‘situational’ and refer to this as a ‘global sphere of 
understanding’. Doing so reminds us that included in this are not only the 
features of our environment, but elements of social context, and also previous 
knowledge of the other person or the situation which we share.74 The global 
sphere of understanding amounts to a ‘world view’ which enables us to 
successfully get on with things. 
The second form of understanding is constituted through the personal 
engagement with other people. I will refer to this as a ‘parochial sphere’ of 
understanding. By this I indicate the ‘to-ing’ and ‘fro-ing’ between interlocutors 
who share a direct relation, as described in the previous section. This form of 
understanding is co-constituted through sustained and ongoing interaction 
between interlocutors. 
 When we think of interpersonal understanding, the emphasis has tended 
to fall on interactional understanding in the parochial sphere (Gallagher 2001; De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). We saw in Chapter 2 that many emphasise the role 
which shared situation performs both in attuning us to others. However, in order 
to account for the manner in which interaction facilitates a progression of 
interpersonal understanding, we need to characterise how these two spheres of 
understanding dynamically influence each other in interpersonal understanding. 
In order to understand how this is possible it is helpful to bear in mind that the 
contents of understanding in both global and parochial spheres are always open 
to modification.  
It is the modification of presuppositions in both which enables the 
progression in understanding to occur. When we seek to understand someone, the 
enterprise will always be shaped by the situation we find ourselves within. For 
example, the way in which I engage and understand someone after hearing them 
give a conference paper will be very different to having a chat with them after 
dinner in the pub. In this way, our global understanding (including awareness of 
social norms) governs the way we enter into interaction with our interlocutor, 
forming a context which shapes our understanding of them in the parochial 
sphere. However, the influence is not just one way. The interaction with someone 
                                                      
74 In the case of interpersonal understanding, we might include knowledge of personality, and 
shared personal history with my interlocutor, if this exists between us. 
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in the parochial sphere (ideally) causes me to revise the presuppositions which in 
part feature in the global sphere.75 This feeds back into the way in which I 
understand the other through the parochial sphere.  
In this way, each sphere informs the other, allowing a revision of 
presuppositions which affects the way in which I interact with and understand 
my interlocutor; at the same time this causes a shift in my global sphere of 
understanding. The revision of presuppositions in both sphere mirrors the 
dynamic of the fusion of horizons, causing a transformation in understanding of 
both the other, and our situation; understanding is honed and revised through 
engagement with one’s interlocutor, as this engagement is cross-referenced with 
one’s own ‘global’ structures of understanding.  
 
3.2 Elements of a Hermeneutic Understanding 
 
In providing a hermeneutic account of interpersonal understanding I seek 
to account for the importance of how the following elements dynamically 
influence each other in interpersonal understanding:  
 
(i) the importance of being situated in a culture that informs our 
understanding of others; 
(ii) the role of pre-judgements (tacit or otherwise);  
(iii) the dynamic joining of horizons to create understanding; it is the 
revision and addition of these pre-judgements through a dynamic and 
mutual relation that constitutes ‘normal’ understanding.  
 
In the rest of this section I explore how understanding others involves the three 
areas above, to effect the ‘fusion of horizons’, mentioned above.  
As we have seen, Gadamerian hermeneutics emphasises how ultimate 
authority for understanding no longer lies solely with the individual. Instead, 
understanding becomes a shared process which is influenced and modified 
directly by my interlocutor, and the contexts we find ourselves within. Applying 
the insights of hermeneutics help to rectify an over-emphasis on both: (1) the role 
                                                      
75 Given that we are ‘open’ to our interlocutor and interested in forming consensus. 
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of the individual in understanding the other (interpersonal understanding is 
characterised as arising through the dynamic, interactive relation between 
interlocutors); and (2) the separability of interaction and context in the process of 
interactional understanding. In doing so, a hermeneutic account of interpersonal 
understanding emphasises both the role of dynamic interaction between 
interlocutors, and further the dynamic relationship of situational and personal 
elements of interpersonal understanding. Drawing on hermeneutics not only 
underlines the importance of these phenomena, but shows how they come 
together in the dynamic process of understanding. 
 
(a) Situation 
 
Chapter 2 explored the work which situation performs in interpersonal 
understanding (p. 83-92). In considering the role of situation within interpersonal 
understanding it becomes noticeable how this account veers away from emphasis 
on the primacy of actions alone being the key to understanding the other. A 
space in which to consider additional contributing aspects to understanding 
others provides a more subtle and effectual analysis of factors that influence and 
are a part of understanding others. It becomes apparent that the ability to 
interpret the other in terms of their actions and behaviour is largely presupposed 
by an ability to interpret the situation in which the other’s actions take place. As 
Gallagher states: 
 
One way to summarise these pre-theoretical conditions is to say […] that 
understanding of others in terms of their mental states requires a 
‘massively hermeneutic’ background. This suggests that there is much 
going on in our understanding of others, in excess of and prior to the 
acquisition of theoretical and/or simulation capabilities. (2001: 86) 
 
An example from Johnson (1987) makes this clear.  
Johnson asks us to consider the following statement ‘Mark chases Paul 
around the house’ (1987: xxxiii). Although Johnson’s primary concern is 
meaning, I believe this example is relevant for present purposes. Taken on its 
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own, this description of behaviour does not amount to much. It tells us what is 
happening in a skeletal way. We can imagine countless scenarios to which this 
description might apply. It may be a game of chase, Mark may be extremely 
angry with Paul, Mark may be a serial killer who likes to chase his victims 
before dispatching of them, Paul may even be a cat which needs to be put out, 
and so on. What this example goes to show is that in understanding others we 
draw on a wealth of additional factors that tacitly enrich our understanding. 
Understanding resting on behaviour and mental state attribution alone hardly 
leads to the ‘full bodied’ understanding of the other which ought to be the object 
of our philosophical investigations.76 Instead, it leaves us only with the 
possibility of a meagre, ultimately insufficient account. As stated above, to 
understand someone’s behaviour, we must, to some extent, understand their 
situation; that is, the context in which the behaviour or actions take place.  
This is not to suggest that behaviour and actions do not provide a way of 
understanding others, merely that this route of understanding is built on an ability 
to recognise and interpret situation. If this is not true we must ask how it is that 
actions may be meaningful; often actions and behaviour are meaningful in 
relation to a situation. Indeed, if what I have explicated so far is correct, there is 
not even a question of ‘whether we allow it or not’; situational understanding is a 
tacit occurrence which is present as much in ‘mundane’ situations as it is in 
extraordinary ones.77 
 
(b) Pre-judgements 
 
Emerging directly from this emphasis on the importance of situation for 
interpersonal understanding is a discussion of the importance of what, following 
Gadamer, I term ‘pre-judgements’ (2004: 293).78 As already seen, understanding 
                                                      
76 Also see Goldie (2007a) for a similar critique. 
77 The importance of ‘situation’ and environment has recently come into focus in various debates 
in cognitive science. ‘Embedded’ or ‘extended cognition’ seeks to point out the ways in which 
instruments and environmental features aid cognition. The discussions of extended cognition 
fundamentally seek to show that the external plays a role in cognition; they broaden the scope of 
cognitive processes outside the internal. See Clark (1997, 2001). 
78 In his account, Gadamer also refers to ‘pre-judgments’ as “prejudices”. Through his 
hermeneutic account, Gadamer seeks to rehabilitate the notion of ‘prejudice’ from the negative 
connotations it holds, particularly in Enlightenment thought (2004: 268-285). In what follows, I 
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of others is facilitated by a mutual engagement in shared social practices, and in 
an ability to tacitly trust these social practices. If our values, social practices, 
bodily gestures, and so on are common in their meanings, then they form a 
background that informs our understanding of others. Indeed, an ability to trust 
in shared social conventions allows us to form preconceptions that again 
facilitate understanding. These can be of the most basic assumptions: for instance 
that the other is ‘like me’, that they are able to engage in conversation, that they 
have ‘personhood’, that they participate in similar social values as I do and so on.  
Pre-judgements such as these, manifest in situational understanding, are 
necessarily in place prior to the process of understanding others. They form 
preliminary grounds on which understanding begins. Shaped by our 
understanding of the shared situation,79 pre-judgements about the situation at 
hand in relation to the other form the base from which the process of 
understanding begins. These pre-judgements may range from those of 
convention (such as it is polite to begin a conversation) or those of more overt 
social norms (I cannot talk in a library) to those of unheeded elements which 
inform our understanding of the other such as body language (‘he’s frowning, he 
can’t be happy’) to recognising inflections of the voice or semiotics (her rapid 
speech conveys her excitement).80 We can even bring personal history into this 
sphere of pre-judgements. These pre-judgements emerge from the general 
situation; they are salient facts that we pick up on and bring to understanding. In 
observing that my friend is not talking to me, I might first consider that he is rude 
until I realise we are in the aforementioned library, in which no one should talk.  
In ordinary understanding these factors would usually already be 
presumed; they enable my judgement. It is not left for me to wonder why my 
friend is not talking to me and then inferentially fill in the gaps. Instead the social 
norm governing the situation dictates my understanding directly, without need 
for inference. A tacit presupposition that he cannot talk to me because of library 
user norms is entailed in a correct recognition of our shared situation. In this case 
pre-judgements act as salience providers, shaping a way into understanding the 
                                                                                                                                                  
use the term ‘pre-judgement’, which Gadamer also uses in order to emphasise the positive value 
which ‘prejudice’ holds in structuring understanding. 
79 This may be in the sense of both cultural or ‘global’ situatedness and also the situation we find 
ourselves in ‘at hand’ or on the ‘parochial’ level. 
80 Chapter 5 deals at length with the roles which expressive embodiment plays in understanding 
others. 
121 
 
other which is more often than not reliant to some degree on situational factors. 
Pre-judgements dictate the terms on which my engagement with others should 
begin and progress. They specify certain types of behaviour as appropriate or 
inappropriate. These points are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, where I 
examine how the spaces within which we interact with others offer precedents 
for the interaction to begin and progress.  
This is not to say that such pre-judgements are always correct. Pre-
judgements are often revised or abandoned on engagement with the other. In 
fact, it is important to recognise that understanding is a gradual process in which 
pre-judgements are continually refined, and are always open to revision 
(Gadamer 2004: 304-306). It is the revision of pre-judgements in light of 
engagement with our interlocutors that constitutes the process of understanding. 
In relation to this we find that according to hermeneutics we need to adopt a 
position of openness to the other in order to properly understand and enter into 
understanding with others (Warnke 1897: 101-104). Openness is an essential 
precondition to understanding. It is only when one is open to the position of 
one’s interlocutor that the possibility of transformation from occupying one’s 
own perspective to a joint perspective is enabled.81 This is expressed through 
Gadamer’s notion and exploration of ‘risk’ (Gadamer 1977: 38; 2004: 305;82 
Coltman 1998: 53). In order to achieve understanding, we have to be able to risk 
our original interpretation and to relinquish control over the direction the 
interaction takes;83 only then can our pre-understanding transform and deepen: 
 
[T]he pre-judgements that lead my pre-understanding are also 
consequently at stake right up to the moment of their surrender – which 
surrender could also be called a transformation. (Gadamer 1977: 38) 
 
                                                      
81 Schutz identifies openness to others as an essential part of the ‘Thou-orientation’ discussed in 
Chapter 2 (pp. 80-81). Also See Schutz 1967 (162). 
82 “[T]he horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we are 
continually having to test all our prejudices” (Gadamer 2004: 305) 
83 See the following quote from Coltman: “In order for the play of conversation to take over, the 
speakers must be willing to yield to its movement” (1998: 53). A common theme in hermeneutics 
is for authority of interpretation not to exclusively ride with an the individual interpreting the 
text, rather the process of interpretation and understanding is shaped by the challenge the text, or 
other person, presents. 
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Pre-judgements mark the terms on which my understanding of others 
begins, the terms on which I approach them. They mark, amongst other things, 
that understanding must start somewhere, for instance with the presupposition 
that the other is like me and will respond positively in engagement. If this pre-
supposition were not in place, then we would most likely not engage with them 
in the first place.84  
If what I have stated so far is to be taken as a description of how we 
understand others in an everyday way, then tacit pre-judgements, which are non-
inferential, must form a part of our understanding. In this case pre-judgements, to 
a certain extent, enable a successful inhabiting and understanding of our 
situation.  
As already stated, we may distinguish between many types of pre-
judgement; these might be practical in the sense that the presence of an object 
indicates a purpose; they might be social, costume might enforce a type of social 
role, from which we can expect something in particular. These types of pre-
judgements form one level. However, there is a lower level of pre-judgement that 
we might identify: ones which are not so much to do with a shared social world, 
but instead form a basis from which understanding may begin. Unlike the social 
pre-judgements, the lower level pre-judgements need to be in place before 
understanding may begin or be consciously embarked on.  
As already discussed, the stance we usually occupy toward the others 
when we are in direct engagement with them is a personal one. Engagement in 
this stance also relies on certain pre-judgements, the most obvious one being that 
the person is ‘like me’ (personhood of the other) and that they are able to respond 
in an appropriate way. ‘Low-level’ pre-judgements of interest that Maruyama 
(1961) identifies are closely aligned to those supposed in second-person 
interaction. Involved in this pre-judgement are a number of presuppositions: that 
my interlocutor will be able to engage in a situation in a ‘full-bodied’ way; that 
they are able to understand the terms of engagement; that they share the same 
social and gestural (facial and bodily) signs as I do; that they, as Maruyama 
points out, have a similar or equal intellectual capacity to mine (1961: 123); that 
                                                      
84 This is reminiscent of Gadamer’s principle of completion (2004: 294) in engaging with others 
or texts we make certain assumptions in order to begin and progress in our understanding of 
them. 
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inflections and intonations in speech mean or indicate the same non-verbal 
content (such as intonation or body language). If these ‘lower level’ pre-
suppositions are not in place then engagement with the other becomes difficult, 
and the efficacy of understanding is curtailed. 
In laying out the importance of such pre-judgements I do not state that 
these remain in place from the beginning to end of understanding; they are fluid 
and open to revision. I merely state that they must be in position, tacitly or 
explicitly, before one engages in understanding in the first place. Pre-judgements 
are open to modification as understanding progresses. They are brought to 
engagement through the global sphere, setting the terms for the way that we 
approach the other according to both social norms and lower level pre-
judgments. This enables engagement with the other in the parochial sphere. 
Having examined the connected roles of situation and pre-judgements in 
interpersonal understanding, I now look at how these are drawn upon in an 
examination of the dynamics involved in the hermeneutic account. 
 
(c) Dynamics 
   
Interpersonal understanding is a continuous, possibly endless enterprise 
that is facilitated through an engagement with the other, leading to a spiral 
structure. The spiral progressive structure is constituted through a dynamic 
engagement between interlocutors in which our presuppositions come to be 
revised (the hermeneutic circle).85 In what follows I show how we may fruitfully 
conceive of the relationship between situational and personal understanding.  
We have seen that prior to engaging with others we hold rudimentary 
assumptions (pre-judgements) and a global understanding of situation, context 
and so forth. We primarily engage with the other in light of these pre-judgements 
and form a basic understanding according to them. As we engage with the other 
through the parochial sphere and modify certain pre-judgements that are false or 
                                                      
85 Given that Gadamer emphasises that understanding is an on-going and potentially endless 
enterprise, which requires openness to the other and a willingness to put one’s presuppositions at 
risk on engaging with the other, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the structure of 
understanding as a spiral, rather than a circle. Rather than ‘going round in circles’, the revision of 
presuppositions in global and parochial spheres allow a continual transformation of our 
understanding, both of the other and our situation, which remains open to revision. 
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misguided, the global background conception is changed accordingly to take 
account of the modification of pre-judgements. This subtle shift in the global 
sphere of understanding leads to a change in understanding at the parochial level. 
The understanding process follows this on-going pattern, facilitated by a second-
person relation and furthered by the influence of background understanding. This 
becomes evident when we consider an example: consider an ordinary 
conversation.  
We enter the conversation with certain pre-judgements, which form a 
background; these may range from social norms that limit what we will think of 
doing and not doing; prescriptions, which shape our behaviour and our 
expectations from the other (for example, when meeting a friend for coffee in a 
café we expect to chat about harmless things because that is what one does over 
coffee. Holding a blazing row is usually deemed inappropriate by the situation 
we find ourselves within); or even pre-judgements of what the interlocutor might 
say or do.  
Even on this brief sketch we see the different strata of background and 
pre-judgments at play. This strata of pre-judgements is added to and revised on 
engagement with the other. As conversation progresses, I may realise that 
expectations I held of my partner are unwarranted. This is reincorporated into my 
background ‘global’ conceptions, and changes the way I approach or view my 
partner. If my partner confides some secret to me, this may affect the constitution 
of my global situation, music or people may fade into the background as I lend 
heightened attention to my partner, while my evident eagerness to listen may 
encourage him to confide further. Here we see that features of the space we share 
(the music or bustling of people around us fading into the background) as well as 
the way we expressively comport ourselves (the embodied signs of an eagerness 
to listen) have a strong input on the construction of the situation in which we 
interact. Features within the parochial sphere (expressive embodiment,86 what is 
said in dialogue) affect the way I relate to my global sphere (pre-judgements 
revised, my understanding of the situation changes).87 It is reciprocal movement 
                                                      
86 Chapter 5 explores the role of mutually embodied expressivity for a changing sense of 
relatedness. 
87 I revisit this specific example in greater depth in Chapter 5. Chapter 4 and 5 explore the effect 
each of these background features (space, embodiment) and how they shape the way we 
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between parochial and global spheres that constitutes the spiral structure of the 
hermeneutic account.  
This continual revision of global and parochial expression usually occurs 
through a personal stance in which the interlocutors are engaged with and open 
to each other. Making this observation limits the circumstances in which 
understanding of this kind may take place. For example, this pattern of 
understanding would be hampered in situations in which social signs and 
symbols are different or have no shared meaning, in which the same language is 
not shared, or in which interlocutors are unable to engage over a second person 
sphere. However, these situations tend to be in the minority; when understanding 
or engagement with another does occur it is usually the case that we both operate 
in this shared sphere of meaning.  
 I previously emphasised the ways in which embeddedness within a 
situation, both cultural and practical, and the ability to rely tacitly on certain 
presumptions, play a part in allowing understanding between myself and the 
other to ‘get off the ground’ (sections 3.2a and 3.2b) and emphasised how a 
fusion of horizons in the parochial sphere causes a revision in our understanding 
of the global sphere. In this way pre-judgements and other background features 
are brought to bear on the other, and further, are modified, held or rejected. In 
light of this, the understanding one has of one’s interlocutor modifies. This 
process of revision and negotiation between my interlocutor and myself in the 
parochial sphere affects my global sphere which in turn affects the way I relate to 
them on the parochial once more. This is at the heart of dynamic interactions 
between people.  
This process allows us to come to an understanding of others, both in 
virtue of our interactions with them and the way we mutually interact in relation 
to our situation. However, it does not always follow that we must come to share a 
heightened sense of relatedness with our interlocutor. Our evolving interactions 
across the global and parochial spheres may result in a sense of alienation with 
the other if our interactions reveal them as frightening, bigoted, or rude. My 
point is that not all interactions taking place within this intimate interactive 
personal stance facilitate a greater sense of relatedness.  
                                                                                                                                                  
approach, relate to and orient ourselves towards our interlocutor and thus affect our 
understanding of them. 
126 
 
To illustrate this, let us consider the following example: imagine that you 
are trekking over a coastal cliff-side walk with another person. It is a very windy 
day, and the ground beneath your feet, whilst undoubtedly beautiful, is craggy 
and uncertain. The terrain slows your movements down, and the signs of 
difficulty and tiredness that you display solicits a reaction in your partner, who 
helps you along, and encourages you not to be afraid. “Come closer to the cliff,” 
they say, “so you can see the view better”. The comforting manner with which 
they speak to you, along with the encouraging words they offer about it not really 
being dangerous, the way they point out the safety rails all combine and begin to 
change the way in which you view the situation: the rocks you previously 
thought of as treacherous don’t seem that unfriendly or dangerous any more, the 
wind you thought was so powerful and hostile no longer appears as something 
that could blow you over the edge of the cliff.  
With these presuppositions revised through interaction with the other in 
the parochial sphere, you tentatively edge closer to the drop, when all of a 
sudden and out of the blue, you feel your partner’s hand on your back, giving 
you a gentle, but no less alarming shove. With that action, your judgements 
suddenly change once more. The place, once again, feels alarming and 
frightening and you are struck and shocked by the cruelty and tactlessness of 
your walking partner: how could they perform such an inappropriate action when 
they could see you were previously afraid? The quality of relations you share 
with your partner shift, and a sense of alienation, and perhaps anger, creeps into 
the relation you share, so recently trusting, now it is tinged by a sense of their 
tactlessness and absolute horror that you could have gone over the edge. In the 
same way, the context of our interactions, the space that we share – originally 
perceived with caution, then with growing adventurousness – feels hostile and 
dangerous once more.  
Each of these three elements – situation, pre-judgements, and dynamic 
interaction – intertwine and affect each other in understanding. As seen in the 
example above, the context we occupy (global sphere) affects the manner in 
which we can relate (parochial sphere): we have to trek slowly to keep together, 
any conversation will probably be accompanied by a hint of breathlessness, my 
walking partner adopts a sympathetic tone and orientation as they recognise I am 
wary of the long drop into the sea. This is intimately tied with the pre-
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judgements I hold (global sphere). I am aware that sheer cliff drops are deadly, 
that my walking partner, in being ahead of me, might be fitter or more 
knowledgeable about the outdoors that I am. When combined these create a 
global orientation that affects the way in which I will interact, both with the 
space around me, and with my walking partner.  
The dynamic interaction I share with my walking partner in the parochial 
sphere – the reassuring conversation, their helping me clamber over more tricky 
areas of the terrain, their soothing talk of the fact that we are safe, and then later 
the misjudged and alarming joke-push – affect the way in which I view the 
situation (global sphere), and my pre-judgements (the walk seems manageable, 
less dangerous, whilst my fear or awareness of the drop lessen in their salience). 
But what is really emphasised in this example is how fluid my understanding of 
the other person and my situation are, and thus how fluid the quality of my 
relatedness with them is. 
Chapter 2 emphasised the commonality and importance of situation. This 
returns to prominence here. Notice how this type of understanding and 
interaction would be difficult in an observational stance. Unlike detached and 
observational understanding, others have input and responsibility over the way 
we understand, an ability to affect us, the cognitive remove of theory theory and 
simulation theory is not usually an issue. My interlocutor and I dynamically 
shape the course of our understanding. In other words, understanding is no 
longer an individualised pursuit; it occurs alongside others and is affected by, in 
Gadamer’s terms, a fusion of horizons. As understanding progresses, my world-
horizon is influenced by that of my partner, which may subtly change my 
understanding of them in context. Thus it might be said that understanding is 
comprised by a mutual and dynamic process which is rooted ordinarily in a ‘non-
objectivist’ stance (Rosch et al. 1993: 149). 
This is clearly seen, when Gadamer writes: 
 
We begin with this proposition: ‘to understand means to come to an 
understanding with each other’ … Understanding is, primarily, agreement 
… Thus people usually understand … each other immediately, or they 
make themselves understood … with a view toward reaching agreement 
… Coming to an understanding, then, is always coming to an 
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understanding about something. Understanding each other … is always 
understanding each other with respect to something. (2004: 180) 
 
 Throughout this short quote the mutual aspect of understanding is 
emphasised. The model offered here is not simply one of X understanding Y, but 
X and Y being in a mutual process of understanding each other. Treating 
interpersonal understanding in this way and not as a highly individualised pursuit 
changes the timbre of accounts of interpersonal understanding. Whilst theory 
theory and simulation theories would not deny that others have an effect on the 
way in which we understand them, their accounts frame and root interpersonal 
understanding primarily as an individualised pursuit: I, observing her behaviour, 
understand her by attributing motivating belief-desire states, which are furnished 
by particular cognitive processes. Thus, the final arbitration of understanding 
rests with the individual. Distilled, the individual observes a person and then 
attributes mental states to them: in this way understanding is a linear pursuit: 
 
Observation  Cognitive processes  Attribution of mental states 
 
If we apply the insights of Gadamerian hermeneutics, we begin to get an account 
which encapsulates an ongoing ‘to-ing and fro-ing’ interaction, which, as we saw 
in Chapter 2, Gallagher and others deem of primary importance in our everyday 
understanding and dealings with others. Instead of the linear and individualistic 
process of understanding described by theory and simulation theories, we arrive 
at the spiral structure of hermeneutics: spiral, since there is a, possibly endless, 
chance that we will go on refining the pre-judgements which anchor us into the 
dialogue in the first place.  
If we recall the coastal walking scenario: my pre-judgements and 
understanding of my walking partner are fluid and changeable, according to the 
context we mutually occupy, our shared activity and interactions which take 
place within the context: in this case, the quality of our relatedness changes and 
becomes strained when my walking partner gives me a gentle shove. In this way, 
we see the spiralling of interaction spiral ‘downward’, as our relations become 
frosty, so to speak: but recall a conversation in which interlocutors discover and 
come to the same conclusion; a common occurrence in academia when 
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colleagues discuss and explore issues together. The coming together and the 
articulation of new modes of thought progress along this spiral structure.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
In Part 1 (Chapters 1 and 2), I explored the extent to which we can state 
that interpersonal understanding is not an exclusively internalistic and 
individualistic enterprise. Having built on the conclusions of Chapter 2, I have 
shown how understanding ordinarily draws on factors neglected by the third-
person accounts of theory and simulation theories. I have suggested how 
understanding takes place according to two different spheres: on an interactional 
‘parochial’ sphere, and also according to a ‘global’ sphere. The latter 
encompasses certain pre-judgements, and an ability to interpret one’s situation 
and draw upon past knowledge. The identification of both spheres is important if 
we are to characterise how everyday understanding occurs.  
A negotiation between self and other in the parochial sphere and, further, 
a revision of the global and parochial spheres in reference to each other 
facilitates and encourages everyday understanding. In highlighting what form 
pre-judgements might take and how these fit into and follow from background 
situatedness and an ability to interpret this, I incorporate neglected elements 
which play an important part in normal social cognition and apprehension of the 
other. Understanding, therefore, according to this account, diverges from the 
supposed linear form delineated in 3.2, and instead becomes spiral by nature as 
the other influences and affects our understanding across the parochial and global 
spheres. 
While we are now in a position to understand both the value and 
workings of interaction, we still need to account for the quality of relatedness in 
interpersonal understanding. As we saw in Chapter 2, accounting for relatedness 
forms a central role in accounting for how we are able to understand others in the 
first place. However, we are left with the question of what it is that feeds into, 
shapes and supports the shifting sense of relatedness which interlocutors hold.  
In the chapters that follow I go on to identify and examine two 
preconditions that feed into and shape the sense of relatedness between people: 
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phenomenological, intersubjective space and reciprocal embodiment. Following 
on from this chapter it will emerge that it is not simply a case that individuals 
possess these two elements which enable interaction to progress: rather, the sense 
of these elements will both affect and be affected by the interactions we share 
with others. By exploring these constituents of relatedness, we will be in a 
position to have a more accurate, more encompassing account of interpersonal 
understanding.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
RELATEDNESS AND SPACE 
 
 
“He shares a community of space with me 
when he is present in person and I am aware 
of him as such, and, moreover, when I am 
aware of him as this person himself, this 
particular individual, and of his body as the 
field upon which play the symptoms of his 
inner consciousness.” (Schutz 1967: 163) 
 
 
 Whilst Chapter 3 offered a framework according to which we may 
understand the dynamics of interpersonal understanding, we are still left with the 
task of accounting for relatedness: to describe more clearly what it is, identify the 
factors that underlie it, and to show how they come together to create a sense of 
relatedness. Recent work on intersubjective understanding focuses on the 
prominent role inhabiting relations with others plays in both supporting and 
enabling interpersonal understanding (Cole 2001; Hobson 2002, 2007a,b; 
Gallagher 2005; Ratcliffe 2007a,b; Starwarska 2007, 2009; Zahavi 2007a). 
Chapter 2 stated the importance of ‘relatedness’ for interpersonal understanding. 
However, there has not been much investigation into what the term denotes and, 
more importantly, how relatedness is facilitated and sustained.   
Going some way toward answering this challenge, this chapter provides a 
phenomenological exploration of one element that underlies and shapes the 
quality and progression of relatedness with others. This is intersubjective space, 
which contributes to creating a context to interaction. In what follows, I explore 
how this sense of space helps constitute and sustain interpersonal relatedness. In 
particular, I focus on the ways space shapes our initial engagement and 
interactions with others. Taking account of space should be an integral part of 
discussions of interaction and those elements underpinning and shaping it, both 
in terms of the spaces within which we find ourselves with others, and the ways 
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in which space provides a framework from which interaction begins and 
progresses. As yet, such discussions have been largely conspicuous by their 
absence. In this chapter, I seek to redress this absence through examining how 
space shapes interaction. I also explore the extent to which our interactions 
reflect back to shape the way we perceive and act within the spaces we find 
ourselves. Doing so will flesh out the two-sphere account given in Chapter 3.  
In what follows, I move away from more traditional notions of space as 
static and as a ‘container’ for human interactions. Instead I highlight, explore and 
emphasise the ways in which spaces are dynamic, and the effects that dynamic 
interaction have on the spaces we find ourselves in.88  
Traditionally, philosophical treatments of space focused on space as 
‘pure’ or ‘geometrical’ space (Casey 1997). Informed by Euclidean geometrical 
understandings of space, it characterised space as primarily measurable, in the 
form that it exists over and apart from any human contribution. Built into this 
understanding is that space is a dimension which is first and foremost objectively 
“representable” and “mappable” (Hubbard et.al. 2004: 4). Furthermore, space 
was understood as the dimension that contains all the things, people and events 
occurring in the world.89 This understanding of ‘space’ is usually understood in 
relation to ‘place’. Here space is defined as a pervasive and all encompassing set 
of dimensions. ‘Place’, on the other hand, signifies a particular locality or region 
within all pervasive space. Such conceptions tended to characterise space as 
static (Casey 1997: 141; Massey 2005: 13), and in doing so the ways in which 
space is ‘lived’ were overlooked (cf. Casey 1997: 222; Malpas 1999: Chapter 1; 
Massey 2005: Chapter 4, pp. 61ff in particular). Construing space exclusively in 
this way neglects alternative ways in which we may conceive of space as 
structuring and structured by human activity and life.  
Phenomenological approaches have sought to highlight and rectify this 
neglect, emphasising how geometrical characterisations of space form an 
                                                      
88 To a large extent, the theme of intersubjective spatiality is intimately linked to the theme of 
Chapter 5: reciprocal embodied expression. Each work together and mutually affect each other in 
creating a sense of relatedness, so it is in some ways misleading to treat each feature separately. 
However, a detailed examination is necessary in order to explore the role and workings of 
relatedness more clearly. I will remark on how these elements come together to shape relatedness 
over the next two chapters, and more concretely at the end of Chapter 5. In this way, the two 
chapters that follow offer the beginnings of a study of relatedness and elements that shape, 
develop and facilitate the sense of relatedness to evolve between interactants. 
89 This understanding of space is referred to as the ‘container model’. 
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abstraction from a more primordial engagement with space as ‘lived’ or 
‘phenomenological’ (see Heidegger 1962: 134-148; Husserl 1970: 29;90 
Merleau-Ponty 1962; Sartre 1958: 322); and ‘social’ (Foucault 1973, 1976;91 
Lefebvre 1991). Such approaches seek to redress the neglect of the ways in 
which subjects – who are primarily embodied, active agents – ordinarily 
experience space.92 Further, how our primary perception of space is shaped by 
our projects, embodiment and other such elements. Following the lead from these 
authors, this chapter shall not address so-called ‘Euclidian’ notions of space in 
terms of pure dimensionality and extension. Rather, I shall focus on the way in 
which space has meaning for people in an ‘everyday’, pre-theoretical way.  
This focus entails adopting a phenomenological standpoint, rather than 
one of objective reflection. Both methods reveal different, important insights for 
different ways in which we may view space: one with space as the object of 
inquiry; one with space as a dimension through which we experience the world. 
Debates on interpersonal understanding acknowledge the role of being embedded 
or situated (Clark 1997, 2001; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher 2001; 
Hutto 2004; Ratcliffe 2007a; Rosch, Thompson and Varela 1991). However, they 
do not sufficiently develop an account of the significance which intersubjective 
spaces have for our understanding of – and how we make meaning with – others. 
The further question of how the spaces we share with other people contribute to 
the form and quality of relatedness we hold with them must also be addressed.  
In talking of ‘intersubjective space’ we can distinguish two aspects: 
(1) The physical space in which interactions occur;93 
                                                      
90 “All this pure mathematics has to do with bodies and the bodily world only through an 
abstraction, i.e., it has to do only with abstract shapes within space-time, and with these, 
furthermore, as purely ‘ideal’ limit-shapes” (Husserl 1970: 29). 
91 Foucault’s histories explore the relation between particular socially created spaces (prisons, 
asylums, hospitals), and how power is manifest through spatial construction. Examples he uses 
include the panopticon (1976) and the changing nature and notions of asylums (1973). In these 
studies Foucault identifies the scope which spaces have for suggesting and controlling behaviour, 
whilst showing how this reflects social attitudes toward madness, sexuality, and criminality.  
92 There is also a thriving field which considers how political and economic forces are manifest 
through spatiality whilst simultaneously influencing how spaces are formed and impact life. (See 
footnote 98.) 
93 In talking of ‘physical’ space, I mean to acknowledge the actual space in which we find 
ourselves within, and in which the interaction takes place. This first aspect of intersubjective 
space can, of course, be a social space (home, classroom, restaurant, on the street) or a non-
social, natural one (park, mountainside, river bank). Using the categorisations of ‘social’ and 
‘natural’ spaces as distinctive raises legitimate questions, as the mountainside may become a 
‘social’ space, when we walk through it with others, or remember others who we have been there 
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(2) The sense of space that it suggests constituted between us through 
interaction.94 
These different aspects of ‘intersubjective space’ are inextricable. Together, both 
play active roles in shaping the way in which we interact with and relate to each 
other.  (1) Provides the physical setting in which we approach, meet and interact 
with others, while (2) describes our awareness of and relationship to things, 
events and persons located within and affected by (1). Furthermore, (2) is the 
affective, social, and phenomenal character which the space holds for us. This 
colours and shapes the way in which we approach and relate to people and things 
we meet in the space; and our interactions with others will transform the sense of 
space, which is dynamic. 
In this chapter, I want to explore aspects of this awareness that have been 
hitherto overlooked. In particular, I outline how it impacts upon understanding 
others. My exploration will focus on the affective, directive, and normative 
aspects of a sense of intersubjective space. First, I argue that intersubjective 
space shapes the initial way in which we engage with others (4.3). Second, that 
dynamic interactions with others shape the sense of space in which our 
interactions occur (4.4). In this way, intersubjective awareness of space is 
dynamic and fluid: the shared sense of space evolves as interaction progresses, 
whilst shaping the ways in which interaction will unfold. Our relation to it, and 
to others, evolves and changes through interaction. Doing so impacts on 
relatedness which I share with, and feel toward others. 
To explore this, after a brief outline of the conceptions of ‘lived space’ 
forwarded by Heidegger (1962) and Merleau-Ponty (1962), I turn to Sartre’s 
well-known examples of the park bench and Pierre’s absence from the café 
(1958). Both examples serve to illustrate how another’s presence or lack thereof, 
is enough to change the manner in which space, for me, and subsequently for us, 
presents itself. From this, we see how the senses of spaces we occupy are bound 
up with the degree of relatedness we share with others around us.  
From here, I explore several different examples of the dynamic 
relationship between space and interaction. In each case, I emphasise how an 
                                                                                                                                                  
with previously. I acknowledge this, and simply use it here as a useful heuristic to make my 
point. 
94 In what follows all references to space, even ‘physical’ spaces, are phenomenological. 
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intersubjective sense of space acts as a foundation for interaction. Intersubjective 
space contains certain normative, functional, and affective directives that guide 
interactions and form a platform that shapes the way we relate and interact with 
others. I argue that while phenomenological space encompasses elements of the 
normative, functional, and affective, it is not reducible to any of these. Rather, 
these elements literally are a sense of space, and are an intrinsic part of what it is 
to inhabit a space in a non-pathological way.  
At heart, this chapter explores two things: first, the intersubjective space 
in which interactions occur; and second, the ways interactions with others 
transform a sense of this space. Emerging from the discussion is the way that 
intersubjective space is vital for, and dynamic throughout, our evolving relations 
with others. 
Before unpacking more fully what is entailed by intersubjective space, I 
will first explore what is meant by ‘space’, ‘place’, and ‘context’.95 I indicate 
what debates on interpersonal understanding stand to gain by talking of space as 
well as context.  
 
4.1 Space, Place, and Context 
 
The term ‘space’ takes its place in a wider family of related terms of 
which ‘context’ forms just one, alongside ‘atmosphere’, ‘field of reference’, 
‘place’, and so on.96 Many recent accounts of interpersonal understanding 
heavily emphasise the importance of context as a backdrop for interaction (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher 2001, 2004b; Hutto 2004; Ratcliffe 2007a, 
b; Zahavi 2007a, 2008a). However, there has not been much attention focused on 
the spaces in which interactions occur.  
                                                      
95 Chapter 3’s exposition of the hermeneutic account of interpersonal understanding heavily 
emphasised the importance of context, as a backdrop which holds in place pre-suppositions, or 
pre-judgements, which form part of the start point for interaction. In this is contained all those 
social signs and symbols that enable us to make initial sense of the situation and others in that 
situation. The discussion which follows makes clear why consideration of space adds something 
important to the account. 
96 For an overview of the ongoing discussions of the importance and definitions of ‘space’ and 
‘place’ see: Casey (1997), Massey (2005), Malpas (1999, 2008), Sheldrake (2001). 
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‘Space’, as a term, has been used in many different ways and has a rich, 
changing philosophical history.97 As we saw on p. 132, ‘space’ has primarily 
been understood according to the ‘container model’. Here space is understood as 
a neutral dimension that contains everything that can be said to occur in the 
world. We saw that such conceptions of space do not take into account the way 
in which space shapes and impacts human life, and vice versa. In response to this 
criticism, other conceptions of space have recently risen to prominence. Moving 
away from understanding space as a neutral container dimension, theorists have 
sought to account for the ways in which spaces impact on social, political and 
human life and activity, and vice versa.98 Here, abstracted notions of ‘absolute 
space’ have been called into question and criticised.99 Terms such as ‘social 
space’ have muddied the waters of neat distinctions between abstract, pervasive 
‘space’ and localised ‘place’. Instead, in using the term ‘social space’ there is the 
recognition that spaces both shape and are shaped by our human relation to, and 
life within them.  
‘Context’ is a term often used in debates surrounding interpersonal 
understanding. As it stands, ‘context’ does not necessarily refer to spatiality. 
Instead, it is most often used to signify a backdrop to events. It is a rich term and 
may be used to denote different phenomena. For example, talk of ‘context’ could 
include: an understanding of surroundings and circumstances within which 
events take place; norms of how to conduct oneself in particular spaces (Morton 
2003);100 assumptions we might make of someone based on their social role or 
function; social signs and symbols including rules written into our daily lives (for 
example when driving stopping at a red light, or walking on the pavement rather 
than the road).101  
                                                      
97 See Casey 1997 for a thorough overview.  
98 For example: Foucault 1965, 1973, 1976; Harvey 1973; Lefebvre 1991; Massey 2005. 
99 Lefebvre, in particular, argues that we can never experience such a thing as ‘absolute space’. 
Instead, he argues, human life entails positionality. We are always positioned within spaces: we 
exist and act within them. These spaces are not primarily abstract spaces, but instead are 
experienced in terms of activities and the social nuances of our everyday life. Further, he argues 
that our actions create certain spaces, whether these be sacred, profane, or politicised. He refers 
to this as the social production of space (Lefebvre 1991).  
100 See Morton 2003 for an account of social virtues and how they shape background 
understanding of others. 
101 See Ratcliffe (2007a, b) for an exploration of the ways these social features form a context 
that shapes our understanding of others. 
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‘Context’ is a backdrop to the activity of interaction: it encompasses 
bodily comportment and gesture, cultural history, cultural practices, political 
backdrop, social roles, signs and symbols, and norms on how to conduct oneself 
in particular spaces. As we see from this list, the term ‘context’ fits a wide array 
of sister concepts, rules, directives and so on. Spatial pre-judgements and 
directives are just one aspect we might distinguish from ‘context’ in this rich 
sense. In referring to ‘context’, emphasis rests on structures, both social and non-
social, that make a situation meaningful. Context, then, is always a context ‘of’ 
or ‘for’ a particular activity, occurrence, task or meeting. In this sense, it is a 
backdrop or setting to a specific occurrence. ‘Context’ is always relational to 
that which it forms a backdrop to. In this sense, the context is anchored in but not 
reducible to the social space in which our interaction takes place.  
The spaces within which we interact shape the context to that interaction. 
Whilst the context forms the backdrop to the interaction, this takes place and is 
rooted within a particular space. This space partly constitutes the context of the 
event. Certain social spaces have normative dimensions that dictate the way we 
behave and relate to each other. The quaintly cluttered old English teashop in 
which one might meet a maiden aunt for tea constrains one and amplifies a 
tendency to engage in polite behaviour, small movements, and general chit-chat. 
On the other hand, the vista opening out from the saddle of a newly climbed 
mountain imbues the walkers with the sense of freedom and achievement. The 
expansiveness of the scene encourages expansiveness in the way the walkers 
move: large strides, long, slow gazing over the panorama of land around and 
about. There is an absence of a need to make the chit-chat that seems natural 
within the teashop; co-walkers are satisfied with sharing a knowing glance. The 
examples here encompass both social and natural settings, but common to them 
both is that the spaces – both the space itself and the sense we have of that space 
– suggest certain ways to interact, both with the spaces and with others.       
In this sense ‘context’ and ‘space’ are highly related terms. Space is an 
inextricable aspect of context without context being reducible to it. Backdrops to 
an occurrence must always be placed, that is, must have a particular spatial 
location. Space holds and localises context, and this is often a location in social 
spaces. Social spaces shape the formation of context. For instance the ways in 
which social space are physically constructed and normatively imbued shape the 
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actions that are and are not allowed or sanctioned to occur within that space. The 
space in which we find ourselves holds certain significances that shape, suggest, 
and go toward forming the context for our encounter. 
In this way, in invoking the term ‘space’ we signal something more than 
just a backdrop for interaction and something more specific than ‘context’. Not 
only do we look at the normative, social structures our lives are shaped by and 
embedded in, but we turn to acknowledge that the spaces themselves both shape 
and constrain actions and interactions. Context is shaped by social space. To see 
this, we only have to turn to the philosophy of architecture and spatial planning, 
which takes as its subject the way the spaces within which people live out their 
lives impact on and hold affective significance for the way we view, act, and 
move around in the world. It is this emphasis on the relation between how spaces 
are constructed and how action, identity, and relationships to and within the 
space are formed that is of interest to the question of relatedness. The spaces we 
find ourselves in cannot simply be reduced to the notion of context alone; instead 
the physical construction of certain spaces, coupled with the way they embody 
certain norms and suggest guidelines for behaviour scaffolds a sense of space. 
This affects the sense of space around us, which in turn helps determine the 
contexts we find ourselves within.  
For example, in the Staatoperhaus of Vienna the opulence of the building, 
constituted and conveyed by the way in which the space is arranged, creates a 
certain sense of grandiosity and pomp. The arrangement of the rooms, the finesse 
in which they are decorated, and our awareness of these things combine to form a 
certain context to any interactions which might ensue. Certain actions, such as 
loud behaviour, will be ‘out of bounds’ whilst others will be suggested by the 
space. The spatial setting inputs and adds to the context to any interactions that 
follow. In this way, context cannot be seen as free-floating. Our context is rooted 
within, suggested, and shaped through the manner in which social spaces are 
achieved, designed and perceived.  
In this chapter, I move away from talking about ‘context’ as separable 
from space, to ‘context’ as being hosted within and given identity by social 
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spaces.102 I do so in order to call to mind how spatial features and arrangements 
feed into the context through which we play out our lives and interactions. To 
think more clearly about the relation between spaces and context, we might 
conceive of space construction and production as performative of context. What 
might this mean?  
Performative schools of thought (Butler 1993)103 seek to emphasise how 
a sense of our own and others’ identities are essentially enacted. They claim this 
is reinforced by the way in which we approach, act within and relate to the 
spaces we find ourselves in. Moving away from conceiving of space in terms of 
pure dimensionality, or in Euclidian terms, performative thinkers seek to 
understand the relation between the social and normative as they are embedded 
within space. Spaces, according to this school of thought, are made meaningful 
by social and individual actions, which pool into constructing a specific 
meaningful space. In this way a church remains a church-space in virtue of the 
codes of practice that we adopt and perform in that specific space. A strength of 
such accounts lies in the manner in which they are able to retain the notion of the 
fluidity of our experience of space. A school sports hall can at different times 
become a concert hall, a place of assembly, an exam venue, or a place of 
exercise. Each manifestation of this space has a different ‘feel’. This is in part 
suggested and given by the activities we find ourselves engrossed in, the relation 
and attitude we take to it, and also the way in which we act. Such accounts are 
able to embrace and explain the ways in which individuals, groups, and on a 
larger scale, society, impact on the spaces they act within to make them 
meaningful.  
Such accounts positively emphasise a way in which social action impacts 
on the way we perceive and give spaces meaning. However, the question as to 
what underpins the way we shape our actions and interactions in different spaces 
is left untouched. It is here that an exploration of the synthesis between 
‘tradition’, ‘social norms’, and ‘space’ will step in, to build on and advance this 
notion of performative space. The sense of space is not built anew each time we 
                                                      
102 We have already seen that there is a distinction that can be made between Euclidean or 
physicalist notions of space, which treat space as an object for study, and phenomenological 
space, which examines our pre-reflective relation to space and the way this shapes our day-to-day 
experience of the world. In what follows when I use the term ‘space’ it will be to refer to ‘social 
space’ in the phenomenological sense. 
103 Also see Austin (1962) who first uses the term ‘performance’ in this way. 
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enter it. A repetition of certain styles of behaviour will serve to reinforce notions 
of a space as sacred, as profane, as homely, as pressured. However, what is 
interesting is the manner in which our interactions might change the way we 
relate to and act within a space temporarily, whilst the sense of space as sacred, 
profane, pressured, and so on, remains intact. That a child runs around and 
misbehaves in a public lecture or concert does not cause the meaning of the 
space to shift. The actions of the child arise out of the collective, intersubjective 
space, and the activities taking place within it. For the child, the space is one in 
which the child’s parents are concentrating on something other than her, which 
she cannot understand and therefore finds boring or stressful. In running around, 
being silly, making inappropriate noises, the child attempts to throw off the 
oppression that the space suggests for her. Yet, the space still remains one with 
affective overtones of oppression or boredom.  
Later, I will consider the directive nature of spaces and the way in which 
social norms, the functionality of space, and affective orientation all combine to 
create a sense of space which directs the way in which we will comport ourselves 
within that space (4.4). But what are the ramifications for studies of interpersonal 
relatedness? A sense of space constrains and shapes the way we will begin and 
enter into interaction with others; it provides and suggests an effective start point 
from which interaction begins. We shall see by the end of Chapter 5 how it is 
that our interpersonal interactions may cause an evolution in the sense of space 
we occupy with others. This in turn affects the quality and type of relatedness we 
share with others. In this way intersubjective space is not pre-given and static. 
Instead, the sense of it that we hold, which encapsulates and influences our 
interactions with others, is dynamic and changeable. 
 This notion of intersubjective space enables me to explore in depth how 
the space we find ourselves in forms a basis for the interactions that will occur; 
they will often instantiate the elements of context, outlined as important for 
successful interpersonal understanding in Chapter 3. As I am talking about 
phenomenological, intersubjective, and lived space my treatment of space will be 
concomitant with many of the features which come under the broader heading of 
‘context’. However, speaking of ‘intersubjective space’ will perform important 
philosophical and phenomenological work, since space as an element that affects 
our interpersonal relations has not been studied in detail. In order to see this, I 
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first spend time exploring what various phenomenological conceptions of space 
reveal for our understanding both of spatiality and of relatedness, starting with 
Heidegger. After this, I move on to deal specifically with intersubjective spaces 
and the ways they impact on our interactions with others,  
 
4.2 Phenomenology and Space 
 
Heidegger reverses the traditional starting point of inquiries into 
spatiality, moving away from the purely objective, scientific view-point toward 
our status as ‘Being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger 1962). Heidegger highlights how 
philosophical treatments of space have been primarily concerned with 
geometrical construals, which he identifies as stemming from an overly 
Cartesian mode of thought. Working against this, Heidegger challenges exclusive 
conceptions of space as “neutralised … pure dimensions” (Heidegger 1962: 147) 
to emphasise how space is also apprehended as circumspective104 and essentially 
lived.  
Whilst we may conceive of space according to the geometric model, 
Heidegger states that ability to do so is underpinned and enabled by a prior 
‘working’ familiarity with space understood relative to Dasein’s projects, 
activities, and involvements within a world. Doing so emphasises our status as 
Beings who are ‘already alongside’ and immersed within a world. This world is 
shaped both by intersubjectivity and practical engagement.105  Heidegger stresses 
the way space suggests possibilities for actions, projects, and goals. We 
experience things (equipment),106 Heidegger states, in terms relative to us: 
A three dimensional multiplicity of possible positions which gets filled 
up with Things present-at-hand is never proximally given. This 
                                                      
104 Heidegger uses the term ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht) to mean something quite specific. 
Literally translated, it means ‘looking around’. Heidegger uses this term to refer to the way in 
which we apprehend things and our environment holistically, in terms of our projects and 
concerns. See the entry on ‘Sight and Circumspection’ in Inwood (1999) for an in-depth 
exploration of this term. 
105 See Malpas (2008: 105ff) for an in-depth exploration. 
106 ‘Equipment’ is a term Heidegger uses to emphasise our practical engagement with ‘things’ or 
‘objects’. Reversing the subject-object standpoint which he attributes to classical philosophy, 
Heidegger uses ‘equipment’ to re-characterise this relation and describe the pre-reflective manner 
in which Dasein encounters entities. He stresses that we do not usually encounter entities as 
‘objects’, but instead as ‘equipment’ which is infused with social and practical meaning, and 
which presents practical possibilities and significance for Dasein. See Chapter 2.2c. 
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dimensionality of space is still veiled in the spatiality of the ready-to-
hand. The ‘above’ is what is ‘on the ceiling’; the ‘below’ is what is ‘on 
the floor’; the ‘behind’ is what is ‘at the door’; all ‘wheres’ are 
discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in 
everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the 
observational measurement of space. (1962: 136-137) 
 
As was saw in Chapter 2, Heidegger outlines three ways we can conceive 
of world:  
(1) That which is made up by the totality of things (beings) in the world 
(tables, chairs, bodies, doorstops, rivers etc.); 
(2) The ways these things relate to create a totality; and  
(3) As ‘Welt’: a term to signify the world that holds pre-reflective 
meaning for us, which is simply the everyday world we live in. It is this third 
conception of ‘world’ he states reflects our everyday relationship with world 
(1962: 93).107  
But what implications does this have for understandings of space? 
Heidegger’s description of our everyday, pre-reflective experience of the 
world as Welt also cradles his approach to space. “Because Dasein is spatial”, 
Heidegger writes, “space shows itself as a priori.” (Heidegger 1962: 146) 
Heidegger goes on to explain that spaces are revealed to us in relation to 
activities we are engaged and involved in: what Heidegger calls ‘regions of 
activity’.108 Groupings of equipment become salient in the field of action, to 
create regions of activity. Instead of seeing space as all-pervasive and neutral, we 
encounter workshops, offices, or markets. Our apprehension of space depends on 
how we act, relate to others and how equipment appears as useful. In this way, 
emphasis is placed on the manner in which spaces are shared and public, and in 
which Dasein is ordinarily immersed.109 In this way, space is coloured and made 
                                                      
107 See Chapter 2 (pp.86-89) for a full exploration. 
108 See Husserl (1989) and also Heidegger’s treatment and exploration of ‘regions’ of space 
(1962: 135ff and Section 70, page 418ff). 
109 See Healey et. al. (2008: 1723). 
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significant by Dasein’s projects and, more generally, in virtue of their Being-in-
the-world:110 
Dasein is essentially not a Being-present-at-hand; and its ‘spatiality’ 
cannot signify anything like occurrence at a position in ‘world space’, nor 
can it signify Being-ready-to-hand at some place. Both of these are kinds 
of Being which belong to entities encountered within-the-world. Dasein, 
however, is ‘in’ the world in the sense that it deals with entities 
encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with 
familiarity. So if spatiality belongs to it in any way, that is possible only 
because of this Being-in. (Heidegger 1962: 138) 
 
Heidegger expresses Dasein’s spatiality in terms of what he terms “de-
severance” (1962: 139-141). In opposition to geometrical understandings of 
space as primarily objectively measurable and divorced from our activities, 
Dasein’s “essential de-severance” (1962: 139) signifies the manner in which 
entities in space appear close, or in Heidegger’s terminology ‘ready-to-hand’.111 
In using the term ‘close’ here Heidegger is once more underlining the nature of 
Dasein as involved and immersed in its surroundings. Spatiality is not ordinarily 
experienced as divorced, objective, and ungraspable. Instead entities are 
experienced in space in terms of regions of ‘concernfulness’ and practicality 
(Heidegger 1962: 140).  
 In this way, Heidegger seeks to challenge what he identifies as the 
privilege that he believes philosophy has previously placed on the detached, 
objective standpoint from which we have tended to describe space. Instead, being 
in space is a matter of belonging to a meaningful environment that we are 
‘always already’ acting in. For Heidegger “[b]elonging-somewhere has an 
essential relationship to involvement” (1962: 420).112 Consequently, a 
Heideggerian approach prioritises an exploration of the ways in which space is 
‘lived’, rather than as abstracted from our activities and dealings in the world.   
                                                      
110 See this thesis Chapter 2.2c; and Ratcliffe 2007a, Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion of this 
of Heidegger’s conception of ‘Being-in-the-world’. 
111 That is as relevant, usable, graspable, meaningful, and practically navigable to Dasein. 
112 See Malpas (2008: 105-106) for an in-depth discussion of this. 
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From Husserl and Merleau-Ponty we gain an analysis of how our bodily 
phenomenology impacts on the way we perceive and conceive of space. Husserl 
makes clear that though we can conceive of space in terms divorced from our 
subjectivity and capacity for action, this conception of space is not reflective of 
how we ordinarily find ourselves engaged in a bodily way in the world. He 
writes: 
  
External space (der Aussenraum) is homogeneous, even though it 
presents itself as oriented in various ways … But the lived body and its 
bodily space breaks the homogeneity asunder. (Zur Phänomenologie der 
Intersubjekitivität: Book 1: 239).113 
 
This emphasis on space, as ordinarily experienced, being a primarily embodied 
space is also taken up and developed by Merleau-Ponty, who, writing against 
what he terms the ‘intellectualist’ (rationalist) approach of “spatialising space” 
and ‘empiricist’ conceptions of space as “spatialised” seeks to explore the way 
space is constructed in virtue of a subject’s embodiment and activities.114  
In doing so, Merleau-Ponty echoes and reinforces the contention of 
Husserl and Heidegger, that geometrical space is not reflective of how we 
ordinarily perceive, act within, and interact with space in a pre-reflective 
manner.115 Merleau-Ponty identifies and rejects the dichotomy drawn between 
these two modes of space as ‘spatialising’ and ‘spatialised’, stating that we 
cannot constrain our descriptions of space to a choice between one and the other. 
Instead, Merleau-Ponty argues that space is ordinarily presented to us as “lived 
space”. The ability to conceive of space as either spatialised or spatialising 
presupposes our experience of lived space.116 Sharing the approach of Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the way space is experienced is inextricably tied with 
our bodily phenomenology. Lived space is “a sensible, a meaningful relation 
                                                      
113 Translation by Casey (1997: 220). Also see Husserl (1989: 195-199) for his exploration of the 
lived body and the practical relation we have with the world in everyday activity. 
114 The former being a reduction of space to the relations between things, the latter evoking 
geometrical conceptions of space as Newtonian absolute space (see Merleau-Ponty 1962: 115-
116; Toadvine 2009: 97). 
115 “Geometrical space is space as thought rather than space as directly experienced. Geometry is 
the abstract mathematics of space. Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that it is in reflection rather than 
perception that I am presented with space as a single, indivisible whole” (Priest 1998: 103). 
116 See Toadvine (2009: 97) for an exploration of Merleau-Ponty’s argument. 
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formed between the body and its environment” (Toadvine 2009: 97-98). Our 
spaces are defined and experienced in terms of our embodiment and activities: 
things may appear near or far, as above or below, left or right according to the 
ways in which our body inhabits and “gears into” the world, creating this lived 
space (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 293-294).  
Phenomenological conceptions and understandings of space approach the 
ways in which we, as active agents in a meaningful world, are shaped by, and in 
turn shape, the way in which we engage with the world. A common thread 
throughout the writings discussed above is the way in which involvement in 
activity, or the ability to be involved in activity, reveals and carves up space for 
us. However, a question emerges about the extent to which we ought to view 
activity as centrally revelatory and constructive of space. Below, I turn to 
examine the way intersubjective interactions impact upon how we perceive 
space. When we take this seriously, we see that the spaces we occupy are fluid, 
and can be shaped by the interactions that take place within them. 
 Also, in considering Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of space we 
must be aware of different modes of activity and their roles in revealing space to 
us. Contemplating a sunset, making a table, walking at night, and writing an 
essay are very different activities that reveal spaces to us in differing ways. In 
these examples, space may be experienced as breathtakingly beautiful, as lonely, 
threatening, or work-like. Space can be expansive or claustrophobic, depending 
on our activities, our engagement with others, and our bodily phenomenology. 
When we begin to think more closely about the relation between spaces, activity 
and others, we begin to see that there are multiple ways of apprehending space, 
according to different layers of engagement and different levels of involvement.  
This is made more apparent when turning to examine the ways people 
may feel alienated from a sense of space as meaningful. Studies of schizophrenia 
(Blankenburg 2002; Minkowski 1970; Sass 2001; Sechehaye 1970) and 
depression (Ratcliffe 2009) illustrate the complicated nature of the ways in which 
space is experienced as meaningful for individuals.117 Whilst Heidegger situates 
his phenomenological analysis of space within the wider context of world as one 
                                                      
117 Examination of cases in which the meaningfulness of space fragments or distorts highlights 
the way in which lived space ordinarily provides a configuring and meaningful backdrop to 
interaction. See Chapters 6 and 7 for an exploration of distortions in the experience of space in 
schizophrenia and depression.  
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in which we are always ‘with’ others, there is not sufficient consideration of the 
ways in which others (either through joint activity, or simply just by the presence 
of others) shape the ways in which space is revealed. We must also account for 
the way in which others revise a sense of the spaces we occupy. I now turn to 
examine examples from Sartre that acknowledge the manner in which other 
people can morph the sense of the space we occupy. Space, under these 
examples, is dynamic.  
Sartre gives us a way into considering the dynamics of interpersonal 
space. In the sections that follow, using phenomenological examples, I draw out 
the ways in which space directs our interactions and reciprocally, the way our 
interactions cause an evolution in the way we perceive space. Space is revealed, 
not only as ‘lived’ and ‘intersubjective’, but dynamic and fluid in virtue of the 
intersubjective interactions it hosts.  
 
4.3 Phenomenological Space and Intersubjectivity 
 
The previous section explored how several writers in the 
phenomenological tradition seek to understand space and the relation the lived 
body has toward it. A common theme emphasised is practicality, and the ways 
that space is revealed to us in terms of our activities, projects and dealings with 
the world we find ourselves in. For Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, this must always 
be an embodied involvement, which structures and scaffolds how space appears 
to us.118 However, whilst attention is devoted to the ways the body scaffolds 
perception of space for individuals, there is not much exploration of how 
intersubjectivity affects the ways we inhabit, perceive, and make sense of the 
spaces we find ourselves interacting in. There is also the question of how 
intersubjective interactions impact on space we share with others. Heidegger 
does place the notion of shared world119 at the centre of his phenomenology. 
However, his account does not take into account how engagement with others 
can change the sense we have of ‘world’. For this reason, further development of 
the ways we find ourselves dynamically engaging with others in space, and how 
                                                      
118 I return to this theme in depth in Chapter 5, in which I synthesise discussion of the importance 
of space for relatedness, with that of embodiment, to offer a richer working picture of how 
relatedness between interlocutors is shaped and morphs through interaction with others. 
119 In his characterisations of Equipment and Mitsein (Being-with-others). 
147 
 
this impacts and shapes us, is needed. This is particularly important in 
accounting for relatedness and the dynamics of interaction.  
This is also the case within literature addressing interaction theory and 
participatory sense-making. Whilst both acknowledge that our interactions and 
exchanges with others are rooted within and informed by social situatedness, we 
need to go further and spell out how this situatedness impacts on our 
interactions.120 However, we saw in the introduction to this chapter that there has 
been a move away from conceiving of space as static, instead emphasising the 
fluidity and dynamic nature of inhabiting spaces. To arrive at a fuller 
understanding of how situatedness influences and contributes toward 
understanding others, we need to explore the way the spaces in which 
interactions take place shape interaction, and also how our interactions shape and 
override the spaces we interact within. To do so is to explore the non-static 
nature of being situated in social space, and can help to understand how spaces 
can be intersubjective. 
Examples of how spaces may be revealed and modified through others 
are to be found in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1958). The sketches of 
Pierre’s absence in the café (10-11), and of the encounter with the stranger on the 
park bench (254) both illustrate the manner in which expectations one has 
regarding others tacitly work to configure the way in which we perceive space. 
In the first example, which Sartre primarily uses to explore the ‘origin of 
negation’, a man waits for his friend, Pierre, to show up in a café.  
The expectation of the presence of Pierre is frustrated, revealing his 
absence as a tangible reality. The crowds of people huddled around tables, the 
noise they make, the activity bustling around the individual fade into the 
background, as Pierre’s absence looms to the fore. The space the individual 
occupies is given and constituted in terms of their expectation, namely the 
expectation of Pierre to either be there, or to arrive imminently. Extending the 
example, we might consider the way in which our awareness of the space around 
us is partly constituted by this expectation. The space becomes one of 
expectation in the light of the absent-other. Pierre’s absence and expected arrival 
serve to reveal the café in a whole new, non-neutral light. Each swing of the door 
                                                      
120 That is apart from acknowledging that they will help form the entry point into our interactions 
with others.  
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becomes salient: is it Pierre? Perhaps the activities you attempt to engage 
yourself in are shallow and do not ultimately win your attention. The newspaper 
becomes something to hide behind, perhaps to disguise the fact that you have 
been stood up. As Sartre writes, the café “slips into the background” (1958: 10), 
and elements of this background appear salient or otherwise in relation to the 
possibility of their revealing something of Pierre. In short, the affective feel of 
the space takes the quality of expectation or perhaps disappointment in virtue of 
the quality of relatedness, or lack thereof displayed in this example, one shares 
with another. The space is an intersubjective one despite the other person not 
being present, as their absence creates and shapes the affective backdrop to my 
waiting. 
In the case of the park bench, the realisation of the proximity of another 
agent brings on a radical shift in the felt-space as the walker realises that the 
spaces he has been moving through are for others, not just for himself; and so 
hold certain possibilities which might frustrate his own. Sartre describes this as a 
radical shift, or lurch in the way the world is constructed for the walker. This is a 
change in felt-possibility; for Sartre, the space comes to be experienced as 
belonging to the Other, with oneself as one of their objects.121  
Whilst this is a seemingly pessimistic view of how others frame our 
experience of space,122 there are certain points to be gained from such examples. 
First, phenomenological, intersubjective space is primarily an affective space, 
which serves to make elements within it salient. Secondly, the presence of others 
reveals spaces as normatively laden: there is an imposition on the actions we will 
deem acceptable or unacceptable; and these norms will frame our actions and the 
ways we will think about ourselves and others within that space. Thirdly, in these 
examples, spaces are dynamic in virtue of the varying degrees of relations we 
share with others in them: the café space is revealed as empty, or as containing 
                                                      
121 For Sartre, this experience is one which is necessarily bodily. It reveals a sense of myself as I 
appear, as a body, before the other. In the next chapter, I explore Sartre’s characterisation of 
intersubjectivity as both bodily and spatial. Whilst Sartre makes the important point of the 
inextricability of spatiality and bodily awareness in intersubjectivity, I claim he does not fully 
appreciate the ways in which spaces can be ‘ours’; and in which normativity regulates and shapes 
the way we inhabit spaces both alone and together. 
122 In focusing on how the other robs a sense of one’s possibility Sartre does not, for example, 
consider the ways in which others may open up a sense of possibilities in our space, or the ways 
in which we might see the space as ours, as for instance when we work together to achieve a 
joint-project. 
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an air of acceptance, the park appears as no longer ‘solely for myself’ in virtue of 
my relation to the others either within or absent from the scene. Again, this is at 
odds with the purely geometrical conceptions of space seen earlier. But we must 
ask how else space constrains and scaffolds a sense of relatedness. 
 
4.4 Space and Relatedness 
 
The examination of Sartre’s examples in the previous section is useful; 
through them we begin to see the ways in which others shape our perception of 
space. However, the examples explored are somewhat individualistic: they centre 
on the experience of individuals and do not take account of the way in which 
mutual interactions might effect revision of a sense of space. It now falls to us to 
draw the strands of the discussion together to shed light on the nature of 
interpersonal interactions, relatedness, and experience of space.  
In order to do this, an exploration of the ways in which we impact and are 
impacted by the spaces we pre-reflectively find ourselves in is needed. We saw 
that for Heidegger, space is an orienter: it forms a meaningful backdrop to 
activities, within which our actions make sense. However, going beyond this, I 
claim that space not only orients, but directs.  
The directive nature of space is particularly important when we come to 
account for elements that underpin and enable an evolving sense of relatedness to 
occur between interactants. The manner in which interactants are able to relate to 
others is dependent on the spaces in which they find themselves and the relation 
they take and develop towards this space.123 In this way, phenomenological space 
not only orients, but frames the scope and starting point of interaction: the spaces 
we interact within provide an appropriate ground basis, from which interaction 
will begin; and will also shape and modify the way in which the interaction, and 
sense of relatedness morphs and progresses. 
The previous paragraph identified two central roles space plays in 
interpersonal interaction: (1) it specifies appropriate grounds on which 
interaction may begin, and (2) it shapes ways that interaction may develop. Both 
                                                      
123 Another interesting line of inquiry, which I do not pursue here, is interaction that takes place 
in non-face-to-face contexts, through digital media or technology, and the extent to which we 
might still recognise space as a framing factor to our interactions. 
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of these points follow from the directionality of space, which impacts on 
intersubjective encounters. The sense one has of space involves at least the 
following inextricable elements: normativity, functionality, and affectivity. Each 
combine to make salient certain modes of – and possibilities for – behaviour, 
action, and interaction.  
We can see this more clearly with an example: imagine yourself in a 
church. In being sensitive to the space we occupy, being in the church 
immediately shapes our behaviour, and the possibilities of behaviour we deem 
appropriate are intimately related to the space we find ourselves within 
(normative directive): we would not run around and speak loudly, but adopt a 
respectful quietness which might show itself not only in the volume with which 
we speak or move, but may manifest itself in a slowing down of movement, or an 
increased feeling of stillness. The church-space, which is for worship, communal 
or private, personal reflection, or to aid a sense of peace, reinforces certain norms 
and standards of behaviour which together also signal and suggest an affective 
atmosphere, whether it be of spirituality, boredom, or stuffiness (functional and 
affective directives).  
This is not to say that we never refuse the claims that certain spaces place 
upon us. Staying with the church example, we might run around, be silly or 
conduct loud conversations. The interesting thing to note is the response this 
solicits in the people also sharing the space. If it is a child creating the 
disturbance, there is no doubt that they will pretty quickly and sharply be told off 
and to ‘behave properly’; if it is an adult, the individual will be showered with 
disapproving looks, or cause hostile shuffling and body language from the 
inhabitants of the church who are trying to concentrate on their own activities. 
The disturbance calls forth and tacitly solicits a shift in the body language and 
activity of the church occupants, reflecting disapproval. When the individual 
causing the disturbance feels this, it contributes tacitly to a reinstatement of the 
behavioural norms governing the space.  
Through this example it becomes easier to see the extent to which the 
space encapsulates normativity (an expectation of how one behaves in a church), 
functionality (what the church-space is appropriately used for) and affectivity 
(the mood governing the church is displaced and then restored after tacit body 
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signalling from disgruntled occupants of the church). We also see how these 
three elements are interrelated, and how they in turn reinforce one another. 
This example shows us the intersubjective nature of many spaces. Their 
continued identity relies on a continuation in invested meaning, by which, in 
acting a certain way in a specific space, we continue to construct and give life to 
the certain space’s identity (recall the notion of ‘performativity’ from Section 
4.1). Its identity and meaning are partially created through the exchanges we 
hold within them, which go on to reveal the space in a new light, and through the 
meaning we invest in them. However, as already mentioned, this is not a one-
way event. The invested meaning in that space becomes live, shaping and 
directing the way in which we conduct ourselves. In this way, space and 
interaction are entangled in a complex, symbiotic relationship. 
Space configures and makes salient certain courses or possibilities of 
action, whilst also affecting the way individuals express themselves bodily in 
relation to the space they occupy. The adoption of certain bodily demeanours 
impacts the way we will interact with others. If a friend approaches me in the 
church-space, we may be conscious that any conversation we have will disturb 
the sense, or atmosphere, of the space. In light of this, we may huddle close to 
talk, keeping our voices to a whisper, restrain any vigorous movements, and keep 
the conversation short. 
Lefebvre captures this sense of space as directive when he writes: “social 
space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and 
prohibiting yet others” (1991: 73). Phenomenological, intersubjective spaces 
reveal certain possibilities for behaviour, action, and intersubjectivity as salient, 
or appropriate, whilst actively cutting off and curtailing others. Another example 
helps clarify this further. Let us return to the library example of Chapter 3 and 
say more about how pre-suppositions that feed into understanding are often 
suggested by and encapsulated within the interactional spaces. In Chapter 3 I 
drew on the example of being in a library and running into a friend (p. 120); we 
saw that ‘in observing that my friend is not talking to me I might first consider 
that he is rude until I realise we are in a library, in which no one should talk.’ 
Instead the social norm pertaining to the space directs my understanding of the 
other, to the extent to which I think nothing of my friend’s silence. Entailed in 
recognition of our situation is a tacit presupposition that he cannot talk to me 
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because of library user norms: thus the pre-judgment is supplied both in relation 
to the functionality of the space and according to the social conventions 
governing the way we occupy the space.  
The functional and normative directives of the space reinforce and 
reference each other. They combine to create and add to the sense of the space: 
the functionality of a space (library used for work and research) is intimately 
related to and reinforced by the norms governing the space (quiet is maintained 
to facilitate this). In this case pre-judgements, related to the spaces we find 
ourselves in, are salience providers; they shape our understanding of others. 
Moreover, they dictate the terms on which my engagement with them should 
begin and progress, and specify certain types of appropriate behaviour. Chapter 3 
outlined how interaction begins with certain pre-judgements, which form a 
background against and through which our rudimentary understanding of others 
is constituted, which we see here are often suggested by the spaces we find 
ourselves interacting within. It is through the course of our interaction that these 
pre-judgements are revised, affirmed or abandoned through dynamic engagement 
with others.  
I have already suggested how a revision of pre-suppositions in the 
parochial, interactional sphere (between people) causes a revision in that of the 
global (the way in which I relate to the wider context-space I am situated within) 
(Chapter 3). So we see that though spaces offer normative and functional 
directives about how we ought to behave to others and the style in which we 
might interact with them, these are revised and abandoned, or reinforced, as the 
interaction gets going. In meeting a new colleague at a work party, we might at 
first be overly polite, attentive, routine in the questions we ask them, until the 
flow of our conversation and interaction takes over, allowing me to forget my 
stiff posture, or the fact that I want to make a good impression on them as we 
find genuine mutual enjoyment in the unfolding of our conversation. I might 
loosen my tie, and perch on a desk, forgetting the ‘formal’ work environment in 
which we interact. The sense of relatedness becomes closer, and is infused by my 
interest in the new person. In this way, our ongoing interaction in the parochial 
sphere overrides the formality that is initially suggested by the relation I have to 
my global sphere (the space I find myself in, imbued with significances of work 
etc).  
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Let us consider another example from Chapter 3. This time, imagine 
yourself in a café, meeting an old acquaintance over coffee. In settling down to 
meet them, we expect to make general chit-chat, or to catch up because that is 
what one does over coffee. Shouting insults at your coffee partner, on the other 
hand, is usually ruled out by what the social space demands or deems 
appropriate.124 However, we can identify a variety of ways in which we meet 
different types of people (old or long-lost friends, current friends, business 
meeting, date, social meeting between colleagues, and so on) in which different 
forms of behaviour are appropriate or inappropriate, and in which we may expect 
different things from our partner, depending on the existing level, quality, and 
type of relationship we share with the person we are meeting. 
Here we begin to see the different strata of background and pre-
judgments at play, which are fluid and change through my engagement with the 
other. As conversation progresses, I may realise that expectations I held of my 
partner are unwarranted. This revision of pre-suppositions is reincorporated into 
my general background conception of the other and our situation, and causes a 
modification in the way in which I approach or view my partner. This may in 
turn cause a modification in the way in which I perceive the space in which our 
interaction takes place.  
The point to be drawn from this is that the influence of space on 
interpersonal relations is not static, but dynamic, and in constant revision: whilst 
the spaces we occupy and find ourselves in suggest certain codes and standards 
of behaviour, the sense of our evolving relations can ultimately over-ride or 
morph the ways in which we perceive and relate to the spaces within which we 
find ourselves. In this way the directive elements of spaces that shape, suggest 
and curtail the possibilities of relating to others in various ways, are not 
insurmountable.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
124 In this way, if our friend annoys or angers us, we might bite a lip turning our anger inward in 
order to avoid ‘making a scene’. The norms of behaviour of the social space preclude airing out 
grievances and holding a public argument. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter I have sought to demonstrate that our experience 
of space, and the way in which interactions with others modify a sense of space, 
constitutes a distinctive and interesting, yet underexplored, experiential category. 
After looking at accounts of lived space from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I 
suggested that examining the ways in which space and experience of space are 
dynamic and intersubjective adds to our understanding of the way in which we 
perceive and inhabit ‘lived’ space. Furthermore, I suggested that examining 
intersubjective ‘phenomenological space’ has special relevance for, and may 
enhance, accounts of interaction and participatory sense-making, which, whilst 
acknowledging the importance of context, have not fully considered the ways in 
which spaces constrain and structure interaction. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
RELATEDNESS AND  
RECIPROCAL BODILY EXPRESSIVITY  
 
 
“In the relation between the body and the world,  
neither of the two is second … Thus, the pre- 
reflective body and pre-reflective world are  
united as in a dialogue.” (Van den Berg 1972: 58) 
 
 
Chapter 4 showed how relatedness is formed in part by the spaces we find 
ourselves in with others. Intersubjective, lived space shapes the way we 
apprehend ourselves and others and the way in which we will interact with them. 
The previous chapter also showed that lived space is dynamic: our apprehension 
of it, and others within it, changes all the time. The task remaining for this 
chapter is to understand how this occurs and in what ways it supports and shapes 
a sense of relatedness.  
In what follows, I argue that whilst intersubjective space provides an 
appropriate backdrop which shapes the way in which we engage with others, 
mutual bodily expressivity and resonance causes a transformation in the way in 
which space is perceived. Affective responsivity to others displayed through 
bodily interaction is central to developing a dynamic and changing sense of 
relatedness between interlocutors. Chapter 4 has already outlined the ways in 
which Husserl and Merleau-Ponty argue bodily phenomenology impacts on the 
way we perceive and conceive of space (see Chapter 4.2 (p.144ff)). However, in 
what follows, I want to emphasise the way in which space and bodily 
phenomenology impact each other to shape and modify a sense of relatedness; 
we see that intersubjective lived space and bodily responsivity to others are 
inextricably bound in creating and transforming a sense of relatedness.  
Bodily movement and expression must always be placed. Intersubjective 
space provides the appropriate grounds for bodily interaction. Yet the way in 
which we move, express, and comport ourselves toward others and the way in 
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which others resonate with our movements can cause a transformation in the way 
in which we perceive space.125 The initial sense interlocutors have of the space 
may change, or be reinforced, as bodily interaction between interlocutors gets 
going.  
In order to examine the inextricability of phenomenological space and 
bodily expressivity for relatedness, let us begin with two examples which have 
featured at varying points in this thesis. Example 1 is that of when working is 
disturbed in a public library, whilst example 2 is of two friends meeting to catch 
up in a coffee shop: 
 
Example 1: Library 
 
Imagine a library during exam and revision season. The various rooms in 
the library take on a particular intersubjective spatial feel. The space is related to 
the task at hand for many of its occupants: to be the site of last minute cramming 
and serious learning. In virtue of this, the library becomes an intense working 
environment. The orientation of each occupant of each filled chair is intensely 
focused in a way which is often missing in ordinary term-time. The silence is 
heightened to a background hum, which comes to the fore in absence of any 
other distracting noise. Although each student in this environment works 
individually, the space is, nevertheless, an intersubjective one. The closed off 
body language, the heightened and focused intent on the page in front of each 
person, allows them to form an individual world, which is, nevertheless, a shared 
one. All the individual workers form a collective according to their mutual goals: 
to do enough work to pass and do well in their exams.  
This implicit intersubjective and mutual characterisation of the newly 
defined library-space becomes clear as soon as an individual breaks the rule of 
the collective, by holding a conversation without whispering or trying to keep 
quiet. In breaking the unspoken rules of the intersubjective space, the social 
dynamic is changed. The library-workers emerge from their intensely focused 
work to exchange irritable glances with their fellow injured co-workers. When 
                                                      
125 As we saw in the church example of Chapter 4 (p.150). 
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the unspoken balance of the environment is disturbed, the people within the 
environment emerge as co-workers, as – taking a Heideggerian line of thought – 
the ready-to-hand feel to the space occupied is damaged. It is often swiftly 
restored however, when the bodily interaction between the injured parties 
suggests that the disruptive individual is unwelcome. Their body language 
becomes hostile and tense, and when it is noticed, the person who caused the 
disturbance ceases to be disruptive, and the working environment is restored. It is 
in this way that the actions and subsequently the interactions of individuals in the 
library combine to retain the sense of space as a working environment.  
In this example, we see how the intersubjective space demands certain 
things of the people within it. In the last chapter I referred to these as the 
normative constraints of the space. In this scenario, this is typified most clearly 
by the expectation to remain respectful of the quiet working environment. The 
normative constraints of the space demarcate an appropriate way which those 
within the space may, and may not, conduct themselves, and how they should 
interact with others: the prerogative is not to disturb the people around. This 
example explores what happens when someone gets this wrong or seeks to 
ignore the normative constraints of the space. The person who behaves 
disruptively causes a response which is manifest in the bodily comportment and 
expressivity of the co-workers. In this way, this example is one of bodily 
interactions which maintain and seek to restore the particular spatial feel once 
this has been disturbed. We see that the spaces we find ourselves within direct us 
to behave in certain ways, and the bodily interactions of people in that space may 
change or retain the sense we have of it. 
 
Example 2: Coffee Shop 
 
To make this even clearer, imagine the following situation first referred 
to in Chapter 3: you and a friend are in a coffee shop, meeting to catch up. At 
first, as the conversation gets going, our interactions are open, plodding and lazy, 
until the friend reveals that she has some news to share. The way the friend looks 
round the coffee shop to gauge where people are, the way she lowers her voice 
which gains a darker, more secretive edge, the way she leans into the table 
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towards me, the way she bites her lip and shields her mouth with her hand as she 
proceeds to whisper her secret to me all combine, both spontaneously and 
emblematically, to create a conspiratorial space between us, in which and to 
which I respond, in a similar manner.  
This, then sets the tone for a particular type of interpersonal interaction, 
and colours my understanding of what she communicates. Already, before the 
friend has started to verbalise her secret, I know it is serious. In recognising this 
affective content, I respond to it by reciprocating her bodily comportment, 
illustrating to her that I understand the seriousness of the communication. This 
encourages a shift in the particular interactive relation we share, which becomes 
one of confidant and confider.  
In this example, what is of interest is the relation between the changing 
phenomenological space inhabited by us both and the course of the type of 
relation we share. The spatial setting becomes the background for the verbal, 
overt communication and my understanding of what my friend will 
communicate. The space which we share, so recently tacitly defined as 
conspiratorial by our reciprocal bodily interactions, opens up a meaning. This 
colours not only what she will proceed to communicate with an air of urgency, 
but also the newly evolved relation we actually share.  
From these examples we see that bodily responsivity to one’s 
interlocutor’s bodily expressivity is important for establishing, maintaining, and 
modifying a sense of relatedness between us. Particularly in the second example, 
we see how sensitively responding to the bodily expressivity of one’s 
interlocutor serves to propel the development of both our interaction and our 
sense of relatedness. Taking the second example: we meet as friends yet, through 
the bodily interaction which follows, the sense of our relatedness changes as my 
interlocutor confides something to me. This changes the way in which I perceive 
the space about us. Whilst my friend and our conversation occupy my full 
attention, my awareness of elements of the space and things within it retreat to 
the background. I cease to notice the music or the awkward position of my chair 
as I become engrossed in our unfolding conversation.  
In this way, in the language of the hermeneutic account, events in the 
interactional, parochial sphere override and cause a change to the way in which I 
apprehend and understand the global sphere. A tacit recognition of emotional 
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responsivity as displayed through the body helps reconstitute a background 
dimension to our interactions, which I have referred to as intersubjective space. 
This sets the scene or adds a particular flavour to the direct, overt communication 
and interactions, which are then shaped by and contained within this space. In 
creating this space in which overt interaction begins and proceeds, gesturing 
tacitly sets up and guides the course that our interaction takes.  
 
 
5.1 The Inextricability of the Body  
and Interpersonal Understanding  
 
(a) Sartre and Young 
 
But how can we go about understanding this? Both Sartre (1958) and 
Young (2005) offer accounts of intersubjectivity which essentially involve 
embodiment and spatiality. What is more, their accounts reveal the different and 
diverse ways according to which this happens. Emphasis on the diversity of the 
transformation of space and bodily phenomenology is a positive element of these 
accounts. Ordinarily, others transform our sense of space in a myriad of ways. 
However, what they both recognise, but do not develop, is that our interactions 
and exchanges with others impact on the way in which space is apprehended. 
In this section, I first examine Sartre’s account of bodily intersubjectivity 
and then turn to Young. After this, we will be in a position to take their insights 
and offer an interpretation which I argue complements my account of how 
intersubjective space and bodily responsiveness to others informs and transforms 
a sense of relatedness between interlocutors.  
Sartre advances three main ways of Being:  
 
(1) In-itself  
(2) For-itself  
(3) For-Others (1958: 306ff) 
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The third mode of self-consciousness, as for-others, describes the 
interpersonal instances in which I am aware of myself as apprehended by others. 
This, for Sartre, always involves a bodily dimension. Perceiving and being 
perceived by another person is not, Sartre says, like apprehending the grass over 
there, or this table (1958: 257). When we perceive another person, we first and 
foremost encounter their transcendence. Sartre distinguishes between two types 
of being which he labels the in-itself (immanence) and for-itself (transcendence), 
and states these are at conflict in this particular interpersonal instance. In 
perceiving ourselves before the other, we feel an overwhelming sense of 
appearing to the other as a body, something that may be apprehended, and 
judged by them:  
 
[T]he Other accomplishes for us a function of which we are incapable 
and which nevertheless is incumbent on us: to see ourselves as we are. 
(Sartre 1958: 353-354)  
 
‘Looking at’ someone thus denies what Sartre would call their 
transcendence, reducing them, in the other’s eyes to the level of the in-itself or 
‘object’ (1958: 262-265). Sartre describes this phenomenon most vividly and 
famously in his example of the peeping Tom caught in the act. Prior to the arrival 
of the other, the voyeur, engrossed utterly in her activities does not retain a 
reflective awareness of herself. She exists and is bound up with her activities. It 
is only when she hears a creak on the stair and realises that someone else is 
present and witnessing her that the situation changes. Self-awareness floods the 
individual. In the presence of the other’s gaze, she sees herself as she is seen. 
The ‘flow’ of her activity is lost, and she becomes fixed in the light of the 
activity.126  Sartre writes:  
 
Shame reveals to me that I am this being, not in the mode of ‘was’ or of 
‘having to be’ but in-itself […] Once more the nihilating escape of the 
for-itself is fixed, once more the in-itself closes in upon the for-itself … 
                                                      
126 Sartre states that involved in this moment is “recognition … that I am as the other sees me.” 
(1958: 222) 
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Thus for the Other, I have stripped myself of my transcendence. (1958: 
262) 
 
Encapsulated within this is the idea that my body is available to be looked 
at by the other, as a material object. For Sartre, this gives the other a power over 
me. Through their gaze I am reminded of the materiality of my body. Their gaze, 
in revealing this aspect of myself, objectifies me and ‘fixes’ my sense of my own 
possibilities. Sartre describes this process as involving feeling oneself as 
spatialised: “The Other’s look” he writes “confers spatiality on me. To 
apprehend oneself as looked-at is to apprehend oneself as a spatialising-
spatialised” (1958: 266).  That is, the structure of ‘being-seen-by-the-other’ is 
one of alienation: the individual is alienated from a sense of their transcendence, 
as one for whom things within space afford certain possibilities (spatialising). 
Instead, in being-looked-at, one experiences oneself as one is, there, in that 
moment as one appears to the other. The effect of this is objectification (the 
person is ‘spatialised’). In this way, bodily phenomenology, especially as 
revealed through being-for-others, is inextricably linked to changes in how 
spatiality is experienced and structured. Sartre describes this in the already 
discussed example of apprehending the man on the park bench (Sartre 1958: 
254-255; Chapter 4.3).  
Sartre is careful to note that looking-at and being-looked-at always 
happens in situation (1958: 344).127 What is more, the relationship between the 
body and situation is interestingly developed, and complements the account of 
direct perception supported by Gallagher and De Jaegher (see Chapter 2).128 
Chapter 4 already explored examples from Being and Nothingness in which the 
presence and absence of people configure and change a sense of the space we 
occupy (see Chapter 4, p.147-148). Through the illustrations of Pierre waiting for 
his friend in the café and the example of the man in the park, Sartre raised the 
                                                      
127 “The other is originally given to me as a body in situation” (Sartre 1958: 344) 
128 I will not go into this issue here, since it falls outside of the remit of this chapter. See Sartre 
1958: 346-347 (“In itself a clenched fist is nothing and means nothing. But we also never 
perceive a clenched fist. We perceive a man in a certain situation who clenches his fist. This 
meaningful act considered in connection with the past and with possibilities and understood in 
terms of the synthetic totality ‘body in situation’ is the anger. It refers to nothing other than to 
actions in the world (to strike, to insult, etc); that is, to new meaningful attitudes of the body” 
(Sartre 1958: 347). 
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issue of how the presence, absence, or expectation of others is transformative of 
space. Analysing the example of the man on the bench,129 Sartre writes: 
 
We are dealing with a relation which is without parts, given at one stroke, 
inside of which there unfolds a spatiality which is not my spatiality; for 
instead of a grouping towards me of the objects, there is now an 
orientation which flees from me. (1958: 254) 
 
Involved in apprehending others, for Sartre, is a felt change of possibility. 
Those things which appeared as objects in relation to me now appear in relation 
to another. What is more, the other’s presence (transcendence) raises the 
possibility of myself being apprehended as an object for him. In this way, the 
subjective constitution of my immediate environment “regroups” (1958: 255), 
and is experienced as for the other: 
 
[T]here is a total space which is grouped around the Other, and this space 
is made with my space; there is a regrouping in which I take part but 
which escapes me, a regrouping of all the objects which people my 
universe. (Sartre 1958: 255) 
 
 In the passage which follows this, Sartre describes how apprehending this man 
on the park bench entails a disintegration of the space around him and the objects 
which appear in that space. This disintegration is the result of a realisation that 
objects within the space serve both his possibilities and my own. Whilst Sartre 
here describes a kind of intersubjective space, it is one in which the presence of 
the other impinges upon me. For Sartre, there is a sense in which, rather than the 
space being shared, the other robs it of possibilities for me. One experiences 
space as belonging to the other person, rather than in a shared manner, as ours.  
Sartre’s description of intercorporeality and the sense of spatiality which 
this involves certainly constitutes a particular type of intersubjective, bodily 
interaction, one which provides the ground for the mutual objectification of the 
gaze (Sartre 1958: 285ff). Feeling an awareness of our bodily nature is, for 
                                                      
129 See Chapter 4 (p.148), for a description of this. 
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Sartre, an obstacle to feeling the full power of one’s subjectivity in 
intersubjective situations. It makes one vulnerable, and capable of being 
objectified. As Sartre puts it, in these instances: “I exist for myself as a body 
known by the Other” (Sartre 1958: 351). It is from this that a negative claim may 
be extracted. Namely, that in interaction with others, I am first perceived as a 
body-object. Or rather, on feeling somebody observing me, I become aware of 
myself primarily as a body-object before them (1958: 351ff).  
The central tenet of Sartre’s point is taken up by Iris Marion Young in her 
characterisation of female bodily existence and comportment in her essay 
Throwing Like a Girl (2005). Although Young by no means generalises her 
account over the whole of female experience, she identifies similar negative 
consequences of embodied intersubjective interactions. Drawing heavily on De 
Beauvoir’s distinction between transcendence and immanence (1972: 608ff) she 
goes a step further than Sartre. She not only shows how the body may be a 
source of objectification. Young, following De Beauvoir, details how women 
come to hold a particular feminine bodily carriage and comportment (2005: 31-
34). She locates this in a tension between viewing oneself through another’s eyes 
(as something or someone to be looked at) whilst feeling one’s transcendence as 
a subject.  
At the heart of her claim is the Beauvoirian tenet that female body 
experience is dualistic in nature: there is an experience of oneself as subject, 
transcending, but also as body-object, transcended (Young 2005: 32). As with 
Sartre, there is the idea of the body being the object of the other’s gaze. In being 
looked at, one’s transcendence is reduced. Young argues that girls are 
encouraged to view their body as something to be adorned, admired, and 
ultimately looked at. Their bodily comportment comes to reflect this expectation, 
and the dualism between transcendence and immanence is propagated. In this 
way, Young identifies female existence as “ambiguous transcendence” (2005: 
36). This describes the way in which women are more clearly aware of both their 
immanence, in virtue of being embodied, as well as transcendence, as a subject 
(2005: 30-32).   
This tension in felt bodily experience affects bodily comportment and 
expression. Young argues that this in turn reinforces the 
transcendence/immanence dualism that she identifies as inherent in female 
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bodily experience. Importantly, this categorises a particular aspect of embodied 
intersubjective exchanges, one which is particularly objectifying. Young does not 
take all our exchanges with others to reflect this form. Instead, she identifies how 
internalising an awareness of one’s body as it is visible to others affects the way 
we move, act, and interact. In this way, exchanges with others reveal our bodily 
nature more clearly to ourselves. They encourage us to take and engage with the 
other’s perspective on ourselves.130 Whilst Young moves on to examine how this 
perception, both of women of their bodies in this way and by others who view 
women in this way, leads to discrimination and oppression, I do not consider 
such claims here, as they fall beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
(b) Criticisms of Sartre and Young 
 
Both Young and Sartre identify a particular phenomenological, 
predominantly visual occurrence in their writing. But does this reflexive and 
largely pessimistic conception of the role of embodiment encompass everyday 
understanding? I think not. Instead, we may view their characterisations of 
intersubjective bodily phenomenology as indicative of a particular type of 
interpersonal embodiment, which is by no means the primary way in which we 
interact with and meet others.  
Whilst Sartre and Young provide accounts of one mode in which we are 
aware of our body in relation to others, this is arguably the exception rather than 
the rule. How, for example, do their accounts fit in with the idea that there is a 
kind of reciprocal attunement between people which often is expressed, or even 
constituted, by tacit bodily orientation? The discrepancy between everyday 
experience and their accounts of interpersonal bodily interactions may reside in 
the importance given to largely visual modes of engagement with others. Both 
Sartre’s and Young’s accounts turn on apprehending myself looked at by 
another.131 Feelings of my own subjectivity are frozen through the gaze, actual or 
internalised, of others. However, the acts of looking described in Sartre’s and 
                                                      
130 This need not always be a negative occurrence as Sartre describes. It may, instead, underlie 
our ability to adopt a perspective and engage with perspectives which are not our own. 
131 Much of what Sartre says holds also for other sense-modalities (e.g. hearing, smelling). 
However, the point still remains that his discussion of bodily intersubjectivity is rather static and 
does not adequately account for interaction. 
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Young’s examples are static. There is the person doing the looking (the other) 
and the person being looked at (myself). This, however, is not often the case: 
Sartre goes on to describe how rather than be objectified by the gaze of the other, 
we may ‘out-look’ them, so to speak, and thus engage in a battle to objectify the 
other and retain a sense of one’s own subjectivity (1958: 255ff). Whilst Sartre 
has begun to account for interaction, his account remains one that is 
predominantly pessimistic. In Sartre’s account the other, and their awareness of 
oneself, is characterised as encroaching upon one’s freedom. As such, Sartre’s 
account struggles to cope with cases in which such interaction is necessary to 
achieve a shared goal. It lacks the interactive mutuality referred to in Chapter 3.   
 As already stated, despite the fact that Sartre and Young legitimately 
describe one type of intersubjective experience, it is highly debatable whether 
this description fits intersubjective interactions as a whole. In light of this, we 
need to distinguish strong and weak claims. The strong claim states that all 
intersubjective embodied interactions take the form Sartre and Young describe. 
The weak claim states that this accounts for only a particular kind of interaction 
with others. Whilst the weak claim is supportable, the strong claim is not.132 It 
simply does not resonate with most of our experience of interaction with others. 
The strong claim misses out the heart of intersubjective experiences: that they are 
mutual interactions.  
I have already argued that at the heart of this mutuality is a two-way 
exchange (Chapter 3). It is the element of exchange which Sartre’s account, in 
particular, misses. It is possible, then, to identify two mischaracterisations 
inherent in Sartre’s descriptions of intersubjective embodied experience which 
undermine the validity of the strong claim. First, Sartre’s description is decidedly 
one-way. It fundamentally describes a static intersubjective experience. A 
consequence of this is that interaction is neglected in Sartre’s accounts.  
                                                      
132 It is important to emphasise that neither Sartre nor Young take their descriptions to be typical 
of all our interactions with others. Young’s account restricts itself to discriminative and 
objectifying instances of apprehending others. Sartre’s account takes the ‘battle’ of exerting one’s 
subjectivity over that of the other’s (through the gaze) to be in the background of our encounters 
with others. However, day-to-day interactions with others stabilise this in different ways. One 
way in which Sartre describes this stabilisation is in instances of bad faith, in which the person 
accepts their objectification. For an example of this, see Sartre’s example of the waiter (1958: 
59). 
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By claiming that we feel our body primarily as an object available to 
view, Sartre fundamentally miscategorises what it is to be present with and 
amongst others.133 Instead, Sartre’s view takes the exception rather than the rule 
and extends this as ‘ordinary’ experience.134 I do not experience myself 
ordinarily through the eyes of the other in normal, unproblematic situations as 
both subjective transcendence and at the same time as a body object. In 
delineating these two ways of experiencing ourselves, we commit a descriptive 
error.  
Secondly, Sartre neglects to account for the positive ways in which others 
transform a sense of my spatiality through interactive engagement; the impact 
this has on his conception of intersubjectivity leads him to neglect a genuinely 
shared sense of space as intersubjective; and the way in which sharing 
experiences or attending to something together can impact on the way in which 
space is apprehended. This flows from and feeds into his account of bodily 
intersubjectivity as a phenomenon in which we experience ourselves primarily as 
looked-at and objectified.  
This becomes clearer after a brief examination of what Starwarska (2006) 
has to offer on the subject of embodied intersubjectivity. Whilst Sartre neglects 
to look at the shared quality of relations, Starwarska argues these are central to 
interaction and are constituted largely by patterns of bodily expressivity and 
shared attention (2006: 24-25). Sartre, with his emphasis on the body as 
uncomfortably salient in our interactions with others, neglects to describe or 
account for how features of embodiment add to interaction. This focus neglects 
an examination of how social attunement is shaped. The salient point for the 
present is that the absence of these elements is detrimental to Sartre’s account.  
Whilst Young’s claims are restricted to cases of discriminative judgements 
that have been generalised and absorbed into bodily comportment, Sartre’s 
description claims to be of our general intersubjective experience. However, 
Sartre’s account of our apprehension of others fails to capture mutual-interaction. 
As a result of this, Sartre’s account appears stilted. It does not capture the 
                                                      
133 Or as a member of a community. There is not much consideration of situations in which my 
interlocutor and I are working toward a common goal in Being and Nothingness. 
134 This is Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Sartre. See Merleau-Ponty 1962: 412. 
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dynamic ‘to-ing’ and ‘fro-ing’ movement of mutual interaction.135 Instead, his 
account is more concerned with what it is to observe and be observed by others.  
We saw in Chapter 2 that there is a large difference between observing 
another and interacting with them. As Reddy states, this is the difference 
between witnessing and receiving a gesture. Receiving and reacting to the 
gestures and embodied comportment of others involves openness to them.  
Chapter 3 showed that understanding others through interaction requires 
the interlocutors to be open to revising their presuppositions, both of the situation 
and of their interlocutor. In some situations (such as discriminative situations 
etc.) there is a denial or unwillingness to revise these presuppositions. This 
denial leads to stultification in the process of mutual understanding. Instead, 
one’s own position and understanding is championed; understanding becomes 
more one sided. Something similar appears to be the case in Sartre’s account of 
the mutual objectification of interlocutors. Here, interactants engage in a 
dynamic in which each attempts to assert their transcendence over the other. In 
doing so, each person feels herself to be a body-object under the other’s gaze 
(objectification). The other reveals to me my own bodily nature. In this case, I 
am not open to the positive possibilities that the other brings to me. Their 
presence is felt as a limitation to my own transcendence.  
For this reason, as we have seen, whilst Sartre sketches an interesting 
account of intersubjective dynamics it is by no means typical of our everyday 
interactions. In most ordinary interactive situations a degree of openness and 
mutuality is usually to be found.136 Further, in such interactions, the body is not 
experienced as objectified or as a potential source of objectification. Instead, 
bodily awareness often retreats to the background of the situation, and we fail to 
notice it at all.137  
                                                      
135 We saw examples of interaction which involves dynamic to-ing and fro-ing in the coastal 
walking scenario of Chapter 3 (see pp. 125-126). 
136 Chapter 3 emphasised the importance of openness, as a readiness to communicate and interact 
with one’s interlocutor and to accommodate the views and opinions of others which might differ 
from one’s own. 
137 Unless our exchange is about our body or implicates it in some way: for example, someone 
asking their friend if their clothes fit them properly, or explaining an illness or injury. Another 
example might be if there is something unusual about my body which draws my interlocutor’s 
attention, such as a plaster cast on my leg, a mark on my nose, or a scar. In these cases, it might 
be difficult for ‘normal’ patterns of interaction to progress as I feel self-conscious since the other 
keeps staring at my nose or scar. The interactional dynamic might only become comfortable 
again once I’ve acknowledged the reason for my scar, or asked the person why they keep staring 
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Embodied expressivity also encourages this mutual, two-way interaction in 
multiple ways. Starwarska makes the central point that in intersubjective 
instances, we often share mutual gaze (2006). This, she remarks, can never be 
successfully described as two people each individually looking at the other. The 
fact that the gaze is shared implies the centrality of the other. It recognises this 
centrality of the other in virtue of it being mutual. The gaze incorporates a tacit 
looping which she calls “double sight” (2006: 23ff). That is, in the gaze we are 
confronted not just by someone looking at us, but the mutuality of our relation: in 
gazing at each other, interlocutors are aware of sharing each others’ attention, as 
we grasp that we see each other. It is not that X looks at Y and then Y looks back 
at X in a uni-directional manner. Instead, when the gaze is mutual, it leads to an 
interactional pattern in which I look at you, aware that you are looking at me, and 
we attend to each other through this relation. This mutuality of the shared gaze 
becomes an axis on which the engagement takes place. Through this, 
relationships are maintained and accounted for. As Starwarska states: 
 
[W]e need to distinguish between social observation where two partners 
observe each other, from social relationship, where two partners mutually 
engage each other … it is the latter type only that exhibits reciprocity and 
realises the dual relation of seeing and being seen that Merleau-Ponty 
attributed to reversibility. (2006: 25) 
 
It is this which Sartre fails capture.  
 
5.2 The Inextricability of Body and Space for Relatedness: 
Body Dialogue  
 
Sartre and Young have provided some ways in which we might account 
for the relation between intercorporeality and interspatiality. However, they 
cannot offer us a ‘full story’. Spaces may be disclosed to us in many ways, be it 
                                                                                                                                                  
at my nose. However, these instances are more unusual, and though mutual interaction is 
somewhat stilted, there is still an openness to my interlocutor which shapes the nature of our 
interaction. 
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as aesthetically stunning, spiritually moving, invasive, enclosed, boundless, and 
so on. What is more, others transform the sense we have of space in multiple 
different ways. Apprehensions of spaces change their ‘feel’ depending on when I 
am in them, or how I am feeling at the time. Or, depending on who I am with, the 
way in which I relate to and am aware of intersubjective spaces is modified and 
shaped by my particular interactive patterns with my interlocutors. 
Experiencing a sunset from a mountain top on my own is different from 
experiencing it with someone else. The mere presence of another is enough to 
change the phenomenal quality of the space. It might be the detection of the 
other’s awe, or their appreciation of the beauty that enhances my particular 
experience, or we may exchange a few words that add or detract from the scene. 
Conversely, they may display impatience on a silent level which affects my own 
relation both to the sunset event and to my partner within the scene. As their 
impatience is manifest, I may react subtly to them with annoyance, or suddenly 
become aware that I’ve been lingering too long. In each case, the presence of the 
other, and the manifestation of bodily expressivity, changes the way in which I 
view the space, and the other person. 
This is supported by accounts in neuroscientific studies which examine 
behavioural synchronisation in conversational interaction (see Rotondo and 
Boker 2002). Such studies observe the prevalence of mirroring the posture of 
one’s conversational partner and seek to explore how and why. Hypothesised 
reasons for this mirroring include: (1) that it enhances an ability to simulate or 
evoke the mental state of the other; (2) that it forms an attempt “to express 
agreement or empathy” (Boker and Rotondo 2002: 164). In a separate article, 
Rotondo and Boker state that such mirroring may “benefit … the continuity of 
the conversation”, apart from in instances where it is seen as malicious 
mimicking (Rotondo and Boker 2002: 151).  
In what follows, I will not pursue the question concerning how we do 
this, but I will ask what effect this mirroring and matching has on a sense of (1) 
the spaces within which we find ourselves, and (2) intersubjective relatedness, 
with others. I shall defend the positive thesis that bodily responsiveness to the 
bodily postures and expressivity of others (which is a different phenomenon to 
mirroring as we shall soon see) causes transformations in the sense of relatedness 
we have toward our interlocutors. This might serve to ‘bring us closer’ or it 
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might shut down or frustrate a taken for granted sense of relatedness, depending 
on how one reacts to the expressivity of others.  
We saw this in the two examples in the opening of this chapter. In the 
first example of the exchange in the library, the conduct of a disruptive person 
causes a collective, bodily response of frustration from other workers in the 
library. Their bodily response to the behaviour of the disruptive person leads the 
disruptive person to change their behaviour. The second example of the coffee 
shop displayed the way in which a sense of relatedness between interlocutors 
develops, becoming more intense as their interaction progresses. Here we saw 
that the bodily expressivity of one evokes bodily expressivity in the other which 
allows the interaction to progress and which newly defines the quality of the 
relatedness between the interlocutors (who take on and play out roles of 
confidant and confider). There is an appropriate resonance in the way the two 
relate to each other through patterns of bodily expressivity. 
In order to conceptualise this and understand what is happening here, it 
helps to develop a notion of ‘body dialogue’. The concept of body dialogue 
attempts to capture the pre-reflective occurrence of bodies ‘speaking’, 
resonating, and relating to each other in interaction. Chapter 2 explored 
Gallagher’s view that ordinarily in interpersonal understanding we directly 
perceive the other person’s emotions, states, or intentions in their bodily 
expression (p.93ff). When I encounter someone, I encounter them as a being 
whose anger, joy, boredom, tiredness, excitement, and so on is expressed tacitly 
through their body position, gesture, and orientation. Such bodily expression may 
or may not accompany verbalisation. By and large, it directly conveys affective 
understanding to the person’s interlocutors. However, the important point to note 
in this section is that in doing so, their bodily expressivity pre-reflectively solicits 
a reaction from their interlocutor. 
Consider a simple example from day-to-day life: that of how we often 
know how our friends are feeling by glancing at them. For example, it is easy for 
my friends to see when I have a headache. Without explicitly telling them, I 
appear sluggish, taciturn. I pinch my temples, close my eyes and talk at a lower 
volume and pitch. All these jointly convey silently to them that I am ‘not 
myself’. My bodily orientation, which suggests I am suffering, solicits a bodily 
response in my friend. Maybe they, in turn, frown with worry and turn toward 
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me before asking whether everything is ok. This low-key bodily responsiveness 
sets a tone of concern through which the consequent communication is tempered. 
This is why I label this phenomenon body dialogue. An individual bodily display 
that affectively communicates something about how I am solicits, and is met by, 
a bodily response from my partner. The evolving reciprocality between us 
constitutes a dialogue of embodied responses. ‘Body dialogue’ signifies the pre-
reflective interactions of affective bodily expression that interlocutors invariably 
show when communicating. This reciprocal bodily expressivity helps to establish 
instances of affective resonance and attunement between people. The effect of 
this is to draw interlocutors into inhabiting a personal relation. 
 Body dialogue may be formalised, such as in the case of sign languages, 
or stock emblematic gestures and responses.138 Or it may be the small scale, for 
example resting one’s forehead sorrowfully in one’s hand may be countered by a 
friend’s squeezing the other hand. Such gestures are without verbalisations yet 
convey an affective meaning to those involved. As Fuchs observes:  
 
[W]e understand the gestures and facial expression of others immediately 
but cannot tell from which details; through the sounds of their voices, 
turning into carriers of meaning, we understand what they want to say, 
Moreover, there is an implicit resonance between their expressions and 
our own bodily reactions. (2005: 98) 
 
This is another point to notice. Body dialogue is not constructed out of 
individual instances of bodily expressivity. Rather in non-problematic interaction 
it is perceived holistically. The elements of my bodily animation and orientation 
combine to create this dialogue with another. It is not the case that a smile plus 
an excited hand movement plus a light tone to the voice equal happiness. I do 
not usually need to infer that my interaction partner is happy by noticing all the 
individual features. Rather the features combine to present the other with 
happiness. Also, the affective responses between my partner and myself shape 
                                                      
138 See Goldin-Meadows who draws a distinction between ‘spontaneous’ and ‘emblematic’ 
gestures (2000). Spontaneous gestures are those we tacitly engage in to add to or emphasise 
certain features of overt communication. Emblematic gestures, on the other hand, carry meaning 
alone and are often culturally recognisable symbols which convey something in particular. For 
example, blowing a kiss or saluting would be examples of emblematic gestures.  
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the course and development of subsequent interaction, which leads to a 
development and sustaining of a particular relation. The dialogue between bodies 
may, then, either reinforce the happiness, or quash it. If I find myself 
automatically smiling back, it reinforces the happiness of the happy person, and 
creates a background and interactive space of mutual contentment, or happiness. 
It is this affective resonance of interlocutors that is the key occurrence in bodily 
dialogue. The gestures of both parties pre-reflectively speak to each other, and in 
doing so, encourage development of a personal relation to be adopted towards 
the other. It is the affective dimension, manifest through gesture and bodily 
expressivity, which I am affected by and which solicits an emotional response. It 
modifies the relation we share with the other.139  
Affective responsiveness to others is often central to defining the type of 
relation engaged in, as we saw in the examples which opened the chapter. This is 
illustrated when we consult accounts from psychopathology, in which a normal 
intercorporeality cannot be established in cases such as schizophrenia (see Fuchs 
2005a) and in forms of facial paralysis such as the Möbius syndrome and 
Parkinson’s disease (see Cole 1999). In these cases, a normal tacit bodily 
responsiveness is compromised in varying degrees, leading to alienation. This is 
alienation both from the lived body (as bodily transparency is lost), and due to 
the inability to affectively respond to any interlocutors, from others. In these 
cases, this inability to affectively express oneself through the body makes it 
difficult to inhabit and develop a personal relation with others. Through 
examination of such cases the centrality of being able to engage in an affective 
body dialogue is highlighted.140  
The effect of body dialogue is not only to transform the sense of 
relatedness between individuals, but also to revise a sense of the space that we 
find ourselves within. A sense of space is inextricable from one’s bodily 
experience. Changes to bodily experience alter one’s experience of space. We 
have already seen how, for Sartre, shame involves changes both to lived space 
                                                      
139 This might be for the better or worse. As our interaction progresses and my interlocutor’s 
stance conveys that they are engrossed and engaged in the conversation we are sharing, it might 
lead to a deepening and intensification of the sense of relatedness I feel with them. I might feel 
closer, more willing to confide. On the other hand, my interlocutor might appear disinterested, 
leading to a dislocation and distance between us. 
140 Chapter 7 examines the effect which changes to cenesthesia and bodily phenomenology in 
depression have on body dialogue and intersubjective understanding. 
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and a sense of one’s own bodily feeling.141 We might also take the further 
example of two bored primary school children sitting at the back of a school 
assembly.  
Looking around the hall, in their boredom, they might notice each other 
sighing, slouching in their chairs, or looking around the hall for something 
interesting to fix their attention on. They might, recognising each other’s 
boredom, catch each other’s eye and begin to pull silly faces, or perform silent 
impressions mimicking and mocking the gestures of the speaker. In giving each 
other silent attention, and continuing the game of mimicking, each eggs the other 
on, transforming the sense of boredom in to amusement, and causing silent 
giggles through their body dialogue. The way in which the assembly hall is now 
experienced changes. Instead of looking around for something to interest and 
dispel the boredom, the hall, and those within it, are objects of amusement. 
Teachers dotted about the place are now those to evade. The structure of the 
space is apprehended through the structure of the game: to amuse each other 
without being caught and told off. In this way, the bodily expressivity of one is 
reciprocated by the other, and the body dialogue which continues causes a 
transformation of the way the space and activity before them is perceived.  
 Accounting for the relationship between reciprocal bodily expressivity 
and phenomenological, intersubjective space helps to flesh out the two spheres 
account. We see that whilst the global sphere informs the way we begin 
interacting with another, our bodily interactions (body dialogue) in the parochial, 
interactive sphere cause a revision of the way in which we originally understand 
or apprehend our situatedness (global sphere). The mutual revision of both 
spheres fuels understanding of, and transforms a sense of relatedness to, my 
interlocutor. I further address the interconnectedness of bodily and spatial 
experience further in Chapter 7, when I turn to Merleau-Ponty and consider how 
depression changes an apprehension of both bodily possibilities and space. 
 
 
 
                                                      
141 Sartre describes this as “an immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot” 
(1958: 222). 
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
Building on Chapter 4, this chapter has demonstrated the ways in which 
space and bodily expressivity are inextricable in a sense of relatedness. 
Relatedness is a dynamic and affective quality which is, in Starwarska’s words, 
an “unmediated awareness of being in the presence of another person” (2006: 
20).  
The preceding chapters have shown how relatedness is not a static 
feeling. Instead, there are degrees of relatedness and alienation which we may 
experience with regard to other people. The degree and quality of this relatedness 
changes throughout our interaction with others; this may be for the better or 
worse. The sense of relatedness one feels toward a partner, close friend or parent 
is radically different to that we feel towards a stranger on the street, or images of 
people we see in famine appeals. Common to all of these is the sense we have of 
the others involved as people (and therefore as people who hold possibilities for 
me, who I may understand, and who may be interacted with).  
However, the degree of this relatedness and the sense of them as a person 
vary widely. When I look at my mother, I know the woman in a rich sense: her 
likes, dislikes, talents and weaknesses, and when I engage with her I bring our 
shared history and knowledge of each other’s personality to our engagement. 
Something very different happens when I am paying for my shopping in a rush 
after having a bad day. The person behind the till performs a functional role for 
me, and our encounter at the end of the long day might not involve the 
pleasantries one would ordinarily wish to bestow on another human being. In 
both instances I apprehend both my mother and the shop assistant as people who 
I share a relation with; though the type and nature of this relation are very 
different in both cases. The relatedness which marks my interaction with them 
shapes the way I will interact with and initially understand them (and also what I 
might expect from them).  
In this way, a sense of relatedness marks our sense of others as people 
that may be interacted with. At the same time, interacting with others transforms 
this sense of relatedness. For example, when walking down the street in a crowd, 
when all is well I do not doubt that those around me have personhood. However, 
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the experience of a sense of their personhood is not in the foreground of my 
attention; it retreats into the background as I navigate my way through the forest 
of bodies trying to get to wherever I am going on time.  
But what happens when something disrupts this? Imagine being in this 
crowd, when, out of the corner of your eye, you see someone trip, fall, and hurt 
themselves in the process. In the event of this happening, you might suspend 
your worry about getting to wherever it is you are going, and rush over toward 
the other, who was so recently an anonymous face in the crowd. Instead, your 
awareness of them and their predicament comes to the fore, and your sense of 
them as someone who is in pain and needing assistance overrides current 
concerns. Their dazed look, as they grit their teeth in pain, leads you to kneel 
down to ask in a gentle voice whether they are okay and what is wrong. Your 
response to them, if accepted, sets a scene of concern through which they 
respond. The interaction might only last two minutes, as you assure yourself that 
they are okay, that they can stand, and that they are not concussed; after which 
you might go your separate ways, and the event retreats to the background and 
falls out of mind as you once again navigate your way through the streets. 
We have seen how intersubjective apprehension of spaces shapes the way 
in which we enter into interaction with others in an ‘appropriate’ manner. As 
interaction progresses, so does our sense of relatedness to our interlocutor. 
Whilst apprehension of our space forms the way we enter into interaction with 
others, a bodily responsivity to the bodily expressivity of others in interaction 
may often override or transform this sense of space. In doing so, reciprocal 
bodily expressivity, which I called body dialogue, often fuels our interaction in 
the parochial sphere with others, and causes change in the way space is 
apprehended. This in turn often reshapes the way we continue to interact with 
others. In this way, spatiality and bodily interaction are core in driving and 
forming a sense of relatedness and in subsequently developing, impoverishing, or 
changing it, depending on the nature of the patterns of interaction I engage in 
with my interlocutor.  
So far we have explored the dynamic manner in which situation in the 
global sphere and interaction in the parochial sphere cause a revision in 
presuppositions which further interpersonal interaction (Chapter 3). Once we had 
examined this in Chapter 3, we moved on to explore more fully what constitutes 
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and changes a sense of relatedness. In doing so, we considered the roles which 
lived, intersubjective space plays in scaffolding our relations (Chapter 4); and 
subsequently the role which embodied expressivity – which is sensitive and 
resonates with that of my interaction partner – plays in transforming the feeling 
or quality of that relatedness (Chapter 5).  
In the two chapters which follow, I take a different tack and explore the 
nature of interpersonal understanding and intersubjectivity when a sense of 
interpersonal relatedness fragments, breaks down, or disappears altogether. In 
order to do so, I explore the nature of intersubjectivity in schizophrenia (Chapter 
6) and depression (Chapter 7). Both chapters reveal that central to the ability to 
understand the other is first the ability to perceive her as a person, and one whom 
I can affect and be affected by. These are abilities which are taken for granted in 
normal and unproblematic understanding. However, when a sense of relatedness 
with others fragments, we see this has serious ramifications for interpersonal 
understanding. 
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PART 3 
 
Alienation: 
Understanding the 
Varieties of Alienation  
in Psychopathology 
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Part 2 focused on the elements contributing to a healthy sense of 
relatedness between interlocutors. Part 3 turns to examine instances of alienation. 
Doing so offers a useful illustrative counterpoint to material covered in Part 2. 
Through an examination of instances of breakdowns in intersubjectivity, the 
‘normal’ conditions of intersubjectivity are highlighted and made salient. 
Examination of atypical experiences serves to reveal what we ordinarily take for 
granted in ‘everyday’ intersubjectivity, both in philosophical exploration and in 
everyday life. As David Karp remarks: 
 
Severe illness, because it so disrupts relationships, illustrates the tenuous 
nature of everyday life, and highlights the taken-for-granted, normally 
invisible boundaries of social relationships. (1996: 162)  
 
 In what follows I seek to explore the ways in which a sense of relatedness 
and interpersonal understanding are disturbed in schizophrenia (Chapter 6) and 
depression (Chapter 7). Doing so reveals the centrality of a sense of relatedness 
for normal social cognition. Across both chapters, I focus on changes to how one 
experiences one’s body and lived spatiality during schizophrenia and depression. 
I also explore the manner in which these changes impact on our sense of others 
as people who offer possibilities for meaningful interaction. The study of 
schizophrenia and depression present different instances in which a basic sense 
of relatedness to others is disturbed. This reveals the centrality of a sense of 
relatedness – and the way in which this is constructed – for healthy 
intersubjectivity and interpersonal understanding; and for an unproblematic 
apprehension of others as people with whom one may interact and understand. 
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CHAPTER 6  
SCHIZOPHRENIA AND SPATIALITY 
 
 
“The person who regards the world as an 
‘It’ lives in ‘severance and alienation’, 
and is without a ‘home, dwelling in the 
universe’.” (Buber 2004 [1937]: 34)  
 
 
In this chapter, I continue my project of scrutinising the role which 
relatedness plays in understanding others. The task here is to examine the 
anomalous experience of intersubjectivity in schizophrenia, paying particular 
attention to the way in which lived spatiality is experienced in this illness. This 
thesis has aimed to show that folk psychology has neglected the importance of 
relatedness for interpersonal understanding. The previous chapters argued that 
relatedness is sustained and shaped by a normative, functional, and affective 
awareness of the spaces within which we find ourselves. This in turn is revised 
and transformed by our bodily interactions with others. Examining the case of 
schizophrenia, we find that intersubjectivity is structured very differently.  
This chapter is largely exploratory. By exploring deviations from lived 
experience in schizophrenia, we can see more clearly what we ordinarily take for 
granted in ‘healthy’ experience. Doing so illuminates aspects integral to healthy 
interpersonal understanding which have been overlooked by folk psychology. In 
what follows, I describe how intersubjectivity fragments in schizophrenia. I then 
explore the ways in which changes to intersubjectivity occur alongside, and may 
be influenced by, changes to the experience of space as lived. Through this 
exploration, two things confront us: (1) the centrality of a sense of interaffective 
relatedness in intersubjectivity and interpersonal understanding; (2) the close 
relation between an affective apprehension of space as lived and relatedness. I 
suggest that exploration of intersubjectivity in schizophrenia highlights the 
importance of accounting for relatedness in our descriptions of healthy 
intersubjectivity, thus supporting my overall thesis. 
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6.1 What is Schizophrenia? 
 
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric illness which involves disintegration of 
coherent thought and affectivity. Symptoms are divided into two main groups: 
positive and negative symptoms (American Psychiatric Association 1994 
(henceforth DSM-IV): 299). Placed under positive symptoms are the psychotic 
and disorganised symptoms of schizophrenia: hallucinations, delusions, loss of 
contact with reality, and grossly disordered thought and behaviour.142 Negative 
symptoms involve a loss or lack of something normally present in healthy 
individuals. Examples of negative symptoms include flattened or diminished 
affect, lack of motivation, poverty of speech (alogia),143 anhedonia, neglect of 
routine self-care,144 poor memory and concentration, difficulty in completing 
tasks, and social isolation.145 Negative symptoms are usually those which mark 
the prodromal phase and onset of schizophrenia (World Health Organisation 
1992 (henceforth ICD-10): 9; DSM-IV: 301, 309); and it is often the negative 
symptoms which lead to a marked diminishment in quality of life (Snyder, Gur, 
and Wasmer 2007: 111).146 Such symptoms are often overlooked when they 
occur alone;147 this is particularly the case when the prodromal phase of 
schizophrenia coincides with adolescence or times of stressful change (World 
                                                      
142 Examples of grossly disorganised behaviour might include silliness, disproportionate agitation 
or excessive anger, bizarre or inappropriate dressing or dishevelment, and inappropriate sexual 
conduct (DSM-IV: 300).  
143 ‘Poverty of speech’ or ‘disorganised speech’ is a phenomenon in which the content of speech 
becomes fragmented and incoherent. This might include jumping frequently between topics, 
often mid sentence, giving vague, irrelevant, or tenuously linked answers to questions, and 
uttering words which sound like nonsense (often referred to as ‘word salad’) (DSM-IV: 300. Also 
see Sass 1992a: chapter 6). Sass helpfully defines it as “speech that is adequate in amount but 
conveys little information because of vagueness, empty repetitions, or use of stereotypes or 
obscure phrases” (1992b: 121). 
144 This symptom may be classed as both ‘positive’ – coming under the banner of “grossly 
disorganised behaviour” (DSM-IV: 300) – and ‘negative’, as there is a lack of normal 
attentiveness and care for the self. 
145 This includes diminishment of an ability to make and maintain social relationships. 
146 See Snyder, Gur, and Wasmer: “whilst delusions and hallucinations may be more dramatic, 
people with schizophrenia often say it’s the negative symptoms that cause the most problems, 
because such symptoms make it nearly impossible to have the full life they want” (2007: 111).  
147 DSM-IV remarks: “Although common in schizophrenia, negative symptoms are difficult to 
evaluate because they occur on a continuum with normality, are relatively unspecific and may be 
due to a variety of other factors” (301). 
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Health Organisation 1992 (henceforth ICD-10): 9).148 However, the negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia impact seriously on the quality – and the structuring 
– of everyday life.149 In what follows, I focus on how interpersonal relations and 
understanding are affected in schizophrenia.  
There is a marked impact on intersubjectivity within schizophrenia, 
leading to social isolation and feelings of alienation (Fuchs 2005b: 116; Gillet 
2004: 27;150 Hoerl 2001; Sass 1999: 317, 322-323, 2001: 251, 2004: 134-35; 
Stanghellini 2004: 177; Stanghellini and Ballerini 2007: 135-136). Impact on 
intersubjectivity includes both a capacity to make and sustain social relationships 
and friendships (DSM-IV: 302; Lysaker et al. 2005: 335), and the capacity to feel 
a sense of interpersonal relatedness (Hoerl 2001: 86).151 Frequently, persons with 
schizophrenia experience a decline in the apprehension of the personhood of 
others, as a sense of feeling related to others erodes and in some cases is lost. 
Others are often perceived and described mechanistically as complex automata 
or ‘robots’ (Fuchs 2005a: 102). This occurs alongside a diminishment in 
apprehending the social nature of the world,152 and has severe consequences for 
social exchange and interaction.  
Changes to intersubjectivity occur alongside and are exacerbated by 
changes in affectivity. Schizophrenia involves key changes in affect (DSM-IV: 
301; Parnas and Sass 2001; Sass 1992a, 2004; Stanghellini 2008)153. One 
prominent negative symptom of schizophrenia is a flattening both of felt affect 
                                                      
148 This is particularly the case for social withdrawal, lessening of emotional expressivity, and 
change to routines of self-care, which can be interpreted and contextualised as a ‘normal’ part of 
adolescence.  
149 DSM-IV states that: “The negative symptoms of schizophrenia … account for a substantial 
degree of morbidity associated with the disorder” (301). 
150 “We might therefore expect the schizophrenic patient to be alienated from a world in which 
others feel secure and assured in their mental life and are cognitively supported by concurrence in 
judgement with others. This loneliness is a source not only of confusion and the thought disorders 
characteristic of schizophrenia but also of the suffering that results from the feeling of isolation 
and the loss of one’s place in the world” (Gillet 2004: 27). 
151 Hoerl refers to this as “an inability to conceive of others ‘in the second person’, to recognise 
them as potential partners in joint and cooperative enterprises” (2004: 86). 
152 This includes changes in the way objects in the social environment are perceived. Objects 
appear devoid of shared social meanings and references (Sass 1992a: 32). 
153 Schizophrenia has also been understood to centrally involve ‘poor reality testing’ in which the 
individual has a marked decrease in ability to distinguish between reality and their own delusions 
and hallucinations. Later in this chapter, I outline the link between affectivity and the way the 
world appears. If we take this seriously, this may provide a resource for bringing together 
diminishing affect with poor reality testing. Sass also argues for this (see Sass 2004). 
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and affective expression (DSM-IV: 30).154 This affects self-affectivity,155 and a 
capacity to recognise the affectivity of others. Sass observes that the severe 
flattening of affect in schizophrenia occurring in conjunction with felt alienation 
from others is a paradox of schizophrenia (1992a: 23). How can “persons [who] 
often seem devoid of emotion and desire” feel a profound sense of alienation 
from others (Sass 1992a: 23)? The lessening and erosion of felt affect, and the 
feelings of alienation, are closely related to two other key symptoms of 
schizophrenia: depersonalisation and derealisation.  
Depersonalisation involves a change in the experience of oneself.156 In 
depersonalisation, the person feels detached from him- or herself and self-
experience is marked by feelings of unreality (Hunter, Sierra, & David 2004: 9; 
Stanghellini 2004: 151, 158). In particular, depersonalisation affects a basic 
sense of self-awareness, more specifically the sense one has of oneself as the 
‘owner’ of one’s actions, emotions, and thoughts (DSM-IV: 530; Stanghellini 
2004: 60; 2009: 59). The person with depersonalisation often feels as though she 
is an observer, rather than the owner, of her thoughts, feelings, and mental and 
bodily processes (DSM-IV: 530; ICD-10: 172). A commonly reported result is 
that the person feels like a robot or as though she is living in a dream or taking 
part in a film (DSM-IV: 530).  
Experience of depersonalisation often occurs in conjunction with 
derealisation (DSM-IV: 530;157 Hunter, Sierra, & David 2004: 9) and involves a 
change in experience of external reality (DSM-IV: 822; Stanghellini 2007: 130-
131). The world appears distant, strange, and feels unreal (DSM-IV: 530); and 
                                                      
154 It is worth noting here that at the same time as affective flattening occurs, some affective 
responses are heightened. For instance, persons with schizophrenia often report feeling 
vulnerable and alone (Stanghellini 2004: 61) and ‘inappropriate affect’ displayed by persons with 
schizophrenia often involves “laughter, grinning, giggling, an ironic or perhaps self-absorbed and 
self-satisfied smiling, a lofty manner, and the like” (Sass 1992a: 112). I will not go into this 
paradox of schizophrenia here. Instead see Sass (1992a: 112-113) for an exploration. 
155 By ‘self-affectivity’ I refer to the capacity to feel affect and emotion. This is linked to, though 
differentiated from, the capacity to recognise affectivity in others. 
156 DSM-IV stresses that many people experience feelings of depersonalisation and/or 
derealisation at some point in their life. These experiences, when fleeting and not causing distress 
or a loss of healthy functioning do not indicate pathology. It is only when symptoms of 
depersonalisation and derealisation cause a marked negative impact on the individual’s life, 
leading to a loss of healthy functioning, that they are diagnosed and treated. See DSM-IV (530-
533). 
157 ICD-10 classifies depersonalisation and derealisation together as depersonalisation-
derealisation syndrome (see ICD-10: 171-172), whilst DSM-IV describes ‘Depersonalisation 
Disorder’ as one amongst many dissociative disorders (see DSM-IV: 530).  
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other people appear “unfamiliar” and “mechanical” (DSM-IV: 822; Hunter, 
Sierra, & David 2004: 9).158 This leads to feelings of detachment and distance 
from everyday life; and also to external reality feeling uncanny (Stanghellini 
2004: 60). The result of this is a fragmentation in the ‘flow’ and ‘dynamism’ of 
life, as intuitively performed actions, activities, and tasks become candidates for 
explicit reflection. Routinely performed actions become “mechanised” 
(Stanghellini 2004: 158; 2007: 133) and external reality becomes “spatialised” 
(Stanghellini 2007: 131). 
The effects of this flattening of affect and disruption to the ‘flow’ of life 
have profound consequences for socialisation and for self. Sass remarks:  
 
For normal individuals, affectivity often provides a medium of 
connectedness, a realm of emotional resonance that both presupposes and 
supports the sense of sympathy or fellow feeling. (2004: 128)  
 
If felt connectedness to the world, and an emotional resonance to others is lost, 
then the way in which everyday life is structured and lived is radically different. 
For precisely this reason, individuals with schizophrenia report that a radical 
alienation marks the mode of schizophrenic existence. 
Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that people with schizophrenia 
often report a severing in feeling connected to others. Through schizophrenia, an 
intuitive and taken-for-granted capacity to understand, resonate, and engage with 
others is lessened and in some cases lost (Sass 1992a: 23, Stanghellini 2004). 
Instead, the experience of others is marked by feelings of alienation, emerging 
from difficulties in affectively “mak[ing] contact” with others, as one 
schizophrenic person puts it (Sechehaye 1970: 46, 54, 55). This may, as Laing 
observes, result in the person with schizophrenia coming to “experience himself 
in despairing aloneness and isolation; instead of feeling like a complete and 
integral whole, he feels ‘split’ in various ways” (1960: 17).  
It is important to note that with a loss of connectedness, we not only lose 
the capacity to feel related to others, but also to feel connected to a shared, social 
                                                      
158 ICD-10 reports that “surroundings seem to lack colour and life, and appear as artificial, or as a 
stage on which people are acting contrived roles.” (172) 
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world through which shared meaning is given and made (Guignon 1983: 243).159 
Feelings of isolation are compounded by a growing inability to feel and 
apprehend the personhood of others. Stanghellini and Ballerini describe this as a 
“loss of primordial intersubjectivity” (2007: 140). By this, they mean the 
intuitive grasp of others as people who engage in meaningful activities which 
have the capacity to affect or offer possibility for us. For Stanghellini and 
Ballerini, this is an affective and pre-reflective grasp of the activities, intentions, 
and personhood of others, through which we are attuned to them.160  
The loss of “primordial intersubjectivity” (Stanghellini and Ballerini 
2007) is a loss of a sense of relatedness toward others. We have seen throughout 
this thesis that relatedness is a pre-reflective attunement to other people. Through 
it, others are apprehend as people with whom one may interact, and who hold 
possibilities (positive and negative) for oneself. But how does this loss of pre-
reflective connectedness to others change the way in which persons with 
schizophrenia understand others? 
Considering the consequences of the flattening of affect in schizophrenia, 
Sass states that “[schizophrenic] persons often display a more deliberative and 
ideational rather than intuitive or emotional style of acting and problem solving” 
(1992a: 23). This deliberative style of understanding things also marks 
interpersonal understanding within schizophrenia, in which there is also a 
diminishment in affective perception of others. Schizophrenic persons report the 
increased necessity of attempting to employ “algorithms” or “tactics” through 
which to understand others (Stanghellini 2004: 22). Stanghellini labels this “the 
attunement crisis” (2004: 22): 
 
What’s missing is the ability to attune with the current situation, to 
intuitively get a grasp on the thinking of the person you are talking to, 
and above all their emotional plane, and to match it. Obviously, we only 
realise the existence of this emotional medium when it’s no longer there. 
(Stanghellini 2004: 6) 
                                                      
159 For example see interaction theory (Gallagher 2001), participatory sense-making (De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo 2007) and also this thesis (Chapters 2-5). 
160 See Stanghellini: “[T]he schizophrenic dis-sociality is considered the effect of a disorder of 
social attunement, i.e., of a kind of non-propositional knowledge consisting in the emotional-
conative-cognitive ability to perceive the existence of others as similar to one’s own, make 
emotional contact with them and intuitively access their mental life” (2004: 10). 
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Instead of approaching others and one’s lived environment in a pre-reflective 
second-person and interactional manner, persons with schizophrenia 
“contemplate [their] own existence from outside – a third person perspective 
view, or a view from nowhere” (2004: 22). However, Stanghellini does not 
properly distinguish between a third-person stance (viewing somebody as a ‘he’ 
or ‘she’) and an impersonal stance (viewing somebody in a detached manner as 
‘it’). The third-person stance is frequently used in non-problematic cases of 
interpersonal understanding161 and does not necessarily involve viewing 
somebody in a dispassionate, removed, and impersonal manner.  
Understanding a person as ‘you’, ‘he’, or ‘she’ – though different modes 
of understanding others – can all be distinguished from approaching them as an 
‘it’ (Ratcliffe 2007a: 79).162 Second- and third- person stances are both personal 
stances. In them the other is apprehended as someone who offers possibilities for 
interaction and understanding.163 Approaching an other as ‘it’, on the other hand, 
involves an impersonal stance. This does not recognise a sense of their 
personhood, or a sense of relatedness between oneself and the other. 
Accordingly, the other is not apprehended as someone who may affect, and be 
affected by, oneself in turn, or as a partner “of reciprocal attention” (Schutz 
1967: 162). Instead they appear object-like.  
Ratcliffe argues that various proponents of folk psychology fail to 
properly distinguish between the ‘third-person’ and ‘it’ in their accounts (2007a: 
82). In particular, he singles out Dennett (1987) as falling foul of this by 
“assum[ing] that an intentional stance is just a matter of interpreting a very 
complicated ‘it’” (Ratcliffe 2007a: 82). Examining the case of intersubjective 
understanding in schizophrenia highlights the importance of this distinction. It 
shows that taking an impersonal, detached stance toward others is atypical in 
everyday intersubjective understanding. Realising this reveals the importance of: 
                                                      
161 For example, when thinking about and understanding others who might not be present, or 
whom we are observing, rather than interacting with.  
162 See Ratcliffe 2007a: 78-84 for an exploration of this. 
163 We saw in Chapter 2 that folk psychology fails to distinguish these two different stances and 
neglects to acknowledge the importance of interaction. In doing so, folk psychology assumes that 
everyday interpersonal understanding is third-person and predominantly observational, which 
leads to a narrow and incomplete description of interpersonal understanding. See Chapter 2 
(p.74ff). 
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(1) distinguishing second-, third-, and impersonal stances from each other, and 
(2) relatedness to others in everyday, normal interpersonal understanding. 
In what follows, I take Stanghellini’s point that the way in which persons 
with schizophrenia relate to others changes, becoming impersonal. But what 
does this tell us about everyday, non-problematic intersubjective understanding? 
First, it emphasises how we are pre-reflectively attuned to others, and recognise 
and respond to their personhood in a way that does not require us to ‘make 
contact’ with them. Secondly, we do not ordinarily have to observe behaviour 
and attribute underlying ‘motivations’ to others in order to understand them. 
Looking at the fragmentation of healthy intersubjectivity in schizophrenia reveals 
everyday intersubjective understanding to be a dynamic process which is 
structured and permeated by affective relatedness with others.  
Examination of intersubjectivity in schizophrenia starkly reveals that folk 
psychology neglects to account for something utterly integral: relatedness. Folk 
psychology argues for the centrality of the role of attributing mental states to 
others for interpersonal understanding. However, this is something which the 
person with schizophrenia primarily comes to rely on only once their sense of 
relatedness fragments or is lost.  
The proponent of folk psychology might respond that this is all very well 
for accounts of explicit attribution of mental states (explicit theory theory or 
simulation theory), but it does not give us grounds for dismissing the centrality 
of folk psychology all together. There is still the prospect that, ordinarily, 
interpersonal understanding is enabled through implicit theory and simulation. 
Indeed, the analysis of schizophrenia given above cannot disprove or deny this. 
However, this response misses the point. Schizophrenia is a condition which 
involves profound changes to intersubjectivity. If we accept the analysis of 
schizophrenia given above, these are rooted in changes to – or a loss of – a 
capacity for interpersonal relatedness.  
But what changes take place in relatedness within schizophrenia? And 
how is its structure changed? We find that within schizophrenia there is 
fragmentation in the perception of space as ‘lived’. This lessens and may 
preclude experiencing oneself, others, and objects as contextualised. In 
particular, a sense of space as shared or even as ‘relevant to me’ is undone. 
Instead, space appears as geometricised. After exploring the experience of space 
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in schizophrenia, I move on to suggest that the inability to feel part of, and 
participate within a shared context is frustrating for self-directing interaction.  
 
6.2 Schizophrenia and Distortions to Lived Spatiality 
 
Exploring first-person accounts of those who have experienced 
schizophrenia, it is possible to uncover a number of references to distortions 
undergone to both perception and experience of spatiality. Whilst there has been 
much already written on changes to a general sense of ‘Being-in-the-world’ and 
bodily phenomenology in schizophrenia (Fuchs 2005a; Parnas and Sass 2001; 
Ratcliffe 2008a; Sass 1992a, 1992b, 1994b, 2001, 2004; Stanghellini 2004), the 
topic of spatiality remains relatively untouched.  
Jaspers makes a few brief remarks on changes undergone to perception of 
spatiality in schizophrenia (1997 [1959]: 80-81), outlining three categories: (1) 
“Exhaustion Neuroses”: in which space seems to become more expansive to the 
patient (80-81); (2) “Experience of Infinite Space”: in which space enlarges to 
the extent that it is perceived as boundless and infinite (81); and (3) “Emotionally 
Coloured Space” according to which the space takes on an affective tonality, or 
character (81). However, after acknowledging these categories, Jaspers does not 
continue to develop them.  
Likewise, Minkowski devotes the last chapter of Lived Time to propose 
that “there is a lived space as there is a lived time” (1970: 400) and the 
ramifications of this for understanding psychopathology (see later in this section 
for an exposition of some of his remarks). Stanghellini also refers a number of 
times to the process of “spatialisation” in schizophrenia (2004: 21, 95, 177). He 
links this to hyper-rationality and uses it as a term to express the lessening in 
affective perception and the manner in which other people and things are 
experienced as detached and affectively unconnected to the person with 
schizophrenia. Sass also makes reference to ‘morbid geometricism’ in some brief 
remarks he offers on spatial form in modernist art and the way in which space is 
perceived and represented in schizophrenia (1992: 161). He sees this as a move 
toward flatness and immobility. Work already amassed on deviations to a healthy 
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‘Being-in-the-world’ would be complemented by a study on the distortions to 
lived spatiality.  
 
(a) General Remarks 
 
In order to see what changes to spatiality are involved, let us consider the 
following quotations taken from Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl, a 
memoir of schizophrenia:164 
 
(1) “Suddenly the room became enormous, illuminated by a dreadful 
electric light that cast false shadows. Everything was exact, smooth, 
artificial, extremely tense; the chairs and tables seemed models placed 
here and there. Pupils and teachers were puppets revolving without 
cause, without objective. I recognised nothing, nobody. It was as 
though reality, attenuated, had slipped away from all these things and 
these people. Profound dread overwhelmed me, and as though lost, I 
looked around desperately for help. I heard people talking but did not 
grasp the meaning of the words. The voices were metallic, without 
warmth or colour. From time to time a word detached itself from the 
rest. It repeated itself over and over in my head, as though cut off by a 
knife. And when one of my schoolmates came toward me, I saw her 
grow larger and larger like the haystack.” (Sechehaye 1970: 25-26) 
 
(2) “Then my room became enormous, disproportionate, the walls 
smooth and shining, the glaring electric light bathing everything in its 
blinding brightness […] Again the terror mounted to a paroxysm. 
Desperately I wanted to break the circle of unreality which froze me 
in the midst of this electric immobility.” (Sechehaye 1970: 31) 
 
                                                      
164 I use this source as it provides a clear and lucid account of one person’s experience of 
schizophrenia which contains features corroborated by further accounts and psychiatric reports. 
As such, it provides an excellent point from which to explore changes occurring to experience in 
schizophrenia. 
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(3) “I saw a boundless plain, unlimited, the horizon infinite. The trees 
and hedges were of cardboard, placed here and there, like stage 
accessories, and the road, oh, the endless road, white, glittering under 
the sun’s rays, glistening like a needle, above us the remorseless sun 
weighing down trees and houses under its electric rays. Over and 
above the vastness reigned a terrifying quiet, broken by noises 
making the silence still more quiet and terrifying. And I – I was lost 
with my friend in the limitless space.” (Sechehaye 1970: 37) 
 
(4) “For me, madness was definitely not a condition of illness; I did not 
believe that I was ill. It was rather a country, opposed to Reality [sic.], 
where reigned an implacable light, blinding, leaving no place for 
shadow; an immense space without boundary, limitless, flat; a 
mineral, lunar country, cold as the wastes of the North Pole. In this 
stretching emptiness, all is unchangeable, immobile, congealed, 
crystallised. Objects are stage trappings, placed here and there, 
geometric cubes without meaning. People turn weirdly about, they 
make gestures, movements without sense; they are phantoms whirling 
on an infinite plain, crushed by the pitiless electric light. And I – I am 
lost in it, isolated, cold, stripped, purposeless under the light. A wall 
of brass separates me from everybody and everything. In the midst of 
desolation, in indescribable distress, in absolute solitude, I am 
terrifyingly alone; no one comes to help me. That was it; this was 
madness, the Enlightenment was the perception of Unreality. 
Madness was finding oneself permanently in an all-embracing 
Unreality. I called it the ‘Land of Light’ because of the brilliant 
illumination, dazzling, astral, cold and the state of extreme tension in 
which everything was, including myself. It was as if an electric 
current of extraordinary power ran through every object, building 
until the whole blew up in a frightful explosion.” (44-45) 
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Within this collection of quotations we see that several themes emerge. 
Each express changes in the way space is perceived as ‘lived’.165 There is a 
stripping away of the affectivity and vitality of space to reveal a somewhat 
brutal, precise, and distorted experience of space and the things the author finds 
around her. 
We find here that there is a distortion in – and re-sizing of – lived space. 
This appears to be a common occurrence within schizophrenia. Jaspers notes that 
in schizophrenia, objects in space often change their scale, becoming “smaller 
(micropsia) or larger (macropsia) or aslant, larger on one side than the other 
(dysmegalopsia)” (1997 [1959]: 80).  In the case above, things and people 
become ‘enormous’ and disproportionate, looming large. At the same time as 
things appearing larger and closer, there is a stripping of practical and affective 
significance, which encompasses environment, things and people. The 
disproportionality occurs alongside a perceived immobility. There is a seeming 
lack of change and vitality to the landscape, both social and natural, within which 
the individual finds themselves. There is a distinct lack of dynamism to Renee’s 
descriptions of the spaces she finds herself within.  
‘Immobility’ and lack of possibility and change are features which are 
mirrored within interpersonal interaction in schizophrenia. In interactive 
situations, there is a lessening of the dynamism and fluidity of interaction. This 
is, in part, an effect of a growing immobility in bodily expressivity. We see in 
quotation (4) that the gestures which flow from people are perceived oddly by 
Renee, as having no intuitive sense. Chapter 5 stressed the transformative role 
which a reciprocal bodily relatedness plays in providing dynamism to interaction. 
Gesture may attune, put us off, enthuse, or dampen our sense of relatedness with 
others. In quote (4) the author loses a pre-reflective awareness of gestures as 
accompanying and substantively adding to communication.  
This coincides with feelings of distance, alienation, and in the cases 
above, a sense of desolation. Space becomes stretching, flat, limitless, and 
infinite in nature and there is a sense of precision in the way the space appears as 
painfully light, smooth, and empty (quote (3)). Again, this experience appears to 
be common in schizophrenia; another schizophrenic patient remarks: “I still saw 
                                                      
165 That is, as space holding certain meanings – both social and individual – values, resonances, 
and implications for the person involved. 
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the room. Space seemed to stretch and go on into infinity, completely empty. I 
felt lost, abandoned to the infinities of space, which in spite of my insignificance 
somehow threatened me” (Jaspers 1997 [1959]: 81). This forms a marked 
contrast from the pre-reflective and taken-for-granted manner in which we 
usually find ourselves inhabiting the spaces around us, as we saw in Chapter 4.  
In each of the quotations above, changes in perception of space are 
reported alongside changes to other phenomena. Quotes (1) and (4) are 
concerned with spatiality and intersubjectivity; quote (2) with disproportionality 
and lack of change; quote (3) testifies to the change in object perception situated 
within ‘infinite space’. This serves to remind us that the way in which we pre-
reflectively perceive space is deeply entangled with the way in which others, 
objects, events, and possibilities all appear to us.  I now go on to explore several 
of these themes in more depth, beginning with (a) un-worlding and 
decontextualisation, (b) loss of affective salience, and (c) distance and closeness. 
Doing so shows us several ways in which a sense of lived spatiality distorts in 
schizophrenia and provides a firm foundation on which to investigate changes to 
intersubjective understanding.  
 
(b) Un-worlding and the Splitting of Space and Context 
 
The fourth quote above is particularly indicative of how spatiality is 
inextricably bound up with our apprehension of others and of things. This quote 
expresses and describes each of the major themes of this thesis: space, others, 
and a sense of embodiment. And through it all, Renee declares, is a sense of 
‘aloneness’, of helplessness; and with this overwhelming feelings of desolation 
and distress.166  
                                                      
166 An interesting point which I shall not go into in this chapter is how, in the onset of her illness, 
Renee overcomes feelings of unreality through close proximity and later physical contact with 
her therapist. In this case it seems that interpersonal contact and proximity is of therapeutic value. 
As Renee’s illness progresses she comes to rely on her contact with ‘Mama’ (her therapist) more 
and more. Whilst one of the symptoms of schizophrenia is growing social isolation and 
alienation, it seems that ‘making contact’ with others to feel their presence is also of therapeutic 
value.  For an example of this see: “Only near her I felt secure, especially from the time when she 
began to sit next to me on the couch and put her arm around my shoulders. Oh, what joy, what 
relief to feel the life, the warmth, the reality!” (Sechehaye: 46) 
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Renee describes the objects surrounding her and the way in which they 
appear, as “geometric cubes without meaning”. Sass has already 
comprehensively described the phenomena of “un-worlding” which he argues 
lies at the heart of apprehension of objects and tools within schizophrenia 
(1992a: 32-33). ‘Un-worlding’ draws directly from the Heideggerian account of 
Being-in-the-world (1962: 78-122), and is a term coined by Sass to characterise 
the waning and eventual loss of affordances which objects hold for people. In the 
process of un-worlding: 
 
[O]bjective “things” … seem unable to evoke or convey … significance or 
value – one perceives meaningless bits of matter. (Sass 1992a: 33)  
 
With this stripping away of practical orientation comes a decline in ability 
to pursue projects successfully. Ordinary objects appear as entities, divorced 
from any practical value for oneself. People with schizophrenia become unable 
to view the world as ‘for them’, becoming abstracted from the fundamental 
embeddedness which Sass, following Heidegger, takes as the way which we 
ordinarily operate in the world. Individuals with schizophrenia are alienated from 
a world in which they are ‘at home’ and in which they are able to carry out 
activities and projects in a taken-for-granted way. People with schizophrenia 
become unable to construe things as ready-to-hand,167 as proffering distinct 
possibilities for the subject. Instead, Sass argues that persons with schizophrenia 
inhabit a perpetual present-at-handness which reduces capacity for action (Sass 
2004: 136). If Sass is correct, in the early stages of schizophrenia, the 
schizophrenic person experiences a stripping away of the meaningful context in 
which we are all primarily embedded (Stanghellini 2004: 114) causing a “loss of 
significant external reality” (Heller 1975: 172). Part of this sense of reality is that 
it is one which others also occupy. With the inability to apprehend affordances of 
things in the world, and the possibilities which these and others present to us, 
there is a decline in the perception of the world as social. As Stanghellini writes, 
during schizophrenia: 
 
                                                      
167 See Chapter 2 (p.88-89) for an exploration of the way in which things may be apprehended as 
ready-to hand and present-at-hand.  
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The sense of belonging to a community of people, of being attuned to 
others and involved in my own actions and future; the taken-for-
grantedness of all these doubtless features of everyday life, may be put in 
jeopardy. (2004: 111) 
 
Evidence of un-worlding is contained within quotations (3) and (4). 
However, in these passages, we find that the experience of un-worlding is not 
limited to the objects which Renee encounters. It also occurs to the spaces within 
which she finds herself. Instead of perceiving herself to be within certain 
contexts, Renee’s experience is one of context and space decoupling. Renee is 
de-contextualised and left in space which is perceived as “limitless” and 
“infinite”. As such, the world is no longer homely for her, and comes to resemble 
‘geometrical’ space in her description. The de-contextualising of space as ‘for 
me’ and ‘lived’ naturally impacts on the way in which one conducts oneself in 
the world. Instead of being ‘at home’, Renee is ‘lost’ and “separated [from 
others] by a brass wall” (Sechehaye 1970: 44-45). This separation is dual in 
nature. Whilst she is cut off from recognising the vitality of others, she is also cut 
off from recognising the vitality of the spaces in which she finds herself. Home, 
for her, becomes “a pasteboard house” filled with “sisters and brothers, robots” 
(Sechehaye 1970: 38). Walking with her friend she “perceive[s] a statue by my 
side, a puppet, part of the pasteboard scenery” (Ibid: 37).  
Space and others appear devitalised, precise, and mechanical; they are 
‘cut off’ from her. In this way, Renee feels she has to reach out to ‘make contact’ 
with others as she no longer intuitively feels their presence as other people. 
‘Making contact’ is Renee’s term for feeling the ‘aliveness’ and vitality, the 
dynamism of world and people. With this gone from her day-to-day life, Renee 
finds herself forced to reach out. What does this tell us about the way in which 
we ordinarily experience space and others?   
First, it tells us that our activities and understanding of others take place 
within the affective context of ‘life’. This is a context which is affective, 
dynamic, and to which we are connected, close, and related. Secondly, it shows 
us that we usually find ourselves related and attuned to others in a basic and pre-
reflective way. We perceive them directly as people whose gestures make sense 
to us and whose actions are connected to and cohere with their situation. Lived 
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space is inherently tied to perceiving others as people, with whom we share a 
world and context which is often ours. This is the platform which, in healthy 
interpersonal understanding, we take for granted and from which we enter into 
interaction. However, it is through a capacity to be affected and shaped by the 
spaces we share with others, and their movements, gesturing, and words, that the 
quality of our felt relatedness to them undergoes change and holds possibilities.  
Without a context, we lose the ability to make sense of ourselves in 
relation to others and the social world at large. The impact of this on social 
relationships is important. Jaspers observed that the schizophrenic person 
appears to inhabit another world (1997 [1959]: 81-85); this is one in which there 
is no taken-for-granted shared referentiality. It is only once this fragments and 
distorts in the case of illness that we can truly appreciate the manner in which 
participation in lived and intersubjective spaces scaffold the way in which we 
approach, interact with and accordingly understand others. 
Furthermore, Renee also sustains a loss of meaningfulness in the 
positionality of the things which occupy the space with her: there seems to be no 
coherence which unites the objects around her in a practical way.168 There is a 
loss of cohesion and meaning imbued in the space in which Renee finds herself. 
Consider the following: 
 
When I arrived, I was as if frozen. I saw the room, the furniture, ‘Mama’169 
herself, each thing separate, detached from the others, cold, implacable, 
inhuman, by dint of being without life. Then I began to relate what had 
happened since the last visit and relived it in the telling. But the sound of 
my voice and the meaning of my words seemed strange. Every now and 
then, an inner voice interrupted sneeringly, ‘Ah, Ah!’ and mockingly 
repeated what I had said.  (50) 
 
 Here, Renee is describing the process of spatialisation in which her 
apprehension of space as lived, affective, social, and as ‘for her’ fragments. 
There is a loss of an overall cohesion to the scene. The effect of this is for things 
                                                      
168 See the discussion of Heidegger’s notion of the ‘regionality’ of spaces in Chapter 4 (p.143; 
also see Heidegger 1962: 135ff). 
169 ‘Mama’ is the name which Renee uses to refer to her therapist, Marguerite Sechehaye.  
195 
 
to appear ‘detached’ not only from herself but from the other things around them. 
We saw in Chapter 4 that Heidegger describes the manner in which we ordinarily 
perceive space in terms of ‘regions of activity’ (1962: 135ff and Section 70, 
418ff). In this way items in space, and space itself, group themselves according 
to our life habits and activities. The office in my house is a region of space that, 
though contained within my home, does not spill out into the ‘living space’. Each 
region of space is configured and marked by an affective apprehension of it, 
which is in turn shaped by my primary activity. In this way, a lump of marble 
when placed in the office might be apprehended and used primarily as a paper 
weight. The same lump of marble in our living room might be apprehended and 
valued as a decorative item. Perhaps it has a history relating to former travels. 
The same items hold different meanings, affordances, and values depending on 
the space and activity within which they are located.  
In the quote above something very different is going on. Instead of a space 
appearing as a ‘region’ which is a host to a particular activity or mode of life, it 
becomes all-pervasive.170 The space becomes ‘distant’ and detached from me and 
my activity. In the absence of a felt connection to the space around me, the 
objects within that space also become ‘distant’ and detached from me. The effect 
of all of this together is to lose an overall context to life and action. Space 
becomes the ultimate container, as there is a loss of cohesion and purpose to the 
things which populate this space (see quotes (3) and (4) above). 
There is a fragmentation of being embedded within what I described in 
Chapter 4 as phenomenological, lived space. This distortion of space is one 
which individualises and makes salient present-at-hand things, rather than 
encountering a familiar backdrop within which equipment hold a meaningful 
place.  
 
(c) Distance v Closeness: The Loss of Affective Salience 
 
Closely linked to the phenomenon of un-worlding is the appearance of 
space – and objects within space – as distant, and yet simultaneously too close. 
                                                      
170 Also recall the recurring language of ‘limitlessness’ and ‘infinity’ which feature in the 
quotation at the beginning of this section. There is an emphasis in all of this of the pervasiveness 
of space. 
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At first glance this sounds contradictory. However, cases in which the 
schizophrenia patient cannot perceive the practical and value-based affordances 
of objects will have a prominent effect on the way they appear within space. In 
short objects are experienced both as distant and alienated from me and can at 
the same time loom large, and become overly close. Consider the following: 
 
When, for example, I looked at a chair or a jug, I thought not of their use or 
function – a jug not as something to hold water and milk, a chair not as 
something to sit in – but as having lost their names, their functions and 
meanings; they became ‘things’ and began to take on life, to exist. This 
existence accounted for my great fear. In the unreal scene, in the murky 
quiet of my perception, suddenly ‘the thing’ sprang up. The stone jar, 
decorated with blue flowers, was there facing me, defying me with its 
presence, with its existence. To conquer that fear I looked away. My eyes 
met a chair, then a table; they were alive too, asserting their presence … 
When I protested, ‘things are tricking me; I am afraid’ and people asked 
specifically ‘Do you see the jug and the chair as alive?’ I answered ‘Yes, 
they are alive.’ And they, the doctors, too thought I saw these things as 
humans who I heard speak. But it was not that. Their life consisted 
uniquely in the fact that they were there, in their existence itself. (55-56) 
 
Here we have the dual occurrence of things becoming detached from 
Renee whilst at the same time they are experienced as too close. Whilst there is a 
loss of the practical meanings of things, and therefore things as appearing for me, 
within my frame of reference (culminating in distance), at the same time this 
‘loss’ entails a lack of affectivity through which things are perceived as salient or 
unimportant. Things lose salience as for this or that, and instead everything is 
perceived as equally important or demanding: things lose their distance from me. 
For Renee, they are “alive”; they exist without reference to her, and as such, she 
cannot bring them under control or see them as serving a purpose for her or for 
other people.  
We find a similar expression of this phenomenon in another memoir, The 
Centre Cannot Hold. In it Saks describes how: 
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Consciousness gradually loses its coherence. One’s centre gives way. The 
centre cannot hold. The ‘me’ becomes a haze and the centre from which 
one experiences reality breaks up like a bad radio signal. (2007: 12) 
 
And: 
 
Consider this: The regulator that funnels certain information to you and 
filters out other information to you suddenly shuts off. Immediately every 
sight, every sound, every smell coming at you carries equal weight; every 
thought, feeling, memory, and idea presents itself to you with an equally 
strong and demanding intensity. You’re receiving a dozen different 
messages in a dozen different media – phone, email, TV, CD player, friend 
knocking at the door, ideas assemble in your head – and you’re unable to 
choose which ones come to the front and which are relegated to ‘later’. It’s 
the crowd at the Super Bowl, and they’re all yelling directly at you. (2007: 
212) 
 
Minkowski, in Lived Time (1970), offers a few brief remarks on changes to 
spatiality in illness, particularly the manner in which perception of space distorts 
in schizophrenia. Much of what he offers during his exploration can be called on 
to shed light on the passage by Renee, and to qualify the interpretation of space 
put forward in Chapter 4. Declaring that “there is a lived space as there is a lived 
time” (1970: 400), he takes his departure from the so-called geometrical 
approaches that characterise space as a static container for objects and action. 
Minkowski states: 
 
[S]pace cannot be reduced to geometric relations, relations which we 
establish as if, reduced to the simple role of curious spectators or scientists, 
we were ourselves outside space. We live and act in space and our personal 
lives, as well as the social life of humanity, unfolds in space. Life spreads 
out in space without having a geometric extension in the proper sense of 
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the word. We have need of expansion, of perspective, in order to live. 
Space is as indispensible as time to the development of life. (1970: 400)171 
 
For Minkowski, space and a ‘normal’ inhabitation of it are essential for a 
healthy life. An ‘everyday’ relation to lived space is integral to a typically 
healthy structuring of experience. From the outset Minkowski contrasts the type 
of space with which he is concerned with the contrasting notion of geometrical 
space. He argues that ‘geometrical’ apprehensions are not the primary way in 
which we experience space (1970: 403). Instead it is abstracted from our 
rootedness in a lived space, which is constitutive of the way in which we find 
ourselves living and acting within the world in a normal manner.172 
But what elements does Minkowski identify as distorted and modified 
during schizophrenia? Firstly, lived distance (1970: 402), and secondly what he 
characterises as a difference between ‘dark’ and ‘light’ spaces (1970: 427-428).  
In speaking of ‘distance’ as being present in a healthy sense of reality and 
life, Minkowski is keen to stress that this is a lived, as opposed to ‘quantitative’ 
distance (1970: 402). The latter is a literal and measurable, ‘objective’ distance 
which exists between two objects or bodies X and Y. This measurable 
understanding of distance fits in precisely with the geometrical understanding of 
space from which he has already removed himself. Instead, by distance, 
Minkowski means something very different, which stems from his ‘lived’ 
approach to space.  
‘Distance’ for Minkowski is an existential quality which structures the way 
life is experienced. It is integral to the conception of a social world as something 
which I am a part of, yet which is bigger than or separate from myself. A healthy 
apprehension of distance marks out that others are distinctive and individualised 
from myself.173 This healthy sense of distance is sometimes paradoxically erased 
                                                      
171 See Chapter 4 for an outworking of interpretations of space as conceived of as geometrical 
and lived.  
172 See Minkowski: “space, seen only from its mathematical and intelligible aspect, served as its 
[time’s] foil, as it were. This aspect of space, stripped of life, could be of little interest to the 
psychologist or psychopathologist … the ‘dead’ aspect of space seems to exclude, a priori, the 
possibility of more profound modifications of the human personality of a truly spatial nature” 
(170: 339-400).  
173 This is echoed by Merleau-Ponty when he writes: “What protects the sane man against 
delirium or hallucination, is not his critical powers, but the structure of his space: objects remain 
before him, keeping their distance and … touching him only with respect” (1962: 339). 
199 
 
and yet intensified in schizophrenia. We see this in some delusions of grandeur, 
by which the person with schizophrenia sees herself as omnipotent or necessary 
for the world’s continued existence. At the same time, the individual can feel 
curiously vulnerable, feeling the world as persecutory.174 It is my contention here 
that it may be understood in part as a distortion in a healthy sense of ‘felt’ 
distance: one feels utterly necessary, responsible, and part of the world; and yet 
at the same time there is a profound sense of alienation from it.   
Clearly, the manner in which one feels attached to, or detached from, the 
world is variable. This forms a sliding scale: from a sense of mystical union with 
the world – in which the mystic experiences herself as continuous with and 
indistinguishable from everything else – to a state of brutal alienation and 
detachment. However, Minkowski claims that distance is a mark of being able to 
live in a coherent, cohesive and unproblematic manner: 
 
I look in front of me; I see objects or people more or less distant from me. 
But I also see life unfolding around me; I see this life bursting out all 
around me; I participate in it myself, but it does not really ‘touch’ me in an 
immediate way; I feel that I am independent to a certain extent, and there 
seems to be spatiality in this independence; there is a distance which 
separates me from life or, rather, which unites me with life. There is always 
free space in front of me in which my activity can develop. I feel at ease, I 
feel free, in this space which I have before me; there is no immediate 
contact, in the physical sense of the word, between the ego and the ambient 
becoming. My contact with ambient becoming is achieved across, or rather 
with the help of, a distance which unites us to it. (1970: 402-403)  
 
In this way there is an ‘at ease’ feeling when we occupy and inhabit the life 
world of our daily existence. In healthy experience of space, distance is 
necessary in order to feel an individual. The boundaries of self and world are 
transgressed within the experience of schizophrenia, with the patient sometimes 
relating that the world depends on her for its continued existence (Sass 1994b: 
76).  
                                                      
174 See Sass 1994b: 77-85 for an exploration of this particular paradoxical delusion. 
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The interplay between excessive closeness and healthy distance is an 
interesting one. To understand this phenomenon, it is illuminating to turn to 
phenomenological approaches toward affectivity. Heidegger noted that our 
Being-in-the-World is always affectively coloured and structured. It is our mood 
which ‘ties us into the World’ and presents things as meaningful, relevant or 
irrelevant to Dasein’s projects (1962: 172ff). Accordingly, affectivity attunes and 
anchors us into a world which appears homely and as ‘for us’. The effect of this 
may vary from producing “a way in which the world appears” (Ratcliffe 2009: 
1), to a general context within which activity, perception, and reasoning are 
tinted; or it may reveal certain features of the environment within which we find 
ourselves as salient, or conversely as something to be passed over due to its 
being unremarkable or indifferent to our projects.  
We have already seen that schizophrenia involves a loss or flattening of 
affect. Numerous cases discussed by phenomenological psychiatry suggest that a 
loss of affective filters correlates with a loss of practical reasoning (Blankenburg 
2002; Sass 1992a, 1999, 2004; Stanghellini 2005: 95-109). The loss of affect in 
schizophrenia entails a lessening of things appearing as salient to a person. Loss 
of affective salience has a radical effect on the way in which world, people and 
events are structured. De Sousa has argued that affects are “salience producers” 
and as such, give both coherence and a frame of reference to experience (1980: 
137; 2004: 64). Affects configure the way we broadly view the world.  
De Sousa states that “[e]motions are determinate patterns of salience 
among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies.” (1980: 
141) He argues that affects highlight certain features of experience (1980: 136). 
This might be because they are useful to our projects, or pertinent to our comfort 
or safety, for example if thing is an object of fear. The point here for De Sousa is 
that affects define a field of reference within which we operate. Affects limit 
what we have to take into consideration in our activities, by making salient 
certain features or by more generally evoking a field or what we may 
comfortably take for granted (1980: 136). Affects as salience prescribers 
therefore have a direct impact on the ways in which we experience, comprehend 
things, and live life. If our affective life fragments or erodes, then the structure 
which affective states provide to experience also fragments and erodes. In 
highlighting certain elements of our environment as interesting, relevant, or to be 
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responded to, we are able to constrain what we need to take into account and 
prescribe bounds within which we perform our tasks.175  
Whereas certain elements normally appear salient in healthy perception, in 
schizophrenia, loss of affect entails a loss of salience and the work which affects 
do to structure and demarcate certain things as significant are lost. With this loss, 
those with schizophrenia cannot constrain a field within which they operate, act, 
and think. This affects the reasoning processes: a field of reference becomes 
limitless and unconstrained. Notice here that we are back to one of the key terms 
which Renee uses to describe her apprehension of spatiality and the world.  
Blankenburg also gives us the example of one of his own patients who had 
great difficulty in performing routine tasks such as getting dressed (2002). 
Blankenburg explains this as the effect of a diminishment in affectivity. With the 
diminishment of affect comes a reduction in perceiving patterns of salience, 
which constrain and structure both tasks and perception. When faced with the 
task of deciding what one will wear, when affective constraints are lost or are 
inoperative the ‘field’ of those things to be taken into consideration suddenly 
becomes wide open, limitless.176 However, when we look at memoirs, 
autobiographies, and psychiatric reports, it seems appropriate to suggest that it is 
not only the ‘things’ that appear in space which lose salience. It is the space 
itself. This is at once a simple, but far reaching point; and one which is important 
if we wish to avoid the ‘container’ model of space and take account how lived 
space structures - and is structured through – interaction.177 
Taking into consideration the flattening of affect holds important 
consequences for the way in which spatiality is perceived. With the flattening of 
affective significances, everything in space appears disconnected, without 
vitality and without relevance to oneself or to others. Instead of perceiving a 
world within which one is at home, which presents opportunities and 
possibilities, a world which is a field of reference and activity, we are confronted 
instead with a spatialised world, one which is a-social and limitless.  
                                                      
175 De Sousa focuses primarily on how affects structure a capacity for reason (see De Sousa 1980, 
2004). However, I will not discuss this here, as the point of relevance is that affects structure a 
healthy perception of the world.  
176 This then impacts on routine ability to follow instructions and complete tasks. The lessening 
of an ability to do these things is counted amongst the symptoms of cognitive impairment (see 
introduction for the discussion of symptomatology of schizophrenia). 
177 See Chapter 4 for discussion of varying conceptions of space. 
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Turning back to Renee’s account, there is a parallel between the words 
which Renee uses to describe her surroundings and space, and those of 
geometrical descriptions of space. Both place emphasis on space which is 
characterised as a continuous underlying container for things, rather than a 
context. The emphasis in both cases is on emptiness and stasis: both in the sense 
of things being stultifying (‘immobile’) and of things being unchangeable. This 
forms a sharp contrast to the manner in which lived, interpersonal space was 
characterised in healthy inhabitation of a world in Chapter 4. Here emphasis was 
on the fluidity and dynamism of spaces that are partly constitutive of specific 
contexts within which activities and exchanges gain meaning. In contrast, the 
life-world which Renee describes is closer to the description of ‘geometrical 
spaces’ discussed in Chapter 4, p.132).  
 
6.3 Schizophrenia, Space, and Interaction 
 
But how do deviations in spatial experience affect the manner in which 
understanding and relatedness between individuals is constituted? In Chapter 4, I 
argued that inherent to, and structuring, a sense of relatedness is spatiality. Here I 
argued that an apprehension of lived space as shared and intersubjective is partly 
constitutive of context. This forms a platform from which understanding begins, 
which is in turn transformed through our bodily interactions with others. In this 
way, our shared sense of space is open to revision on engagement with others: 
space both suggests and shapes the manner within which we first approach and 
make sense of others whilst others feed back into this sense of space, changing 
the qualitative feel of it and the manner which we inhabit it through interaction.  
 
(a) Perceiving Others 
 
 We saw in section 6.1 that schizophrenia involves loss of feelings of 
interpersonal relatedness; whilst section 6.2 explored how a loss of affective 
resonance is also something which occurs between individuals and the spaces 
which they occupy. Lived space loses its characteristic ‘homeliness’ and 
regionality, and becomes infinite and detached from human activity and life. The 
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dissociation of space from lived space causes a retreat from the world or 
environment being a meaningful context for action and interaction. Without 
being able to recognise and respond to the social, normative, and affective 
aspects which are inextricably bound with a sense of space as social, 
schizophrenic persons lose a frame of social reference which ordinarily feeds 
into our interactions with others, forming some of the presuppositions which we 
bring to our interpersonal exchanges. 
  The effect of depersonalisation and the de-contextualisation of space is 
that people and things come to be perceived in similar ways. This is evident in 
Renee’s account in which description of people comes to match that of her 
perception of ‘things’: they are mechanised and evade intuitive, pre-reflective 
understanding. Curiously, the sense of loss of affective attunement is recognised 
clearly by Renee who writes about the demise of being able to ‘make contact’ 
with others. In the early stages of her illness this is experienced as frightening 
and disturbing: 
 
During the visit I tried to establish contact with her, to feel that she was 
actually there, alive and sensitive. But it was futile. Though I certainly 
recognised her, she became part of the unreal world. I knew her name and 
everything about her, yet she appeared strange, unreal, like a statue. I saw 
her eyes, her nose, her lips moving, heard her voice and understood what 
she said perfectly, yet I was in the presence of a stranger. To restore 
contact between us I made desperate efforts to break through the invisible 
dividing wall but the harder I tried, the less successful I was and the 
uneasiness grew apace. (Sechehaye 1970: 36) 
 
As her illness progresses, she frequently remarks that the meanings and 
purpose of gestures escape her (1970: 44). They appear to be complex 
movements which have no meaning. People are described as “puppets” and 
mannequins moving here and there without apparent sense (Sechehaye 1970: 25-
26, 29-30, 37). Perception of gesture in schizophrenia loses its fluidity and 
inherent meaning. There is a spatialisation of movement instead of a smooth, 
coherent whole; the schizophrenic person perceives gesturing not as part of a 
communicative whole, but as individualised movements. Again, this has the 
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effect of diminishing intuitive interpersonal understanding, and also slows 
interaction. We already explored how schizophrenia often disturbs and affects 
bodily phenomenology, in particular feelings of body ownership (6.1).178 The 
result of this is that schizophrenic persons experience difficulty in pre-reflective 
action and movement as their gaze is turns inward upon themselves (Stanghellini 
2007: 130).179 Fuchs refers to this as a “disembodiment of the self” (2005a: 101) 
in which one occupies a perspective on one’s self whereby one is always aware 
of the movements, even those which are usually spontaneous: 
 
[T]he schizophrenic person suffers from what may be called a 
disembodiment of the self. She does not ‘inhabit’ her body any more, in 
the sense of using as taken for granted its implicit structure, its habits or 
automatic performances, as a medium for relating to the world. (Fuchs 
2005a: 101) 
 
 The effect of this is to slowdown and hamper gesturing or, in severe 
cases, for gesture and bodily movement to cease altogether.180 The body, and 
perception of others’ bodily expressivity, are experienced as mechanised (Fuchs 
2005a; Sass 2004; Stanghellini 2007, 2008: 312, 2009). This has a profound 
effect on interaction and feelings of relatedness which are propelled by bodily 
dialogue (Chapter 5), and contextualised and structured through a sense of shared 
space (Chapter 4).  
 Considering Renee’s account shows how fragmentation of affective 
attunement to others is expressed as seemingly irrevocable social detachment. 
She talks about an ‘invisible dividing wall’ and being in the presence of 
strangers. As perception of a face becomes fragmented and dissociative there is a 
feeling of an unfriendly and hostile sense of space between Renee and her friend. 
                                                      
178 Feelings of loss of body ownership, or that one is being controlled by something alien often 
occur alongside a loss of bodily transparency. (Hoerl 2001: 85; Stanghellini 2009: 57) 
179 See Stanghellini 2007: “A person with schizophrenia is also displaced from his perceptual 
process, and therefore can become aware … of them. His gaze is turned inside – he watches, so 
to say, his eyes watching.” (130) and: “Schizophrenic persons undergo a special kind of 
depersonalisation: the living body becomes a functioning body, a thing-like mechanism in which 
feelings, perceptions, and actions take place as if they happened in outer space. They also endure 
a special kind of de-socialisation: the interpersonal scene becomes an empty stage in which the 
main actor is unaware of the plot, out of touch from the role he is acting and unable to make 
sense of what the others are doing” (2007: 133). 
180 As in catatonic forms of schizophrenia. 
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The metaphor she employs to convey the experience of the onset of 
schizophrenia is also a fundamentally spatial one. The sense of ‘aliveness’ which 
Renee tries so hard to recapture and maintain is described again in a spatial term: 
she tries to ‘make contact’, that is, to reach out and reconnect herself.181 This is 
brought to attention very clearly in the, previously quoted,182 manner in which 
Renee describes the scene around her as she takes a walk with a friend: 
 
Around us the field spread away, cut up by hedges or clumps of trees, the 
white road ran ahead of us, the sun shone in the blue sky and warmed our 
backs. But I saw a boundless plain, unlimited, the horizon infinite. The 
trees and hedges were of cardboard, placed here and there, like stage 
accessories, and the road, oh, the endless road, white, glittering under the 
sun’s rays, glittering like a needle, above us the remorseless sun weighing 
down trees and houses under its electric rays. Over and above the vastness 
reigned a terrifying quiet, broken by noises making the silence still more 
quiet and terrifying. And I – I was lost with my friend in the limitless 
space. (1970: 37) 
 
Again, note the language: ‘endless’, ‘limitless’, ‘unlimited’, ‘infinite’. There is a 
recurring emphasis on stasis, limitlessness, purposelessness. There is also a loss 
of vitality, a loss of aliveness, in her perception of the world and of people (“I 
perceive a statue by my side, a puppet, part of the pasteboard scenery”). As Stern 
argues in Forms of Vitality (2010) feelings of vitality and expression of it are of 
central importance in unproblematic and developing interactions. Being 
confronted by this in others, and recognising it forms an impetus to approach and 
engage with others; and more, it shapes the course which that engagement will 
take (Stern 1985, 2010). And, once more, this is inherently linked to the spaces 
these interactions take place in: “movements happen in space, so a sense of space 
                                                      
181 This notion of ‘making contact’, that is feeling the affective pull of people as people in a full 
and rich sense is repeated throughout the book. During the early stages of her illness Renee prizes 
the contact she is able to make with ‘Mama’ alone (her therapist) and described the benefit she 
feels in therapy in terms of this ‘being able to make contact’. Eventually even this is lost and 
Renee enters into a period of illness in which she becomes detached and alienated from others 
and her environment, and in which perception of personhood is not possible. 
182 I replicate the quote here for ease of reference. 
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is defined by the movement.” (2010: 4) It seems that this is lost to Renee in 
schizophrenia.  
This is also hinted at by Minkowski (1970) in his exploration of ‘light’ and 
‘dark’ spaces. Light space, he writes is, ‘precise, natural and non-problematic’ 
(428). Furthermore: 
 
I also situate myself in this space, and in doing so I make myself similar to 
ambient things, at least in one aspect of my being; I occupy a place in this 
space in relation to other objects which are there, exactly as they do. I ‘fall 
into line’ in this way … and the space that englobes all of us brings about a 
levelling effect. Space thus becomes a ‘public domain’ I share it with 
everything that is there; it no more belongs to me than to anything else that 
it contains beside me; I occupy only a very small place in it. It is in this 
space that I see my fellow men - seeing, moving, acting, living as I do. 
Light space is an immediately socialised space in the broadest sense of the 
term. (428) 
 
Minkowski’s description of ‘light’ space or a non-pathological apprehension of 
space emphasises just what is lost in an unproblematic inhabitation of lived, 
social and intersubjective space: precisely the ability which is compromised for 
Renee. 
 Given this, we might identify ‘un-worlding’ to be at the heart of spatial 
apprehension in schizophrenia. A loss of the ability to hold things and people 
close to oneself: to feel connected. We see this when we appeal to Renee’s 
account. At the heart of Renee’s experience is a felt alienation of herself from: 
(1) others, (2) from the spaces she finds herself within, and (3) the objects and 
tools in those spaces. The waning of ability to perceive tools as having a use for a 
particular subject in a particular situation also occurs alongside a muting of 
ability to have a sense of the bodies of others as lived bodies. The gestures which 
animate and imbue our interactions with tacit meaning and depth now stultify 
and float free from meaning. In the above quote, Renee’s friend becomes a 
‘statue’: devoid of a sense of vitality and aliveness. There is nothing for Renee to 
be affected by or to relate to. And we have already seen how for her: 
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People turn weirdly about, they make gestures, movements without sense; 
they are phantoms whirling on an infinite plain, crushed by the pitiless 
electric light. (Sechehaye 1970:44) 
 
 There is not only a draining of lived meaning, then, from objects and space, but 
also from others. Sense decouples from movement and characteristic gestures 
lose their stock meanings.183 When this happens, a basic sense of others as 
people; as holding potentiality for both self and other wanes and is lost. The 
reciprocal to and fro sustained in interaction is compromised and the individual 
suffering from schizophrenia loses the foothold from which to launch into 
interaction: instead ascribing motives, reasons, and the ‘rules’ for interaction 
become salient and necessary.  
 
(b) Praecox Feeling 
 
Often, work on intersubjectivity in schizophrenia has tended to focus on 
the effects of changes to intersubjectivity stemming from and impacting on the 
schizophrenic individual. However, it is interesting to widen the scope of this 
and consider the effect which it has on their interaction partner. To do so, we 
may examine certain characteristic features of interaction in the early and 
prodromal stages of schizophrenia. In particular, therapists have remarked on the 
difficulty which often accompanies understanding those with schizophrenia. 
Jaspers remarked that the schizophrenic person appears to inhabit another world 
or existence, which proves difficult to enter into and share (Jaspers 1997 [1959]: 
281184; Hoerl 2001: 63185). Stanghellini reflects on his experience as follows: 
                                                      
183 See Chapter 5 for an exploration of the role of differing forms of gesture in interaction and the 
role this plays in constructing a sense of relatedness. 
184 See the following: “The normal world is characterised by objective human ties, a mutuality in 
which all men meet; it is a satisfying world, a world that brings increase and makes life unfold.” 
(1997: 281). Jaspers goes on to make brief remarks about the ‘worlds of schizophrenic persons’ 
(282). He surmises that far from there being a single frame of reference through which to 
understand ‘the world of the schizophrenic’ that there is no mutual world: “Schizophrenics, 
however, are not surrounded by a single schizophrenic world, but by a number of such worlds. If 
there were a single, uniform world formation schizophrenics would understand each other and 
form their own community. But we find just the opposite. They hardly ever understand each 
other; if anything, a healthy person understands them better” (282-3). The lack of a shared mutual 
context or frame of reference isolates the patient and excludes them from the “mutuality in which 
all men meet”. 
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Although my efforts to understand, by suspending all clinical judgement, 
allows me to see this person’s self-reports as a possible configuration of 
human consciousness. I must admit that there is something 
incomprehensible … in these experiences. (2007: 129) […] He seems to 
look and to listen from another place. (2007: 130) 
 
And for Sass: 
 
Schizophrenics are … perhaps the clearest illustration of that 
incomprehensibility which … can occur between persons who may share 
a language but not a single ‘form of life’. (1992a: 110)  
 
Whilst there is a sense of alienation lying at the heart of individual 
experience within schizophrenia, it is also important to acknowledge that there is 
frequently a sense of alienation accompanying the intersubjective interactions 
engaged in with those suffering from schizophrenia. Many writers and 
psychiatrists have often commented on the uncanny feelings that arise when 
sustaining dialogue, eye contact, or interaction with someone diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. The ‘praecox feeling’ captures this. Involved in the praecox 
feeling is that one is facing someone entirely alien, distanced, and detached both 
from the situation at hand and from oneself. 186 Often described as strange, odd 
and disconcerting,187 it is this sense of radical alterity that some psychiatrists 
have considered the best diagnostic indicator of schizophrenia” (Sass 1992a: 
45).188 The mark of the praecox feeling is one of “strangeness or remoteness, of 
                                                                                                                                                  
185 Hoerl, reflecting on Jaspers, states the following: “Schizophrenic patients, Jaspers suggests, 
live in ‘specific, private worlds’, which are not mediated by communication with others and 
whose origins are to be sought in a psychopathological process that actually severs ties” (2001: 
63).  
186 Sass helpfully provides the etymology of this term as deriving from the term ‘dementia 
praecox’, an older name for schizophrenia. See Sass 2004: 130. 
187 See Sass, who defines the praecox feelings as: “the feeling of strangeness or remoteness, of 
encountering something beyond normal emotional contact or rapport, that normal persons may 
have in the presence of a person with schizophrenia” (2004: 130). 
188 Also see Stanghellini 2007: “This feeling of displacement has been, right or wrong, also 
considered the kernel of the ‘encounter’ with the schizophrenic: a precocious feeling of alterity 
… that I feel in front of him. Indeed this displacement hides a much more complex structure. It is 
not just an intuitive and pre-categorical diagnostic existence, which the phenomenological gaze 
helps to reveal. In the first place, I have the sensation that he is not there where I see him. The 
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encountering something beyond normal emotional contact or rapport” (Sass 
2004: 130) and is constituted through interaction. It often places a strain on 
ordinary patterns of interaction. The feeling which is created between patient and 
therapist is one which makes fluid and dynamic interaction difficult.  
But what is it that makes interpersonal interaction, exchange and 
understanding difficult? One answer to this seems to be the way in which 
reciprocal embodied expressivity and ways of sharing our context change. 
Returning to Jaspers’s point of schizophrenia patients seemingly occupying 
another world, there is the feeling that whilst we inhabit the same physical space, 
the same language resources, we do not share a context. Patient and therapist lack 
a shared sense of commonality which encompasses the way the world about 
them is felt. This creates difficulty in making sense of both the symptoms and 
situation which the patient experiences (Hoerl 2001: 83). Hoerl remarks that 
“this situation is radically different from our own” (2001: 83).  
Given the flattening of affect and depersonalisation which also often 
occur, we are also faced with another who is not able to affectively resonate with 
oneself, or feel affect in a healthy manner. I have already remarked on the way 
which this impacts to slow or preclude ‘normal’ bodily interaction. In short, the 
sense of relatedness between therapist and patient is disturbed and fragmented, 
and this phenomenon is rooted in a loss of conspicuousness of normal bodily 
affective relations.189   
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have explored and explained the deviations to 
intersubjectivity which occur in schizophrenia. We saw that central to 
schizophrenia was a loss of interpersonal relatedness to others, which lessens the 
experience of the personhood of others. I began the chapter by making the point 
                                                                                                                                                  
here-and-now experience is at stake. He seems to look and to listen from another place.” (130). 
And also Sass 1994 “Most other primary features of schizophrenia can be understood as aspects 
of, or else as contributing to, this autism and the alienating, difficult-to-understand quality (the 
quality of strangeness and detachment known as the praecox feeling) that accompanies it.” (95) 
189 This forms an interesting parallel to work by Jonathan Cole (1999), which described a 
fragmentation of ordinary interactions when ability to tacitly express oneself both facially and 
through the body is lost in physiological illnesses such as Möbius Syndrome, Parkinson’s disease 
and Bell’s palsy. He interestingly notes how a lessening of expressive ability on one side calls for 
a change in patterns of interaction, and the understanding ensues. 
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that in preoccupying itself with the role of attributing propositional attitudes to 
people, based on observation of behaviour, folk psychology has neglected a more 
primordial feature of interpersonal understanding: relatedness. Examining 
intersubjectivity in schizophrenia reveals just how central relatedness is to 
healthy intersubjectivity and interpersonal understanding.  
To explore this further, I examined the deviations to experience of space 
as ‘lived’ undergone in schizophrenia. We saw that the condition often entails a 
geometricisation of space, which stems from depersonalisation and results in a 
‘de-contextualisation’ of the schizophrenic person. Also lost is a sense of sharing 
a social world. To explore the phenomenological underpinnings of this, I drew 
on Sass’s notion of un-worlding, Minkowski on distance, and De Sousa on 
affective salience. I suggested that exploring the deviations which occur to lived 
distance and closeness, provides a more helpful route into understanding the 
existential changes this illness provokes.  
The loss of a pre-reflective and affective attunement to others emerges as 
characteristic within some forms of schizophrenia, which severely hampers a 
normal ability to be with and around others. First, I emphasised how changes to 
(i) the perception of space as lived, and (ii) bodily expressivity are central in 
schizophrenia. I then outlined how this affects the individual’s ability to feel 
related to others. This exploration highlighted what is normally taken for granted 
in our everyday interactions with others.  
Such a study, then, is invaluable in considering what it is which enables a 
trouble free and everyday ability to engage and understand others. In the next 
chapter, I look at deviations that occur in intersubjectivity in depression. I focus 
on changes to cenesthesia, and the way this ordinarily structures experience of 
others and world. We find that ability to successfully tacitly inhabit and relate to 
our bodies as ‘lived’ is central to intersubjectivity and interpersonal 
understanding.  The next chapter moves on to use depressive experience as a 
case study to examine how changes in one’s relationship to the ‘lived’ body 
affect ability to engage in and sustain a sense of relatedness with others. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DEPRESSION AND THE BODY 
 
 
“The most important part of the environment is my  
fellow-man.” (James 1884: 195) 
 
“It was never this estrangement that grieved  
him nor anything tangible, but a constant 
                                and indigenous sorrow.” (Peake 1946: 205) 
 
 
In this chapter I scrutinise changes to intersubjectivity in depression and 
develop a phenomenological account of changes to interaffective relatedness. 
Doing so contributes to this thesis by underlining how felt relatedness to others is 
integral to a capacity to interact with and understand them. People with 
depression often report a sense of being irrevocably ‘cut off’ from others (Karp 
1997: 7; Styron 1990). This is closely associated with the feeling that one cannot 
‘reach out’ or ‘be reached’ by others (Brampton 2008: 10). For example, one 
person describing their experience of depression states: 
 
I wanted a connection I couldn’t have; I did not understand or value the 
ones I did have. It was a story I saw again and again in the ward. ‘Only 
connect!’ E.M. Forster had written, but we hadn’t, or couldn’t, or never 
had. There was the doctor, lost in his personal torment, or Heather, 
grasping for superficial symbols of connectedness, or Luisa, looking for it 
through sex. It seemed to me the basic definition of any mental illness, 
this persistent, painful inability to simply be with someone else. On our 
side of that severed connection, it was hell, a life lived behind glass. 
(Thompson 1996: 199-200) 
 
Here Thompson expresses something central to depression: the loss of 
interaffective relatedness. Accounts, testimonies, and memoirs of those who 
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have, or have suffered from, depression place this loss as central to their 
narratives. Solomon describes it as “the aloneness within us made manifest” 
which “destroys … connection to others” (Solomon 2002: 15); whilst for 
Brampton “[l]ife is about connection. There is nothing else. Depression is the 
opposite; it is an illness defined by alienation” (2008: 1). And, when asked to 
talk about his experience of depression, another person states:  
 
I believe depression is – a disease of isolation that tells you to withdraw, 
stay away, don’t be a social person. Stay away from the people who are 
going to make you better. (Karp 1996: 35 [author’s italics]).  
 
Though I have referred to just four testimonies here, these are indicative and 
reflective of a wide and pervasive experience of intersubjective alienation in 
depression.190 Classified as a mood disorder (DSM-IV: 328; ICD-10:112, 119ff), 
common symptoms of depression include: feelings of sadness, inappropriate 
guilt, changes in weight and appetite, loss of energy and vitality, feelings of 
worthlessness, difficulty in thought and speech, and retreat from – and 
diminishment in ability to cope with – social situations (DSM-IV: 328).191  
 In this chapter, I go one step further and characterise depression as a 
disorder of interaffective relatedness which fundamentally involves changes to 
affects that attune us to others. We see from the quotes above that in depression 
there is a felt loss of interpersonal connectedness. The lack of connection is not 
simply experienced as absent. Its absence is palpable to the person with 
depression. What is more, it is felt as painful.192 This is a loss, not just of 
affectivity but specifically of affects which connected one to others and which 
promote a felt sense of belonging.193 Changes to relatedness in depression are 
                                                      
190 Also, see the interviews of persons with depression in Karp 1996 (26-27, 34-38). These lead 
Karp to state: “An insistent theme raised in every interview centres on human connection. Each 
person’s tale of depression inevitably speaks to questions of isolation, withdrawal, and lack of 
connection. The pain of depression arises in part because of separation from others; from an 
inability to connect, even as one desperately yearns for such connection” (1996: 26-27). 
191 In what follows, when I refer to ‘depression’ I indicate what DSM-IV labels ‘Major 
Depressive Disorder’ (369ff), diagnosis is based on the presence of symptoms listed above. 
192 We see this in the quote from Thompson above, which describes this graphically as a “severed 
connection”.  
193 We see this in some first-person narratives of depression manifest in the way in which 
spatiality is experienced: instead of a place feeling ‘homely’, it takes of a darker atmosphere. For 
example: “I did notice that my surroundings took on a different tone at certain times. The shadow 
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different from those undergone in schizophrenia (Chapter 6). In schizophrenia a 
sense of apprehending others as affective-beings fragments and people appear 
devitalised and mechanistic. Although this sometimes occurs in depression in 
which depersonalisation is co-present, persons with depression usually retain a 
sense of affective personhood of others. Importantly, this is recognised but not 
felt. Persons with depression often report feeling outside of and apart from the 
social world, and excluded and distanced from others (see Karp 1996). This 
obviously has ramifications for one’s sense of self and world; in depression 
others are felt as physically present and sharing the same physical space as the 
person with depression, and yet they are apprehended as affectively far away. 
In this chapter I seek to achieve two things: (1) An exploration of changes 
to interaffective relatedness and the ways this impacts on intersubjectivity and a 
capacity for understanding others; and (2) Suggest the ramifications of this for 
accounts of everyday intersubjectivity. I argue that consideration of depression 
reveals that our ‘start point’ in understanding others is one in which we are 
situated with them in a shared context within which we feel affectively close. In 
emphasising the role of attributing propositional attitudes, folk psychology 
forgets what is in place to enable such an ability in the first place.  
In seeking to characterise and explore changes to interaffective 
relatedness in depression, I examine how changes to bodily phenomenology 
impact on a sense of others as holding possibilities for oneself. To do this, I 
explore several examples from first-person accounts of depression which 
emphasise changes in bodily phenomenology. Exploring these, we see that 
depression is a disorder which involves significant changes to bodily 
phenomenology. Depression upsets taken-for-granted bodily awareness 
(cenesthesia): the body becomes conspicuous and is often felt as painful. In the 
analysis which follows, I suggest that these changes to background cenesthesia 
impact on a felt connectedness to others (relatedness), so that it is extremely 
hampered, and in severe cases, lost. I then suggest how this affects 
intersubjectivity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
of nightfall seemed more sombre, my mornings were less buoyant. Walks in the woods became 
less zestful, and there was a moment during my working hours in the late afternoon when a kind 
of panic and anxiety overtook me, just for a few minutes, accompanied by a visceral queasiness – 
such a seizure was at least slightly alarming, after all” (Styron 1990: 41). 
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7.1 Depression and Distortions to Bodily Phenomenology 
 
(a) General Remarks 
 
As we have seen, many testimonials of depression feature two strongly 
recurring motifs: (1) a loss of interpersonal connectedness, which is often 
experienced as somatically painful; and (2) felt changes to the lived body. 
Though classified as a psychological disorder, depression involves a high 
prevalence of somatic symptoms (pains in localised parts of the body, agitation, 
tiredness, feelings of constriction in the chest (DSM-IV: 350; Fuchs 2005a: 99)) 
as well as psychological ones (Solomon 2002: 20). Depression also involves 
symptoms which cannot be categorised as solely psychological or somatic, but 
involve both (for example, anxiety, insomnia or hypersomnia, diminished 
concentration (DSM-IV: 356)). In this way, depression is a disorder which has a 
profound effect on experience of the body as lived and dynamic (Fuchs 2001, 
2005a).  
In what follows, I look in detail at the effect these changes to bodily 
experience have on intersubjectivity in depression. In order to do so, I engage 
with first-person accounts of depression. The exploration which follows presents 
us with ways of thinking, considering, and understanding the changes to 
cenesthesia in depression. This achieves two things. First, it enables new ways of 
understanding changes to a capacity for intersubjectivity in depression. And 
secondly, it also provides a counter case from which we may re-evaluate ways 
interpersonal understanding has traditionally been conceived. Consider the 
following: 
 
(1) “As I saw it, my mind made a choice each day about how to torment 
my body. One day it might be a terrible ‘grief knot’ in my throat. On 
another it might be chest pains that could easily be mistaken for a 
heart attack. Other days it might be an awful heaviness in my eyes, 
pressure in my head, feelings of sadness in my cheeks, shaky hands 
and legs, or even some combination of all these. On my most difficult 
days I was constantly aware of my body, monitoring from minute to 
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minute whether things had become better or worse. During all of this 
I felt deeply alone. Everyone else seemed to be moving through their 
days peacefully, laughing and having fun. I resented them because 
they were experiencing such an easy time of it. I felt utterly cut off 
from them emotionally. I was angry because there was no way they 
could understand what I was going through. Their presence seemed to 
magnify my sense of isolation.” (Karp 1996: 7) 
 
(2) “The madness of depression is, generally speaking, the antithesis of 
violence. It is a storm indeed, but a storm of murk. Soon evident are 
the slowed-down responses, near paralysis, psychic energy throttled 
back close to zero. Ultimately, the body is affected and feels sapped, 
drained.” (Styron 1990: 46-47) 
 
(3) “What began to enrage him the most was my remoteness, my zombie 
face – this blank look I had. It closed him out, which was the one 
thing he could not bear; to him, overt hostility would have been 
better. We could be watching television, having a meal, driving down 
the road, when he would say, ‘You’re doing it again’. The zombie 
look was, in fact, the mask of depression, a clinical symptom known 
well to psychiatrists. But the creeping emotional numbness I was 
falling into made it impossible for me to know when my face 
assumed that expression.” (Thompson 1996: 123) 
 
(4) “My body feels spongy and heavy, weirdly unfamiliar. It is as if my 
flesh has been pumped full of a thick viscous liquid.” (Brampton 
2008: 28) 
 
Uniting each of the above quotes is a common concern with the way in 
which the body becomes salient and conspicuous, though this is realised in 
different ways. Quote (1) shows how the body becomes conspicuous through 
near constant feelings of pain or discomfort. The physical discomfort which Karp 
experiences brings awareness of his body to the forefront of his attention and 
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becomes the default way in which it is apprehended. His body as a taken-for-
granted background to all encounters, interactions, and activities is lost and 
fragments as he turns attention to the various feelings he experiences. Parts of the 
body appear as uncomfortably salient through feelings of constriction (throat, 
chest) or pressure (eyes, head). Attention is diverted to these experiences, and the 
heightened awareness of the body as uncomfortable prevents a normal ‘getting 
on with things’: instead the body becomes an obstacle and absorbs the attention 
of the sufferer (Fuchs 2005a: 99).  
Quote (2) speaks of the extreme fatigue and weariness which is a 
hallmark of depression. Emphasising the slowing of the body’s responsiveness 
and a lack of energy, Styron writes of what DSM-IV describes as an increase in 
fatigue which is disproportional to activity (DSM-IV: 350). Depression often 
entails a pervasive tiredness which is felt prior to any activity or physical 
exertion, and which makes movement, activity, and exercise difficult. Persons 
with depression report that it takes increased time, effort, and energy to complete 
routine tasks of self-care, or the demands placed on one through work or day-to-
day responsibilities (Solomon 2001: 53-54).194 
The experience of the body as slowed and drained is closely related to 
feelings of unfamiliarity of one’s body which often accompany depressive 
episodes and experiences. This is the subject of quote (4). The type of bodily 
conspicuousness here is revealed through change to the background feeling of 
the body (cenesthesia). Instead of one’s body being (by and large) inconspicuous 
when performing activities, Brampton retains a constant awareness of her body 
as weighty, heavy, and alien. This awareness of the body as such becomes the 
default manner in which the body is experienced and, we shall see later, 
structures the way one acts and perceives the world and spatiality. 
Awareness of one’s body as heavy and cumbersome causes changes in 
the way one perceives what one is able (and unable) to do. Tasks which once 
                                                      
194 “I kept running through the individual steps in my mind: you turn and put your feet on the 
floor; you stand; you walk from here to the bathroom; you open the bathroom door; you walk to 
the edge of the tub; you turn on the water; you step under the water; you rub yourself with soap; 
you rinse; you step out; you dry yourself; you walk back to the bed. Twelve steps, which sounded 
to me as onerous as a tour through the Stations of the Cross [...] I would sometimes start to cry 
again, weeping not only because of what I could not do, but because the fact that I could not do it 
seemed so idiotic to me” (Solomon 2001: 53-54). 
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appeared easy now take planning and perseverance.195 One person reports how 
this impacts on their interactions with other people:  
 
[T]he sufferer from depression … finds himself, like a walking casualty 
of war, thrust into the most intolerable social and family situations. There 
he must, despite the anguish devouring his brain, present a face 
approximating the one that is associated with ordinary events and 
companionship. He must try to utter small talk, and be responsive to 
questions, and knowingly nod and frown and … even smile.  But it is a 
fierce trial attempting to speak a few simple words. (Styron 1990: 62-63)  
 
This makes plain the extent to which tasks which are normally taken for granted 
require energy and become tiring. Karp also identifies this with regard to 
intersubjectivity and interaction when he writes: “Depressive feelings make 
interaction arduous and sometimes the need to withdraw from others overrides 
the realisation that self-isolation will only deepen one’s anguish” (Karp 1996: 
35). Feelings of the body as cumbersome and heavy, then, impact not only on 
performing tasks and activities but also upon being around, and responsive to, 
others.  
The effect of the arduousness of maintaining a ‘normal’ bodily and facial 
expression and carriage are also made plain in quote (3). In quote (3) Thompson 
details the changes undergone in a normal bodily expressivity and the way in 
which this can impact others. Here Thompson describes the effect which a facial 
freezing had on her (then) partner, which she attributes to a growing numbness 
and diminishing affectivity. This, again, is common to experience of depression 
(Stryron 1990: 16) and stems from a growing weightiness and heaviness 
experienced in the body as it is felt, as well as diminishing in felt affect. Quote 
(3) reports not only on the experience of a lessening in bodily animation and 
affectivity, but also on the impact this might have on others.  
In each of these cases there are changes to the body as it is ordinarily 
experienced (or not experienced) in healthy interactions with others and the 
                                                      
195 For example: “I found everything excruciatingly difficult, and so, for example, the prospect of 
lifting the telephone receiver seemed to me like bench pressing four hundred pounds” (Solomon 
2001: 85). 
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world. Instead of the body forming the background of our awareness of self, 
others, and world, it becomes conspicuous in several ways: through physical 
discomfort (quotes (1) and (4)), as a slowing down, or lack of energy (quote (2)), 
and through our intersubjective exchanges with others (quote (3)). We find that 
in depression there is a re-attunement in the way in which the body is primarily 
experienced. Fuchs (2005a) notes that in severe depression the body loses the 
quality of transparency (95) and comes to be experienced as object-like and in 
all its materiality. He refers to this as “corporealisation of the lived body.” 
(2005a: 96) 
 
(b) Corporealisation and the Loss of Bodily Possibilities 
 
We can identify the process of corporealisation present in quotes (1) and 
(4). In both quotes there is a loss of the normal way in which the body structures 
– and is felt in – healthy, everyday life. Instead, parts of the body (as in quotation 
(1)), or the body as a whole (as in quotation (4)), come to be experienced as 
objects of awareness rather than as a medium of activity. Quotation (4), in 
particular, conveys the feeling of strangeness which accompanies this process. 
The corporealised body becomes “weirdly unfamiliar” in Brampton’s words; this 
is markedly different from the way in which the body is often taken for granted 
in our actions and activities.196 Before exploring corporealisation – and its 
                                                      
196 Though this is not always the case. For example, when learning to balance whilst riding a 
bike, we feel a heightened awareness of our body as something which has the potential to be hurt, 
or as cumbersome as we wobble and attempt to keep balance. We are also often aware of our 
bodies when learning new skills, practising and repeating techniques and postures until they 
become habitual. For example, when first playing the violin one learns to hold the violin and the 
bow. In doing so one’s body feels awkward and rebellious: the exertion of holding the neck of the 
violin with the left hand, the elbow held aloft at chest height and the wrist forced to keep a flat 
line makes the arms feel heavy and awkward. The student then adjusts their cheek on the chin 
rest, trying to find a comfortable position. In the process, one’s body aches and feels rebellious as 
we force ourselves to keep the required position. However, the strangeness of the position of the 
arms, hands, and cheek dissolves on sustained engagement with, and practice of, the instrument. 
What used to be cumbersome and cause aches, becomes natural and second nature. Young (2005) 
also details the way in which the body may be experienced as conspicuous and as a focus of 
one’s awareness in pregnancy (‘Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation’) or under the 
objectifying gaze of others (‘Women Recovering Our Clothes’, see also the discussion of Sartre 
and bodily phenomenology in Chapter 5 of this thesis (pp.159-162)). However, in many of our 
routine activities the body, rather than being an object of attention or awareness, becomes that 
which enables actions to take place and structures the manner in which they do. This will be 
discussed shortly. 
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presence and effect on the body – in depression, we first need to say something 
of how the body ordinarily structures experience.  
 
(i) The Body as it is Ordinarily Structures 
Experience: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
 
Various positions in phenomenology state the inextricability of body and 
experience of the world (Husserl 1989, Sartre 1958, Merleau-Ponty 1962). In 
opposition to the way the body has often been conceived of as a ‘thing’ or 
‘object’ in the world, these positions state that the body is not merely the vehicle 
through which consciousness interacts with the world; this way of characterising 
the body forgets the more primary way in which it structures experience in day-
to-day life (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 235ff). Arguing against this, Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty, in their analysis of how the body structures experience, make the 
strong claim: ‘I am my body’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 231; Sartre 1985: 326).197 In 
doing so, they seek to exorcise the notion of “the ghost in the machine” (Ryle 
1976 [1949]) implied by the conception of subjectivity and body as separable.198 
Instead, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty emphasise how the body is constitutive of 
subjectivity. It is argued that the body opens up possibilities within, and shapes 
experience of, the world (see Merleau-Ponty 1962). In the discussion which 
follows, I explore the arguments of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Both illustrate 
how the body shapes experience. 
In order to do this both Husserl (1989) and Merleau-Ponty (1962), draw 
on the long-standing distinction between two ways we may conceive, relate to, 
and understand the body as: (1) Körper, that is the objective, physical body, 
which encompasses the body as it appears as an object of reflection; and as (2) 
Leib which characterises the body as it is lived and pre-reflectively experienced. 
Involved in the latter characterisation is the body as it functions when things go 
well and one is pre-reflectively caught up in activity. Husserl (1989) and 
                                                      
197 In asserting this, Sartre was influenced by Marcel who asserts “I am my body”. See Marcel 
1951: 119; 1963: 47.  
198 As typified by Descartes mind-body dualism. See, for instance, Descartes (2000: 57-70). 
There is a long and rich philosophical history underlying this point, which is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. For a history of changing philosophical treatments and conceptions of the body see: 
Crane and Patterson (2000). 
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Merleau-Ponty (1962) argue that in this situation, one’s body acts as a field of 
intentional possibility through which things are experienced and apprehended.  
Exploring how the body does this, Husserl outlines two indispensible 
areas in which embodiment shapes and constrains experience: first, the body 
orients experience, and secondly, things appear as possibilities in terms of bodily 
ability. To begin, Husserl makes the point that the body is that which provides 
perception with positionality: 
 
The Body is, in the first place, the medium of all perception; it is the 
organ of perception and is necessarily involved in all perception. (1989: 
§18) 
 
Here, Husserl states that things are given to us in particular ways in virtue of our 
body. Being embodied orients experience of the world. The body becomes the 
locus point from which things are experienced from a certain perspective or 
distance in relation to us.199 It is, Husserl writes, the “zero point of orientation, 
the bearer of the here and now, out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the 
whole world of the senses” (1989: §18). The body performs this role for Husserl 
simply because there is no way of experiencing and perceiving things from 
outside it: I cannot be near or far from my body, instead things appear near or 
far, left or right in virtue of my bodily position. Importantly, for Husserl, the 
body orients not only in terms of physical distance and measurable relationality 
but also in terms of possibilities. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty refer to this as 
experiential ‘horizons’ of possibility (see Husserl 2001, Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
Through the horizonal structure of experience I apprehend both present and 
future possibilities. In this way, as I look at the cup on the table, it appears to me 
in virtue of my current bodily position. Involved in my perception of the cup is 
the possibility that if I squint or turn my head to the side, I see it from another 
angle, which reveals something more about the cup (Husserl 2001: 50-52).  
My perception of the cup is also structured in terms of possible actions: it 
might appear as graspable or as delicate (if it’s a fine china cup). In this way, 
                                                      
199 Merleau-Ponty makes the same point when he states: “The relationship between my body and 
things is that of the absolute here to there, of the source of distances to distance. My body is the 
field within which my perceptive powers are localised” (1964b: 166). 
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horizons of possibility involve multiple sensory modalities (Husserl 1989: 42). 
Let us take another example: looking at a rotten apple on the table (vision) 
involves apprehension that if I get closer it may smell bad (smell), or that it may 
feel soft and oozing beneath my fingers if I pick it up and put it in the bin 
(touch). Horizons of possibility are structured and shaped by the body: both in 
terms of positionality (I see this side of the cup, if I move away from the rotten 
apple, I will not smell it) and action (the cup appears as something I can reach 
out and grasp, the door is something I can walk through).200 In everyday 
experience Husserl states that objects suggest ‘hidden dimensions’ for bodily 
activity: doors are to be walked through, seats are to be sat on and so on (2001: 
50ff).  
What is more, Husserl states that horizons are not always perceived 
neutrally, but can be appealing or otherwise: they have an “affective claim” on us 
(2001: 98). In this way, on a hot day after a jog, a glass of water appears as 
tantalisingly graspable. Horizons of possibility, then, are necessarily constrained 
and presented in virtue of what we are able to do, within the limits of our bodily 
capabilities and phenomenology. 
Building on the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty also argues that 
ordinarily when things ‘go well’ I do not notice my body (Leib); I do not need to 
hold it in conscious thought or wilfully direct its actions in a conscious 
manner.201 Instead, the body is what pre-reflectively opens up the world to me. 
“Movement”, Merleau-Ponty writes:  
 
[I]s not thought about movement, and bodily space is not space thought 
of or represented. ‘Each voluntary movement takes place in a setting, 
against a background which is determined by the movement itself  … We 
perform our movements in a space which is not ‘empty’ or unrelated to 
them, but which on the contrary, bears a highly determinate relation to 
                                                      
200 Husserl refers to this as “kinastheses” (2001: 50-52). This term indicates how the body 
necessarily structures horizons of possibility: “The lived-body is constantly there, functioning as 
an organ of perception; and here it is also, in itself, an entire system of compatibly harmonising 
organs of perception” (Husserl 2001: 50). 
201 See footnote 197 for exceptions to the way in which we can experience our body as 
conspicuous in unproblematic, everyday life. 
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them: movement and background are: in fact, only artificially separated 
stages of a unique totality.’ (1962: 159)202    
 
We do not ordinarily, in everyday situations, perceive any gap between ‘myself’, 
‘my body’, and ‘my situation’. Instead, for Merleau-Ponty, there is a horizon 
which binds our actions and future actions together in experience. He refers to 
this as the “intentional arc” which: 
 
[P]rojects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our 
physical, ideological, and moral situation, or rather which results in our 
being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings 
about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 157)  
 
Resisting the idea that in order to act within the world, we must first be able to 
represent it, Merleau-Ponty argues that in non-problematic experience, we do not 
begin from the stand point of ‘I think’ (1962: 156ff). Instead, the way in which 
we find ourselves in the world is primarily structured by motility, action, and 
potential for action, in terms of the ‘I can’ (1962: page). This is what Merleau-
Ponty refers to as ‘motor intentionality’.  
Motor intentionality describes the manner in which we are able to engage 
habitually in an action. For example, when I sit at my piano, I do not have to 
explicitly think of the level at which I raise my hands, the position I place them 
over the keys. I do not have to consciously place my feet at the pedals, poised 
over them, but not yet pressing down on them. I do not consciously signal to 
myself to start playing, or gauge the force with which I begin to strike the keys. 
Merleau-Ponty’s point is that in healthy experience one does not first represent 
and think through the situation, and then perform the actions. Rather, the actions 
flow from the situation and take place within a context which gives them 
meaning. Furthermore, my actions flow from my bodily capabilities.  
Likewise, when I am going about my day-to-day business, things in the 
world seem possible or impossible; offer the prospect of amusement or despair, 
                                                      
202 Merleau-Ponty quotes Goldstein here. For further details see footnote 93 in Merleau-Ponty 
1962: 159. 
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in terms of my bodily skills, capabilities, and limitations. When passing a shop 
which sells musical instruments, the piano in the window might call out to me, 
presenting itself as something to be played. I might feel the itch in my fingers 
and a deep urge to play it. In this bodily way, the instrument does not primarily 
appear as detached from me, but instead my experience of it is shaped and 
configured by my skills and capabilities. These bodily skills and capabilities 
project possibilities onto myself which are bodily possibilities.  
Merleau-Ponty goes on to argue that this has an impact on the way in 
which space, and things within space, are experienced and configured (Merleau-
Ponty 1962: 159, quoted above on pp. 221-222,). Merleau-Ponty argues that 
there is an intentional directedness between person and the world: our bodily 
capabilities project and create a spatiality within which things are experienced 
according to potential for action. This is given and shaped in terms of the ‘I can’. 
The jar on the top shelf is not just presented to me as occupying a certain 
position in relation to my own positionality. Instead, it appears as within reach or 
grasp, or hopelessly out of reach. The hill which I stand in front of may reach 
high into the sky, but appears as a challenge (or trial – depending on health and 
capability) to be surmounted. In this way, the body shapes potentiality of action 
through the ‘I can’. In turn this structures perception of the world and opens up 
possibilities. So what happens when this fragments? Fuchs argues that depression 
involves a fragmentation of the lived body as it structures experience, as a result 
of a corporealisation of the lived body. 
 
(i) Corporealisation and the Loss of Bodily Possibilities 
 
Now we have accounted for ways in which the body ordinarily structures 
experience, let us return to examine how this changes in depression. We have 
already seen in section 7.1a that depression involves an upheaval in the way in 
which the body is experienced. Fuchs refers to this as a corporealisation of the 
lived body. In describing the body as it is ordinarily experienced as ‘lived’ 
Fuchs, drawing on Merleau-Ponty (1962), maintains that the body is 
‘transparent’ (Fuchs 2005a: 95). That is, it is not usually experienced as 
something requiring attention. Instead, it sets the scene and shapes the manner in 
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which things are experienced. As Fuchs puts it: “the world is disclosed by the 
interactions of the body with its environment” (2005a: 96).  
Corporealisation involves a loss of this bodily transparency. Instead of 
the body being a “mediator of experience” (Fuchs 2005a: 96), it becomes an 
object of awareness. In speaking of the body as ‘mediator’ between subject and 
world, Fuchs opens a possibility of interpreting what follows as a weak form of 
subject-body dualism (Leder 2005). Here, the body might be interpreted as a 
container for subjectivity, rather than constitutive of it (as Husserl, Sartre, and 
Merleau-Ponty argue). This is a claim which Fuchs wishes to avoid, as he 
himself states (2005b). Instead, his characterisation of corporealisation assumes 
that the lived-body structures experience in the way discussed in the previous 
sub-section.  
The effect of corporealisation is that attention which would ordinarily be 
directed out toward world and activities, is directed inwardly to the body. In 
Fuchs’s words, “the relation of the subject to the world is deprived of its 
immediacy, leading to a fundamental alienation of the self” (Fuchs 2005a: 96). 
Instead of the body projecting a mode of spatiality in which things are 
experienced in terms of the ‘I can’, the body is instead spatialised: it is 
experienced as bounded, heavy, and cumbersome. Instead of things appearing in 
terms of the ‘I can’, the ‘I cannot’ becomes prevalent.  
In characterising the relationship between person and world as one which 
is necessarily shaped by, and through, bodily phenomenology, we saw that 
Merleau-Ponty presents the world in terms of the ‘I can’. Our bodies, in 
constraining the things that we experience as possible, impossible, challenging, 
comforting, and so on, opens up and presents possibilities for action and activity 
(1962: 408). For Merleau-Ponty this also affects our intersubjective relationships 
with others. Intersubjectivity is shaped through intercorporeality (see Merleau-
Ponty 1962: 403-425, 1964b: 159-181).  
This is important for understanding changes to bodily experience 
undergone in depression. Through depression we have seen that there is a change 
in which people become aware of their body as an object of attention: it appears 
as heavy, weighty, and cumbersome (Fuchs 2005a: 99). The bodily transparency, 
which Merleau-Ponty argues is the norm of the ‘I can’, gives way to opacity and 
reconfigures experience in terms of ‘I cannot’. The body, instead of opening up 
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the world, becomes an obstacle: things must be done in spite of it (Fuchs 2005a: 
99). We might reflect, as we already have done (see footnote 198), that there are 
instances in ordinary and healthy experience in which the body is the focus of 
our attention, or becomes opaque. However, the experience of the body as 
opaque in depression is a radical version of this. As attention is turned inward, 
cenesthesia becomes alien and constantly uncomfortable.  
This is often manifest in the onset of depressive episodes as bodily 
discomfort; a list of niggling somatic complaints which usually have no 
discernable diagnosis (DSM-IV: 350). This is frequently reported in 
autobiographical accounts of the experience of depression. Styron, for instance 
states: 
 
And soon I was in the throes of a pervasive hypochondria. Nothing felt 
quite right with my corporeal self; there were twitches and pains, 
sometimes intermittent, often seemingly constant, that seemed to presage 
all sorts of dire infirmities … Normally I would have been satisfied, 
indeed elated, when, after three weeks of high-tech and extremely 
expensive evaluation, the doctor pronounced me totally fit; I was happy, 
for a day or two, until there once again began the rhythmic daily erosion 
of my mood – anxiety, agitation, unfocused dread. (1990: 44) 
 
And Thompson also records similar concerns: 
 
[S]igns of chronic depression were emerging. Even before the accident, I 
had begun to make frequent trips to the doctor, always complaining of a 
variety of aliments. Some were real; others had no clear physical cause. I 
seemed to suffer constantly from stomach-aches, headaches, a mysterious 
cough, strange lumps in my lymph glands – a litany of ailments baffling 
my doctors and worrisome to my mother. (Thompson 1996: 34) 
 
As we see in the quotes above, the onset of depression frequently involves a list 
of somatic complaints often passed off as hypochondria. Such somatic 
complaints commonly include: achiness, heaviness or a weighty feeling to one’s 
body, pains in the chest (common in cases which are compounded by, and rooted 
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in, anxiety), feelings of suffocation and lethargy, the feeling that more energy 
must be exerted in order to complete routine tasks (Karp 1996: 29, 30).  
If, as Merleau-Ponty and Husserl argue, the body shapes the horizons of 
daily life, changes in background bodily feeling203 will lead to changes in what 
appears possible and impossible, and also the affective tonality through which 
the world appears. Losing bodily transparency and instead experiencing oneself 
as lacking in energy, motivation, and as ‘heavy’, limits a carefree sense of 
activity. Instead of opening out possibilities for action and interaction with the 
world, the body is felt as “an obstacle” (Fuchs 2010: 1). Tasks require extra 
energy and people appear distant; others are now those to whom the person with 
depression needs to reach out.  
Of interest is the effect this may have on the configuration of bodily 
spatiality and possibility. For Merleau-Ponty we saw that spatiality is given in 
terms of motor intentionality. The space around us appears as limitless or 
claustrophobic, navigable and surmountable, or impossibly perilous, in relation 
to bodily capabilities and skills.  
Drawing on this insight is important for understanding changes to 
intersubjectivity and spatiality in depression. Recurrent in first-person accounts 
of depression is imagery of enclosure which is evoked to convey the sense of 
isolation central to experiences of depression (Brampton 2008: 171; Karp 1996: 
29; Plath 1966: 178, Styron 1990: 44; Wurtzel 1995: 101). This is pertinent to 
the way in which the body is experienced. Instead of the body opening up 
possibilities, in depression, the body now works to shut off, close down, or reveal 
things in the world as difficult or impossible. The effect of this is to restrict the 
apprehension of space as ‘embodied’ (in Merleau-Ponty’s words) and limit it to 
the boundaries of the body (Fuchs 2005a). Experience of others and the world 
becomes distanced as the person with depression feels encapsulated and 
enclosed.204 Fuchs expresses this when he writes:  
                                                      
203 Particularly, as we have seen, in the case of the body occupying the foreground of one’s 
attention. 
204 For examples, see the following: “I felt as if my head had been encaged in Lucite, like one of 
those butterflies trapped forever in the thick transparency of a paperweight” (Solomon 2001: 66); 
an interviewee when asked to describe the feeling of depression responds: “I feel like I’m in a 
cage and I’m trapped, and I can’t get out and it’s night time and the daylight’s never going to 
come” (Karp 1996: 29); “[People with depression] may continue to associate with friends and 
family while nevertheless feeling disengaged, uncomfortable, marginal, and profoundly alone. 
Indeed … sometimes being in the presence of others and ritualistically moving through the 
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Corporealisation … means that the body does not give access to the 
world, but stands in the way as an obstacle, separated from its 
surroundings: The phenomenal space is not embodied any more. (2005: 
99)  
 
In depression, the close relationship between the body and space 
collapses and the person with depression feels a sense of slowing down which 
quote (3) in 7.1a expresses. Instead of the pre-reflective relationship between self 
and world which Merleau-Ponty, drawing on Goldstein, describes (see 1962: 
157, quoted on pp.221-222), the depressed person now has to reach out to the 
world; bodily heaviness and conspicuousness adds to and feeds a sense of 
isolation, encasement, and alienation (see first-person accounts in footnote 205).  
This is also the case for feelings of intersubjective relatedness to other 
people in depression (Brampton 2008: 10;205 Karp 1996: 27). Horizons shape our 
perception of things as presenting certain possibilities for perception and action. 
It is possible to argue that this is also the case for other people.206  
We have already seen in Chapter 2 that the social roles which people hold 
structure our expectations of, and interactions with, them. Throughout this thesis 
more widely, we have seen that relatedness is what enables us, in part, to view 
others as providing possibility for interaction: when we feel related to others, we 
often feel affectively close to them. They are presented to us as holding 
possibility for interaction, whether this is paying for shopping or holding a ‘deep 
and meaningful’ conversation. In both cases our interactions are structured by the 
other person or people appearing as ‘close’. By this, I mean we do not have to 
“bridge a gap” (Reddy 2004: 54-55); people appear as those with whom we can 
get on and interact.  
In depression, this is not the case. Although they share the same physical 
space, other people appear distant, cut off, far away; they do not appear as 
                                                                                                                                                  
motions can dramatically magnify a sense of loneliness and isolation” (Karp 1996: 34); 
“Depression feels like the most isolated place on earth. No wonder they call it a disease of 
loneliness” (Brampton 2008: 1).  
205 “My inability to reach out and communicate with them drove me almost mad with grief” 
(Brampton 2008: 10) 
206 See Smith 2010 for an account of perception of others’ intentions, feelings, and mental states 
which draws on Husserl’s conception of horizons. 
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‘graspable’. Instead the person with depression must reach out, and expend 
energy in order to initiate and sustain the usually taken-for-granted feeling of 
interpersonal connection.207 For instance, consider the following: 
 
(a) “[W]herever I sat – on the deck of a ship or at a street café in Paris or 
Bangkok – I would be sitting under the same glass bell jar, stewing in 
my own sour air.” (Plath 1966: 178) 
 
(b) “I need people I date to be a little able to take care of themselves, 
because taking care of me takes a lot of energy, and I can’t be 
responsible for every little hurt feeling someone has. Isn’t that a 
terrible way to feel about love? […] I am not yet in a full-blown 
depression, but am slowing down a little – I mean that I have to focus 
on each thing I do on more and more levels.” (Solomon 2001, quoting 
correspondence with ‘Laura’: 94-95) 
 
(c) “After the lecture, I went with a group of friends and the people 
who’d organised the event to dinner in a nearby restaurant. The 
evening included enough varied people so that some effort was 
required to muster the appearance of perfect politesse, but under 
ordinary circumstances it would have been a pleasure. As it was, it 
seemed as though the air around me was setting, the way glue sets, 
into a weird rigidity, so that people’s voices all seemed to be breaking 
and cracking through the solid air, and that cracking noise made it 
hard to hear what they were saying. I had to break through just to lift 
my fork … I was slightly mortified but did not know what to do about 
it … And then I found that the air was getting so hard and brittle that 
the words were coming through in staccato noises that I couldn’t quite 
string together … I felt the logic disappearing right out from under 
me.” (Solomon 2001: 88) 
 
                                                      
207 Also see Styron 1990 (62-63), previously quoted on p. 217. 
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(d) “During the spring of 1994, I went to parties and tried and failed to 
have fun; I saw friends and tried and failed to connect.” (Solomon 
2001: 45) 
 
In each of these quotations we see that the structure of interpersonal experience 
has changed: instead of being ‘alongside’ others in an unproblematic and taken-
for-granted manner, isolation is the default position from which interaction with 
others begins (as displayed in quote (a)). This is a subtle but forceful point. 
Instead of our apprehension of others holding possibilities for interaction and 
joint ventures, the person with depression now needs to exert energy in order to 
‘connect’ (as in quotes (c) and (d)) or simply to follow and keep up with 
interactions (quote (c)). Quotes (b) and (c) both link this to a decrease in bodily 
energy stemming from a need to surmount changes to cenesthesia. Quote (b) 
clearly shows how disintegration in background bodily feeling impacts on the 
way in which spatiality, and others, are perceived. As the body begins to feel 
thick, heavy, and strange, so does the air become thick and interaction becomes 
difficult to sustain, as people feel more distant. Here the changes in cenesthesia 
and bodily possibility (lifting cutlery demands energy, hearing is affected) 
impact directly upon interpersonal possibility (interaction becomes fragmented 
and challenging, speech slows down, and sustaining a conversation and line of 
thought become difficult) and spatial atmosphere (the air becomes brittle and 
tense). Bodily feelings involved in depression, here, entail a change to 
interpersonal horizons of possibility.  
 
 (c) A Slowing of Reciprocal Bodily Expressivity 
 
 The question to be addressed is how does this affect interpersonal 
dynamics? Chapters 4 and 5 argued that central to the dynamic transformation of 
a feeling of relatedness are an ability to participate within intersubjective, lived 
space which structures the way in which we begin interaction with others 
(Chapter 4); and an ability to respond appropriately to the bodily carriage and 
gesture of others with one’s own (Chapter 5). I argued that bodily responsiveness 
to others in the parochial, interactive sphere can fuel interaction, and cause 
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transformation in the manner in which we relate to the spaces around us and to 
our interlocutor. In the previous section, we saw that loss of bodily transparency 
causes a realignment to and shift within horizons of possibility. When one’s body 
feels cumbersome, heavy, and alien (as in quote (4) in 7.1a) this impacts on the 
way in which we view activities and tasks. What once seemed possible, now 
feels difficult and effortful. The loss of bodily transparency, Fuchs argued, 
disrupts an unmediated relation to the world and spaces in which we find 
ourselves. 
 Quote (3) in 7.1a showed another manner in which intersubjectivity is 
affected through depression. Here, Thompson described the manner in which her 
facial expressivity changed, becoming immobilised and mask-like. Through 
depression her tacit bodily expressivity changed. This not only impacted on her 
own experience, but also that of people around her. The effect was to create a 
‘distance’ between herself and others. We have already seen that depression 
involves changes in the way the sufferer feels tied into the world: we have seen 
that there is a slowing, and a feeling of weightiness (Fuchs 2010). There is a 
tendency for the body to become conspicuous and for movement, activity, and 
speech to slow down completely (DSM-IV: 350). It follows, similarly, that this 
causes a slowing and weightiness to the dynamism of interaction. As bodily 
transparency is lost, there is a slowing of embodied expressivity which in turn 
causes a hesitancy or conspicuousness in the sense of relatedness between 
sufferer and interlocutor (Fuchs 2005a). That is to say, a slowing in embodied 
expressiveness affects the rhythm, flow and what we might call using Stern’s 
(2010) vocabulary, vitality of intersubjective exchange.  As Karp states: 
 
Depressive feelings make interaction arduous and sometimes the need to 
withdraw from others overrides the realisation that self-isolation will only 
deepen one’s anguish. (1996: 35) 
  
 Reciprocal bodily expressivity establishes, directs, and maintains a sense 
of relatedness between interlocutors, with bodily bearing and tone of voice 
playing companion roles.208 In depression, the loss of bodily transparency leads 
                                                      
208 As argued in Chapter 5. 
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to a decline in spontaneous bodily expressivity; this is often accompanied by a 
flattening in tonal variation of the voice (Styron 1990: 17)209 and a stultifying of 
overall bodily comportment (Fuchs 2005a). All these factors come to bear upon 
dynamic intersubjective exchange in depression, to slow down the pace of 
intersubjective exchange. This potentially has an effect on feelings of 
interpersonal resonance which reciprocal gesturing helps to establish.  
We saw in the coffee shop example of Chapter 5 (pp. 157-158) that body 
dialogue between interlocutors reinforced a sense of the relatedness which they 
shared, and encouraged the participant who was relating a secret to carry on. The 
pre-reflective reciprocation of the bodily posture of their partner reinforced that 
they were listening, attentive, and interested. In this instance of unproblematic 
interaction, the body dialogue was fluid and dynamic, and encouraged resonance 
between the two interlocutors.  
In depression, the body loses some of its expressive vitality (Fuchs 
2005a, 2010). In interactive situations, the lessening of embodied expressiveness 
solicits an affective response on the part of one’s interlocutor: the slowing and 
flattening of embodied responsiveness places a strain on the formation of a self-
directing bodily dialogue. The heaviness of body, and the shift in bodily 
possibility which persons with depression experience, lessens an ability to 
participate in this shared bodily dialogue. Interestingly, the effect that changes in 
embodiment have on a taken-for-granted, self-directing, and dynamic interaction, 
is to slow and to reduce capacity for the self-directedness of the interaction. 
Cole’s work on the Möbius syndrome210 (1999, 2001, 2009) shows how reduced 
capacity for tacit embodied expression not only inhibits a flourishing sense of 
relatedness between interlocutors, but how this feeds back into feelings of 
alienation and distance within the individual. With a reduced capacity for tacit 
bodily responsiveness comes a reduced capacity to establish an unproblematic 
sense of relatedness between individuals. In turn, this causes a heightened 
                                                      
209 It is worth quoting Styron here, who connects the loss of a capacity to interact with bodily 
pain: “At this point the ferocious inwardness of the pain produced an immense distraction that 
prevented me from articulating words beyond a hoarse murmur; I sensed myself turning wall-
eyed, monosyllabic, and I also sensed my French friends becoming uneasily aware of my 
predicament” (Styron 1990: 17). 
210 Möbius syndrome is a rare congenital facial paralysis in which Möbius patients cannot facially 
express themselves. 
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vulnerability and sense of alienation which feeds the depression. As one 
interviewee of Karp states:  
 
A paradox of depression is that sufferers yearn for connection, seem 
bereft because of their isolation, and yet are rendered incapable of being 
with others in a comfortable way. (1996: 14) 
 
Central then to this slowing of embodied expressiveness is a change in the sense 
of relatedness between interlocutors. The slowing in embodiment solicits a 
slowing or heaviness to the feeling of relatedness shared between interlocutors. 
As the rhythm of interaction slows, entering into and reinforcing the sense of 
mutual relatedness can become difficult. As interaction requires more energy and 
becomes more difficult there is a reinforcement of the feelings of isolation and 
alienation. As one sufferer remarked: “The pain of depression arises in part 
because of separation from others; from an inability to connect, even as one 
desperately yearns for just such connections” (Karp 1996: 27). 
  
(d) Changes to Lived Space 
 
We have seen in the previous section the consequence that shifts in 
bodily feeling have on relatedness, which in turn affect ability to interact with 
others. A loss of bodily transparency changes the way in which we are able to 
apprehend possibilities. Horizons of possibility change and things that once 
appeared easy or taken-for-granted require new energy, consideration, and time. 
But what happens when we are no longer able to feel as though we belong to and 
share the same space with others? What happens when the tacit feeling of 
inhabiting a social, lived, and shared space wanes and one feels detached as if by 
a gulf from others?  
Spatial imagery, metaphors, and language are recurrent in 
autobiographies, accounts, and interviews by those suffering from depression. 
These describe a sense of isolation, detachment, and marginalisation that 
characterise experience of depression. Several accounts of depression express 
feelings of being ‘cut off from the world’ (Karp 1990: 7; Thompson 1996: 13; 
Wurtzel 1995: 96-97); and trapped behind or encased within thick glass walls in 
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which the depressed person exists alone, able to see out to the world and people 
around, and yet unable to reach the social world (Brampton 2008; Plath 1996; 
Thompson 1996: 223). Reports of the experience of depression repeatedly refer 
to feelings of “suffocation”, “drowning” and being “enclosed” (Karp 1996: 29; 
Thompson 1996: 128). Whilst such language use may seem merely to point 
toward a feeling not expressible in ordinary language, it is significant that many 
of these metaphors are spatial metaphors which express both extreme isolation 
(glass wall, being cut off) and the overwhelming power with which depression 
assails those who suffer from it (suffocation, drowning).  
At first glance it might appear as though there is a dichotomy here: the 
sufferer is isolated, alienated, cut off from a social world; and yet they are 
overwhelmed in a way in which things feel painfully close. On the one hand 
there is an irrevocable distance, and yet on the other things seem intensely close. 
Without the intervention of others, a social sense of perspective is removed and 
the experience and feelings of the depressed person become more intense (see 
Karp 1996: 37). Others are identified here as having the power to heal, or ease 
the burden of depression; yet since they are experienced as affectively distant, 
this reinforces the vulnerability and the sense of alienation. The person suffering 
from depression feels themselves as individualised, cut off from a reciprocal 
sense of being amongst and tied to others, due to a loss of relatedness. Loss of 
relatedness leads to the necessity of ‘bridging the gap’ when initiating or 
participating in interaction, a task which is often described as arduous.211  
Before going into this in more depth in the next section, let us pause to 
consider two examples. The first deals with withdrawal from the lived space as 
described in Chapter 4; the second with a more pervasive shift in the affective 
character of the space which one inhabits in depression. In this way we can 
distinguish two themes in accounts of depression: the first is the feeling of a 
retreating and increasing alienation from belonging within a socially meaningful 
space; the second addresses the manner in which space is apprehended after the 
withdrawal and through the sense of alienation. 
 The following statement from Brampton is illustrative of the first: 
                                                      
211 “Depressive feelings make interaction arduous and sometimes the need to withdraw from 
others overrides the realisation that self-isolation will only deepen one’s anguish” (Karp 1996: 
35). 
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Even as I shrank from my surroundings and the middle aged woman in 
front of me, I cried. I had no idea why. (Brampton 2008: 59) 
 
Whilst the following captures the second distinction: 
 
It was not really alarming at first, since the change was subtle, but I did 
notice that my surroundings took on a different tone at certain times. The 
shadow of nightfall seemed more sombre, my mornings were less 
buoyant. Walks in the woods became less zestful, and there was a 
moment during my working hours in the late afternoon when a kind of 
panic and anxiety overtook me, just for a few minutes, accompanied by a 
visceral queasiness – such a seizure was at least slightly alarming, after 
all. (Styron 1990: 41) 
 
Both of the quotes above express elements integral to the turn of lived spatiality 
in depression. We might take the first to encapsulate something of unfolding the 
experience of spatial change, whilst the second quote captures something of the 
sense of what the world appears like once the severing, cutting off or distancing 
from a ‘normal’ apprehension of intersubjective, lived space has occurred. The 
first contains the essence of ‘shrinking’, of the transition; the second is the spatial 
and affective backdrop of depression. 
 Whilst there has been much written on the major changes in experience 
of temporality in depression (Fuchs 2001, forthcoming; Tellenbach 1980) there 
has not been as much attention given to changes to lived spatiality. A subtle and 
often overlooked feature of the consequences of experience of depression is a 
reorientation and a devitalisation of lived spatiality; an element which has a 
direct bearing on interpersonal dynamics.  
During the onset of depression, sufferers might experience feelings of 
sliding or “shrinking” (Brampton 2008: 59) away from a daily existence which is 
rooted in shared, social and public spaces. It is not the case that in feeling the 
retreat of the self from these public spaces, the sufferer ceases to belong to, be 
referenced by or shaped through public spaces, far from it. Instead, sufferers 
experience themselves in this retreat becoming radically individualised.  
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Though the person with depression may share the same physical, 
proximal space which is also populated by others, there is an affective change 
within the way this is inhabited; there is affective distance. The sufferer may 
physically be in close proximity to others – or in a social situation with others – 
whilst, affectively speaking, feeling a million miles away. Reported feelings of 
encasement are common in which there is the sense that the sufferer exists within 
their own parameters marked out by their depression. Also common are reports 
of feeling separated from others as if by a gulf (Fuchs 2002, Karp 1996).  
In such situations, there is a lessening in the potentiality to feel part of a 
mutually shared, intersubjective space. Things that might be meaningful to one 
person may be experienced as overwhelming or impossibly distant to depressed 
persons. When cut off from a world seemingly inhabited by others but not 
oneself, the normative, functional, and affective directives of certain spaces 
become elusive to pick up on. Features of the space which might be salient to 
others, as guidelines for behaviour, as cause to share comment on and so on, 
might not hold the same significance to the person suffering from depression: the 
turning of attention inward212 contributes to a severing of felt connection to – and 
feeling affectively tied and tuned into – a shared, intersubjective and social 
arena. 
 The second quote regarding spatiality eloquently describes a manner in 
which lived space appears once the retreat from social surroundings has begun. 
In this case, there is a strong sense of a loss of vitality, buoyancy, and lightness 
to Styron’s relationship to the world around him. This is intimately connected to 
the loss of pleasure typical of depression (anhedonia). However, it is striking in 
its description of these spaces lacking something in particular. They lack a sense 
of enjoyment and as Styron puts it ‘zest’. What is the effect of such a change in 
perception of space on relatedness and intersubjective relations?  
 Chapter 4 argued that relatedness evolves and is shaped by a mutual 
apprehension of our surroundings as notable: others, through interaction, modify 
and develop the way in which we understand the spaces we find ourselves 
within. However, related to the loss of pleasure in depression and the feeling of 
being encased, space becomes static. It becomes a backdrop of indifference; 
                                                      
212 Changes to bodily phenomenology turn the attention toward the body, which is felt as painful 
or alien.  
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there is a shift in the affective tonality of the apprehended surroundings. This 
shift is both a consequence of and exacerbates the feeling of encasement 
described previously. As such, it reveals space in an idiosyncratic and indifferent 
manner, which frustrates entering into mutual relatedness. Space, in depression, 
is static and timeless:213 an unchanging backdrop to an individualised sense of 
self.  
 
7.2 Lessons for Folk Psychology 
 
Given the analysis of depression put forward so far, we find that at the 
heart of depression are changes to interaffective relatedness. Within depression 
there is a profound change both in feelings of belonging to, and participating in, 
a social world (Karp 1996: 34-35). These changes have significant ramifications 
for an effortless participation in interaction with others. Consideration of 
depression should be of interest to accounts and studies of intersubjectivity and 
interpersonal understanding. When we are presented with a case in which 
membership in the social world is felt as tantalisingly close, and yet impossibly 
distant, examination of the changes which are undergone stands to tell us much 
about what we ordinarily take for granted in interpersonal understanding. 
We have seen that at the heart of depression is the loss of interaffective 
relatedness. People are no longer felt as ‘close’. This has effects on apprehension 
of felt possibility, both of things in the world and which others present to us. 
Instead people with depression feel isolated and separated from others. When we 
consider accounts which testify to depression involving a severing between self 
and others, it reveals that the way we ordinarily find ourselves with others is as 
connected to them; as having a sense of interaffective relatedness. The loss of 
interaffective relatedness in depression points toward it being primary, pervasive, 
and primordial within our ordinary interactions and understandings with others. 
What this reveals is that the start point of intersubjectivity and intersubjective 
                                                      
213 Solomon remarks that one difference between feelings of sadness and depression is experience 
of temporality: “Being upset, even profoundly upset, is a temporal experience, while depression 
is a-temporal. Breakdowns leave you with no point of view” (Solomon 2001: 55). I do not go into 
the complex issue of experience of temporality in depression here. Instead, see Fuchs 2001, 
Ratcliffe 2012, and Tellenbach 1980. 
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understanding is not one individual making sense of another. But, instead we 
primordially share a sense of relatedness to others and this shapes the way we are 
able to make sense and meaning with them, to jointly attend to tasks together and 
to do something as routine as having a conversation. This stands in contrast to 
the individualistic and impersonal start point of ‘I’ making sense of another 
through attributing propositional attitudes of folk psychology. 
Throughout this thesis I have been careful to emphasise what folk 
psychology misses from its account. It seems appropriate to use the words of 
Ratcliffe to sum this up: “What they leave out of the world is precisely what 
binds us to it” (Ratcliffe 2009: 291). Whilst Ratcliffe here is not talking about 
folk psychology and intersubjectivity, the phrase seems an apt one. What we are 
presented with through case studies of depression is the very thing that is integral 
to binding us into a social world in such a way that we are able to navigate, talk 
to, interact with, or even assign propositional attitudes to others. And this is a 
sense of relatedness. Ordinarily, a sense of relatedness involves a felt sense that 
we are alongside and affectively ‘close’ to others. An account of interpersonal 
understanding that leaves this out must be to some degree impoverished. 
Considering depression also reveals to us that, ordinarily, we feel 
connected to others. Depression involves a central loss of interpersonal 
connection. We saw in the previous chapter the nature of experience in people 
who no longer have a taken-for-granted sense of others as people who offer 
possibilities for affective interaction. Instead, people are perceived and 
understood in a mechanised manner. We saw that this was a consequence of 
affective depersonalisation.  
The case of depression illuminates a similar point, though from a 
different angle. We find that an affective apprehension of others as close – that is 
related – to us is integral to our social relations, interactions, and understandings 
of others. Whilst people with depression still retain an affective sense of people 
as people,214 when relatedness is severed, depressed persons lose the felt 
possibility of others as close, as able to be interacted with; as holding 
possibilities for us, and as us holding possibilities for them. What depression 
shows is that our ‘start point’ in understanding others is one in which we are 
                                                      
214 That is rather than seeing them impersonally as a complicated ‘it’. See Chapters 2 (p. 77 (fn. 
51)) and 6 (p.185-186) for an exploration of this point. 
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situated with others in a shared context within which we feel affectively close. In 
emphasising the role of attributing propositional attitudes, folk psychology 
forgets the glue which holds us in place to allow such ability in the first place. 
 This presents a particular challenge for orthodox accounts of folk 
psychology: theory theory and simulation. Depression presents a counter case in 
which an ability to understand others through an ‘impersonal’ attributing of 
propositional attitudes to others, based on their behaviour, remains largely intact; 
and yet the way in which the depressed person is ‘in the world’ is profoundly 
changed and becomes difficult.  
Given this, traditional accounts of interpersonal understanding rooted 
primarily in folk psychology (theory theory and simulation theory) cannot 
provide us with a fully nuanced resource with which we might understand 
changes in intersubjectivity undergone in depression. This is precisely because 
folk psychology fails to appreciate the fundamentality of relatedness and the 
second-person relation in understanding others. In accounting for changes in 
intersubjective understanding in depression, what is needed is an emphasis on 
changes to feelings of relatedness: the affective bonds between self, others, and 
world which furnish experience with a sense of meaningfulness. Mutual 
participation in interaffective relatedness marks and facilitates a relation to others 
in a non-problematic way. We have seen throughout this thesis that this is 
usually taken for granted in everyday experience. In this way, reflecting on the 
lived experience of depression potentially serves us with a different starting point 
for the ability to be intersubjective, something that is prior to an ability to 
understand others through attribution of propositional attitudes to behaviour. 
This start point is a sense of felt relatedness.   
This deviates markedly from what theories of folk psychology suggest, as 
we saw from Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis: both theory theory and simulation 
theory maintain that of primary importance is the ability to attribute propositional 
attitudes to others, based on observation of their behaviour. What an examination 
of the experience of depression reveals, is that a primary sense of attunement to 
others and to the spaces in which we find ourselves is important. This is not 
reliant on ability to infer reasons for actions. Instead, this is much more akin to 
the pre-verbal, pre-theoretical descriptions of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity lauded by Trevarthen (1979, 1993; Trevarthen and Hubley 
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1978) and which Gallagher (2008) and others (Hobson 2000, 2007a, 2007b) 
emphasise the importance of. In focusing primarily on the importance of 
attributing propositional attitudes to others, accounts allied to folk psychology 
seem to miss the point in the case of depression.  
Consulting the lived experience of depression reveals that at its core is a 
perceived and tangible alienation between sufferer and others. This is revelatory 
of what we ordinarily take for granted about ‘normal’ intersubjectivity: that 
ordinarily we are primarily attuned to others in a manner which makes them feel 
‘close’, and which shapes and moulds the beginnings of interaction with them.  
 
7.3 Revisiting the Hermeneutic  
Account of Interpersonal Understanding  
 
There is no debate, though, that depression simultaneously erodes hope and makes ongoing 
involvement with others difficult and uncomfortable, if not impossible. (Karp 1996: 32) 
 
The previous section illustrated how folk psychology cannot satisfactorily 
account for the experience of intersubjectivity in depression, since it presumes 
the individualistic standpoint as the default normal stand point of everyday 
understanding. As we have seen, consideration of intersubjectivity in depression 
suggests that we experience ourselves primarily in relation to others; it is this 
ability and sense of connection that is lost, slowed or ruptured in depression. I 
now show how the hermeneutic account of interpersonal understanding can offer 
a better characterisation of intersubjective understanding that can accommodate 
non-normal instances of understanding. 
 We saw in section 7.2 the way in which a decrease in bodily transparency 
leads to a shift in horizons of possibility, which are given in relation to the body. 
Amongst other things the change in bodily horizons of possibility impacts on the 
manner in which other people are apprehended and interacted with. In particular, 
it leads to a lessening in spontaneous bodily gesturing, and a weightiness and 
effortful comportment of the body.  
 The manner in which this affects interaction can be explained in terms of 
relatedness being more difficult to sustain through interaction. It helps if we 
appeal once more to the hermeneutic model of understanding, in which dynamic 
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interaction between individuals in the parochial sphere is supported, facilitated 
and evolves according to tacit and often spontaneous entering into bodily 
dialogue. When a mutual and reciprocal bodily dialogue is difficult to sustain, 
this leads to tension between interlocutors, and seamless and flowing interaction 
becomes more difficult to enter into and follow through. As we saw in Chapters 
4 and 5, relatedness is sustained not just through this tacit bodily reciprocality, 
but this bodily reciprocality is also impacted by and impacts upon a sense of 
shared space. In depression, there is the characteristic slide away from 
apprehension of space as socially shared and meaningful. Pervasive feelings of 
alienation, marginalisation, and distance reveal the world in a certain way, which 
forms a backdrop to interaction and action.  
 Because of its impact on perception of space, depression also makes it 
difficult for an evolution and joining of horizons in the global sphere: 
interlocutors find it difficult to come to occupy the same affective space through 
interaction. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and reiterated in Chapter 5, this sense of 
space as plateauing and stultifying is partly due to the difficulties which 
interlocutors face in sustaining a taken-for-granted dynamic evolution of 
relatedness in the parochial sphere. Felt relatedness becomes thinner, as the 
depressed person feels progressively more detached; instead of horizons joining 
to create a shared field of reference, meaning and understanding, the sufferer of 
depression finds it difficult to transcend the bounds of alienation they so readily 
experience. In this way, a sense of common relatedness is more difficult and 
more conspicuous to create: the depressed person experiences themselves 
primarily and radically as an individual. Interlocutors begin at an affective 
distance from each other which is difficult to transcend. This is not to say it is 
impossible. However changes to the affective tonality of the space, and the way 
the body is experienced, make it difficult for the depressed person to be able to 
be comfortable in transcending the severed connection.  
At the same time, the participant who does not suffer from depression 
also struggles to establish ‘normal’ patterns of interaction and a deepening course 
of relatedness. The less the person suffering from depression is able to respond 
tacitly or otherwise to their bodily gesturing, the more aware of their own body 
they become. Interchange, then, becomes stultified. However, we have found that 
only by taking seriously the central nature of relatedness and the necessity of its 
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presence for ‘normal’ understanding can we begin to understand depression and 
intersubjectivity in depression. If we cling to notions of an individualistic start 
point, then we are unable to explain how, and why, depressed intersubjectivity 
differs from that of ‘healthy’ or ‘normal’ understanding. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored changes in interaffective relatedness through an 
examination of the deviations to bodily experience occurring in depression. It 
focused on two things. First, it presented depression as a disorder which involves 
radical changes to a taken-for-granted sense of intersubjectivity, which 
constitutes a loss (partial or complete) of a sense of relatedness to others. 
Secondly, it brought this analysis to bear on debates in interpersonal 
understanding.  
I began by exploring the fragmentation of relatedness through an 
examination of changes to the lived body undergone in depression. Drawing on 
Fuchs’s characterisation of depression involving corporealisation, I showed how 
changes to background bodily feeling impact on bodily horizons of possibility. I 
suggested that this impacts on intersubjectivity in two main ways: apprehending 
the body as an obstacle causes a change in bodily possibility from ‘I can’ to the 
‘I cannot’; furthermore, loss of interaffective relatedness causes other people to 
feel ‘distant’. This impacts on the way in which we view others as holding 
possibilities for interaction. Secondly, the lessening of dynamic movement and 
expressivity in depression leads to a difficulty in establishing bodily resonance 
during interpersonal reaction. This makes pre-reflective participation in body 
dialogue difficult. I then moved on to examine how a loss of relatedness impacts 
on apprehension of, and participation within, social space. I rounded off the 
chapter by suggesting certain lessons that this analysis might hold both for folk 
psychology and those seeking to characterise and describe everyday 
intersubjectivity.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have brought ‘relatedness’ under examination. 
My aim in doing so has been twofold: first, I wished to explicate and explore 
how relatedness between people is central to interpersonal understanding. 
Second, in doing so I wished to shed some light on what it is we are talking 
about when we appeal to ‘relatedness’. I began this thesis by stating in the 
Introduction that various theories and people who explore interpersonal 
understanding appeal to ‘relatedness’. They claim that relatedness is central to 
interpersonal understanding, and yet is neglected by dominant accounts seeking 
to explain it (theory theory, simulation theory). In this thesis, I have supported 
the view that relatedness plays an integral role in understanding others; and have 
contributed an exploration of certain factors which support, shape, and transform 
a dynamic sense of interaffective relatedness. 
Chapter 1 started things off with an overview of the dominant accounts of 
interpersonal understanding. The orthodox accounts of interpersonal 
understanding (theory theory and simulation theory) focus on understanding the 
actions and behaviour of others. They describe interpersonal understanding as a 
matter of attributing appropriate propositional attitudes to others. Understanding 
others under this description is characterised as a matter of understanding and 
predicting their behaviour and is a spectatorial enterprise. Throughout this thesis 
I have shown that though attributing propositional attitudes on the basis of 
behaviour sometimes forms part of an ability to understand others; this is not the 
primary or default manner of interpersonal understanding. Theory theory and 
simulation theory are too narrow in their account of understanding others. 
Presuppositions underlying accounts of folk psychology were explored in 
Chapter 2. This chapter was also largely expository and covered key criticisms of 
folk psychology. These state that folk psychology does not and cannot provide 
‘the full picture’ of our everyday, unproblematic understanding of others. 
Instead, we saw here that interaction theory and participatory sense-making 
emphasise and argue that understanding others is a matter of dynamically 
engaging with them; an occurrence which often entails a direct and second-
person relation. This, they argue, rarely requires an explicit attribution of 
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propositional attitudes to the behaviour of others. In this chapter I agreed with 
the main thrust of these arguments and supported arguments which state that 
interpersonal understanding is, in the everyday sense, largely interactive and, 
when it is unproblematic, does not require attribution of mental states. Interaction 
theory and participatory sense-making have both emphasised the dynamic and 
mutually co-operative nature of interpersonal understanding. Both theories 
acknowledge and argue for the importance of interlocutors participating in a 
shared context. However, it remained for us to understand what enables us to 
enter into interaction in the first place. We were also left with the task of how to 
account for the dynamics of interaction.  
The remainder of this thesis went some way to answering these 
challenges. Part 2 sought to address these lacunae by offering a hermeneutic 
account of interpersonal understanding (Chapter 3), before turning to offer a 
phenomenological exploration of elements contributing toward a sense of 
relatedness (Chapters 4 and 5). Unlike folk psychology, the hermeneutic account 
seeks to recognise the manner in which situatedness in a shared context and a 
dynamic relation between interactants actively shapes and enables interpersonal 
understanding to occur. In this sense, the hermeneutic account recognises and 
develops an explanation of certain elements which are necessary for 
interpersonal understanding and yet are neglected by traditional accounts. It also 
adds to the work of interaction theory and participatory sense-making by 
investigating the nature of the dynamics of interaction; and exploring how 
interaction between interlocutors occurs in tandem with interaction between 
interlocutors and their shared context. 
Chapter 3 began by emphasising that understanding others through 
interaction relies not only on transformations in the way I understand and relate 
to my interlocutor; but also how we both relate to the context in which our 
interaction takes place and which we share. I identified and conceptualised this 
as a twofold revision of previously held presuppositions: first, in the parochial 
sphere – the interactive relation between my interlocutor and myself; and 
secondly in the global sphere – the interactive relation between myself and our 
shared context. I characterised interaction and the process of interpersonal 
understanding as a constant transformative and dynamic revisionary process 
negotiated between these spheres. 
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From here we needed to think more about the term ‘relatedness’ itself, 
and to explore and characterise elements which shape and affect the sense of 
relatedness between people. To do so, I explored intersubjective lived space 
(Chapter 4) and reciprocal bodily expressivity (Chapter 5). 
Chapters 4 and 5 worked together to offer a phenomenological 
exploration of elements which are integral to relatedness and which are 
inextricably bound. Chapter 4 developed a distinctive approach to 
intersubjective, lived space. It outlined how I conceive of intersubjective space as 
constituting a context for interaction, which is in turn transformed through 
interaction. This chapter works in tandem with my Chapter 5, in which I explore 
how mutual bodily expressivity transforms our sense of intersubjective space. I 
argue that this impacts on and changes the quality of relatedness between 
interlocutors, whilst also fuelling the dynamic nature of interaction. 
To consolidate the account of relatedness and interaction given in Part 2, 
I turned to instances in which a normalised sense of relatedness breaks down in 
instances of schizophrenia and depression. Examining the nature of interpersonal 
experience in these limit cases was revelatory of elements which are ordinarily 
taken for granted in everyday, healthy experience, and have indeed also been 
taken for granted by theory and simulation theories. Chapter 6 focused on the 
manner in which apprehension of a lived spatiality (phenomenological, 
intersubjective space) often breaks down in cases of schizophrenia, and in doing 
so, places strain on unproblematic intersubjective experience: particularly, 
persons with schizophrenia may find it hard to participate within and navigate 
shared and social spaces. Instead, space is experienced as geometricised. In 
conjunction with this, I argued that this is related to a sense of depersonalisation 
of others often experienced in schizophrenia in which others appear outside the 
bonds and bounds of relatedness. This, I argued, has obvious and drastic effects 
on a sense of interpersonal relatedness, which is fragmented and may become 
increasingly absent – or in severe cases, lost altogether – from experience. 
 Chapter 7 similarly looked at the altered sense of intersubjectivity 
commonly experienced by those suffering from depression. I argued that at the 
heart of this illness is a loss of relatedness: suffers are able to perceive that others 
are people, and yet feel affectively severed from them. This results in 
irregularities in interpersonal experience. Sufferers withdraw, and find 
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interpersonal exchanges hard and laborious. Taking into consideration the nature 
of this affective distance again serves to underscore the arguments driving Part 2 
of this thesis: that affective, spatial, and embodied reciprocality are of central 
importance in interpersonal experience and understanding.   
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